VIEWS FROM THE CAPITALS
Why the Kaczynski twins despise their EU cash cow
Autumn 2007
When Poland’s right-wing leaders talk about the European Union they still say “them” not “us”. Most Polish people speak about “our relations with the EU” as though their country were still an outsider. It’s a symptom of the country’s deep-seated nationalism, itself a reflection of Polish suspicions of old enemies like Germany and Russia. So today’s eurosceptic politicians are only too willing to exploit their countrymen’s fears of outside aggression, and that’s bad news for the rest of Europe. Until Poland explodes some of its own historical myths and teaches the younger generation about the democratic values of Europe, Warsaw is likely to go on treating the EU as no more than a means to defend its narrow interests.
Polish self-interest was paraded for all to see at last June’s European Council. When President Lech Kaczynski arrived in Brussels to fight for Poland’s voting rights in the Council, regardless of the democratic merits of the double majority system backed by most other EU leaders. His twin brother, Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski, had already said that Poland would never accept any dilution of its national vote, and after days of backroom brinkmanship and heated public exchanges, the Kaczynskis’ intransigence won a reprieve for the old voting system until 2014.
The row over voting rights in part reflects the underlying views on Europe of Poland’s conservative government and the ruling Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). They see Poland’s main job in the EU as making sure it remains a union of sovereign states. Concepts like pan-European democracy, political integration and a common European identity are barely mentioned.
But the voting power question went to the heart of Polish worries. Fear of a German-dominated Europe is still very real and Polish children are still taught a highly skewed version of history. National identity is still largely constructed around the country’s past relations with Germany and Russia, so the leaders of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość find it easy to exploit anti-German sentiment and foster hostility towards some European partners and the EU itself. Hence the Kaczynski brothers’ claim that the German presidency’s plans to reform the EU voting system was deliberately designed to increase Berlin’s weight in Europe at the expense of smaller states, especially Poland.
Such nationalist arguments appeal to many Poles, especially among the poorly-educated older generation who have only a limited knowledge of the outside world. That’s why they are endorsed not just by the ruling coalition but also by the centre-right opposition, the Platforma Obywatelska. Only the centre-left opposition party is more pro-European.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that there is so little discussion in Poland about the kind of Europe the people might want. Public debate centres on the need to keep Poland strong and free from outside interference. Even Poland’s political elite lacks a clear vision of the future of Europe. Some conservative politicians attack the EU for being so secular, but the idea that Poland should become the Catholic evangelist of Europe mostly comes from ultra-conservatives such as the Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) which is even farther to the right than Prawo i Sprawiedliwość.
The Kaczynski brothers are themselves more down-to-earth. They see the EU as a valuable source of finance for the Polish economy and want to keep the grant money rolling in. But rather than accepting EU funds as genuine development assistance, they see it more as rightful compensation for Poland’s past misfortunes; and thus feel no obligation towards the EU in return. Their political involvement in the EU mainly revolves around blocking unwelcome decisions in Brussels, especially if seen as liable to erode Polish sovereignty.
This nationalistic approach is likely to continue for the foreseeable future as there is no sign that Poland’s politicians or people are beginning to view Europe as a shared democratic space. Certainly there is no sense of a common European identity. Change will only come about, it seems, if Poland radically revises the way history is taught and embarks on a large-scale public debate, especially among the younger people, about what it means to be Polish in today’s European Union.
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