After a promising start, the European Union’s enlargement process appears to be losing some of its momentum. András Inotai argues that if Europe is to retain its global influence then it must overcome that sense of “enlargement fatigue”, continue to reform and develop a clearer vision and mission for the 21st century
When the EU’s 12 "newcomer” member states negotiated their accession, there was no in-depth discussion about their goals or their views on the basic values underlying European integration. This was in large part because their expectations were mostly self-evident.
Everybody wanted to join an EU that was open to the world, and was itself keen to embrace further enlargement. All the candidate countries also wanted to become part of a globally competitive Europe. The then EU of 15 expected for its part a more efficient and stronger Europe to emerge as a result of taking on the new countries. And, perhaps with some reservations, all or most of the newcomers were in favour of deeper EU integration. Being in large part formerly communist economies with lower levels of development, at least as expressed by per capita GDPs, all hoped for the same sort of solidarity from the EU integration process that had been the case in the Mediterranean countries and in Ireland.
The newcomers’ early years of membership have clearly not yet met these expectations − partly due to the shortness of the time that has elapsed since accession and partly as a result of national interests. A sense of global openness certainly remains common amongst the accession states, and that reflects their relatively high levels of sensitivity to external trade and to international capital flows. But the first signs of protectionism – one could call it “economic patriotism” – are becoming evident. That’s linked to a large extent to similar attitudes in some of the older member countries − as demonstrated by a growing number of barriers to the free flow of capital within the EU’s internal market. These are designed to protect against “threatening” takeovers of “national champions” or “strategic companies”. In addition, the consequences of rapid liberalisation have begun to generate a backlash in some counties which has sometimes been manipulated by populist politicians.
As for further enlargement, there remain many advocates of it throughout the EU-27, even if there’s a growing focus by some on their own special interests. The western Balkan countries enjoy the support of some of the central European members, for example, but there is no widespread consensus among the newcomers on the future of Kosovo. Poland and the Baltic states tend to underline the importance of Ukrainian membership, but interestingly enough, and in contrast to several of the older member states, no new members (with the exception of Cyprus) have a clear position on Turkish membership.
The trade figures provide clear evidence, however, of the growing competitiveness of most new member countries. Between 2003 and 2006, total exports from the 10 “big bang” accession states that joined in 2004 grew from 6.2% of the EU-25's total to 8.3%, while total imports rose from 7.3% to 8.8%. A driving force behind this growth was the substantial increase in trade between the new member countries. In the four-year period, Latvia's exports to other new member countries grew by almost 13 percentage points, followed by Lithuania (5.8% growth) and Hungary (5.5% growth). In other words, the most significant trade-related benefit to arise from EU membership has been the growth of trade between new member states. The increasing competitiveness of the accession countries is also reflected in their share of non-EU exports, which has risen from just 3.7% to 6.7% in four years.
The prospect of further EU integration yields ambiguous attitudes amongst the newcomers, and the debate about the EU's ongoing budget revision reveals an especially cautious approach in most of them. This is partly explained by the fact that accession countries are net beneficiaries of the budget − a status that all new members understandably wish to retain. And any major reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) could polarise opinion in the accession countries, separating those in favour of yet closer integration from those who incline towards maintaining the status quo. Before contemplating CAP reform, all new member countries still hope to benefit from the CAP on the basis of the present system. And it's worth bearing in mind that agricultural subsidies in particular strengthened public support for joining the EU, especially amongst farmers, and became an important factor in national party politics. At the same time, agricultural subsidies have also helped to develop a subsidy mentality in the accession states that could become a serious obstacle to major CAP reform – and this could have significant political implications for some other member countries.
The EU budget for 2007-2013 did, though, abolish the “second-class” status faced by new member countries during the early years of their membership. Now a key objective is to shape the EU's development strategy and to make the best possible use of the theoretically unprecedented budget for financial transfers. Inevitably, accession countries will want to entrench a level of economic and social development that will enable them to catch-up with the older member states. No less important, the accession states will need to maintain consensus amongst key sections of society that EU membership is vital to development.
In an historical perspective, one of the most important aspects of the enlargement process will be the new-found capacity of the accession states to influence policy. They are ceasing to be nations that are merely on the receiving end of policy, and are increasingly becoming policy-shapers themselves. Most new member states have suffered foreign domination, in some cases for centuries. Values imposed from the outside had either to be accepted, or if possible avoided through complex systems of informal survival techniques. In sharp contrast, as fully-fledged EU members they can actively influence policy and shape the future of the integration process.
In truth, however, the early years of membership have not yet seen the accession states play an especially significant role at the EU's top table. This may partly reflect the absence of a real need on their part to shape policy, because developments within the EU did not at that point really threaten any of their basic interests. The newcomer countries may also have felt reluctant to create new tensions so soon into their membership. It is arguably taking time for the accession states to overcome their own historical baggage and become more comfortable with playing a pro-active role in shaping policy. After all, this involves developing a familiarity with defining national strategic interests and identifying strategies for pursuing those objectives within a community of 27 nations characterised by different interests and against the background of a deeply rooted culture of compromise. Nevertheless, some early attempts amongst the new members to develop a more active policy-shaping role have been evident – notably on regional policy in the east, on the future of the western Balkans, on energy policy, and in migration and internal security issues.
Considering the new members’ somewhat low profile in EU decision-making to date, it is surprising how many politicians and opinion formers elsewhere in the EU refer repeatedly to “enlargement fatigue”. With the exception of two not especially successful Polish blocking actions, there is no evidence that any new member country has attempted to hinder European integration. Any doubts there may now be over the future of European integration have basically arisen from the negative referendum results on the EU’s Constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands, as well as from “economic patriotism” in several long standing member states. The absence of a clear EU-wide strategy towards the western Balkans (and future enlargement generally) also underlines the weak points in the EU’s strategic thinking. It would be more realistic to address the EU’s problem of “reform reluctance” instead of continually focusing on “enlargement fatigue”.
The basic problems facing European integration are rooted in the delays over the past two decades in key member states to fundamental reforms. This has made further significant enlargement impossible, but now the deepening of the Union cannot be delayed further if Europe is truly serious about playing an influential role in global politics and international economic relations. Global challenges, the objectives of the integration process and preparations for further enlargement are all beginning to exert pressure. There is also the need to maintain stability and security, especially in the continent’s weakest point – the western Balkans. With foreign and security policy, energy, the EU budget, migration and reform of EU decision-making also to be thrown into the mix, it is the next stage of European integration that will decide our future.
The newcomer states not only have the same rights but must also share the same responsibilities as older members. They have to become active participants in the broad and much needed debate about defining European values. No less important is the identification of Europe’s main objectives. The somewhat passive approach expressed by the French word finalité needs to be replaced in the consciousness of Europeans with a concept borrowed from American political literature − “mission”.
It is essential for all the member governments to collectively redefine Europe’s mission in the coming decades so that it reflects global realities. These include the ineluctable rise of Asian economic power, our own demographic decline, unprecedented levels of migration from Africa, two-way international capital flows (not only from Europe to less developed countries, but from China, India, Russia and other countries into the European economy), rapidly growing international competition, and environmental and climatic challenges.