Countering homegrown terrorism in Europe is high on the security policy agenda, writes, Busso von Alvensleben of the German Foreign Ministry. But it will demand a much more sophisticated response than western societies have so far been capable of
The phenomenon of homegrown terrorism features prominently in experts’ discussions and stands high on the security policy agenda, thanks to the terrorist attacks by Islamist militants in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005. Abortive attacks in Germany and Denmark last autumn and arrests in Barcelona earlier this year underline the on-going nature of the threat.
Because it’s a new phenomenon, we need to review and re-think how we respond to it. International security cooperation, border controls and transport sector monitoring are all important, but they don’t go far enough. What is also needed – and is absolutely critical – is to identify radical tendencies within Europe's Muslim communities and devise strategies to counteract them. These strategies can vary in approach: our narrower aim should be to nip terrorism in the bud, and our broader one to open a dialogue with the Muslim community comparable to Germany's Islam Conference.
What both have in common, though, is the strong emphasis they place on intercultural communication because it is seen as the best way to break down prejudices and negative clichés on both sides, and in both cases are constantly nurtured and reinforced by jihadi propaganda.
From a security policy point of view intercultural communication is intended to immunise those sections of the Muslim community that are deemed to be potentially receptive to such propaganda, with the clear aim being to prevent their radicalisation and recruitment to jihad.
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MATTERS OF OPINION
Europeans overwhelmingly support cultural diversity
The great majority of Europeans believe that young people benefit from contact with their peers of other origins or beliefs, according to a Eurobarometer survey last December in advance of the 2008 EU year of Intercultural Dialogue.
Over eight in 10 agreed about the benefits of intercultural contact for young people, with only 13% disagreeing. Support was the greatest in Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, Hungary, Luxembourg and Portugal – with all having over 89% of respondents in favour. The lowest support, but still with a clear majority in favour, was in Romania, Malta and Bulgaria.
However, a two-thirds majority also believed in the importance of maintaining family and cultural traditions. Across the board, Europeans were in favour of both supporting cross-cultural communication and upholding family traditions. Only in Denmark did a majority support the former proposition while dismissing the need for the latter. Support for cultural isolationism was expressed by just 13% of EU citizens, and was mainly held by those with a lower level of educational attainment.
In the EU15 (the older member states), this opinion was the most prevalent (although still held by fewer than one in four people) in Belgium, Austria and The Netherlands.
http://www.gallupworldpoll.com/
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For immunisation of this sort to be successful, it is important to first clarify what it is that can turn someone into a jihadi. There appears to be no single answer to this, but the experts say it often has to do with feelings of marginalisation and victimisation, as well as with migration-related identity problems. This is certainly true, but it’s too broad an explanation to be very useful. One common pattern that does emerge is that because it promises meaning and identity, the jihadi message seems to appeal particularly to people who are unsure about who they are and where they are heading.
Last year a study of Germany's Muslim community analysed social integration (including obstacles), religion, attitudes to democracy, the rule of law and politically inspired violence. The vast majority of respondents were from a migrant background, and a quarter were Muslims whose families had been in Germany for a generation or more. In terms of ethnic origin and religious practice they were a representative sample of Germany's Muslim community.
The study gave some valuable insights into homegrown terrorism, for it revealed a consistently close link between radicalisation and "vicarious" experiences of marginalisation and discrimination. A critical factor was the powerful emotions generated by US-led military interventions in Muslim countries, and by the situation of the Palestinians. The blanket suspicion that was widely seen as falling on the whole Muslim community after every terrorist attack was also strongly resented.
But the study showed there was no automatic correlation between condoning the use of violence and having Islamist sympathies. It concluded that individuals who condoned the use of violence and also had Islamist sympathies were more likely than others to become involved in homegrown terrorism, and that a mere 1.1% of Germany's Muslims fell into this category. The authors also noted that the mechanisms that turn Muslims into potential terrorists are the same as those that make German teenagers and young adults susceptible to xenophobic propaganda and right-wing extremism.
The study's conclusions applied only to Germany, but its main findings have been largely corroborated by a Gallup study based on a large-scale survey of the world's Muslim population. According to Gallup, only 7% are politically radical and condone the use of violence, their motives are not so much religious as inspired by the demeaning treatment Muslims are perceived to suffer politically and socially. This was also found to be a significant factor in the German study.
As with any research, these findings are open to question, yet it seems reasonable to conclude that in terms of actual policy radical change isn’t needed. But the findings nevertheless shed new light on homegrown terrorism as a phenomenon.
Certain aspects of the host country environment may contribute to radicalisation, but external factors also play a major role Muslims’ attitudes towards their host country are strongly influenced by the perception that Muslims in general are subjected to humiliation and oppression. This is constantly reflected in media coverage and is also exploited by Al-Qaeda for its own ends. It is also and liable to be reinforced by any negative experiences that Muslims may suffer themselves. In this light, the term "homegrown" is misleading because it suggests that the reasons for radicalisation are purely domestic, whereas the hallmark of Islamist terrorism is its transnational nature.
Political factors clearly play a greater role in radicalisation than do religious ones. This is in marked contrast to the conventional view in the West that the prime motive for Islamist terrorism is religious. That erroneous assumption is seen by many Muslims as evidence of the West's contempt for Islam, reinforcing their view that Muslims as a whole are victims of discrimination. This sets up a vicious cycle that is liable to generate further radicalisation on both sides.
Finally, there is the quantitative aspect. The number of potential terrorism recruits can obviously only be estimated, but it corresponds more or less to the percentage of the population in any western society likely to be involved in violent crime. In no sense do these people amount to a movement, let alone a mass movement. But as protagonists in the complex web of interaction between the Muslim and the Western world, they see militant terrorism as their preferred option.
There are, of course, other quite different forms of interaction, and that brings us back to the question of how best to respond to the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism. A distinction is often made between "hard" tools for combating terrorism – i.e. executive, including military measures – and "soft" tools such as programmes promoting the integration of Muslim immigrants, efforts to stabilise and develop problem countries and strategies for intercultural dialogue. The slogan "war for Muslim hearts and minds" is a grotesque yet revealing attempt to link both sets of tools. Even when the intention of such interaction is to communicate a political message, an image of war is used. This comes close to mounting a counter-offensive in the propaganda war initiated by Al-Qaeda and its PR network. The first casualty of any such operation is likely to be the West's own credibility – yet credibility is the key to successful communication.
If we adopt the parlance employed by Al-Qaeda while at the same time proclaiming our intention to communicate with the whole Muslim world, we run the risk of reinforcing Al-Qaeda's message. The impression given is that the rationale for communicating with the Muslim world is to combat terrorism and any "competition of ideas" is confined solely to Al-Qaeda’s jihad agenda. Such a response is hardly likely to alter the mindset of potential recruits. Their friends and associates, too, may take it as confirmation of their prejudices and that could trigger further radicalisation.
The conclusion that all this points to is that we should worry not just about homegrown terrorism, but also our response to it. At the end of the Cold War there was much talk of a broader definition of security. Yet what we are now seeing is a return to a narrower definition. The current focus on combating terrorism means that at home and abroad security issues are encroaching on policy areas concerned with entirely different matters, thus jeopardising effective action in these areas. The tendency to view Muslim grievances in one-dimensional terms reduces political discourse to a very simplistic level. Our interactions with Muslims may be unconsciously influenced by this defensive reflex, and that may encourage equally defensive attitudes on their part.