Whatever ISAF’s tactical successes, the security situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. Christa Meindersma of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies sets out a four-point plan for Europe to win the peace there
The heated debate over Europe’s troop contributions in Afghanistan illustrates the challenges to its global security ambitions. When the time came for Dutch troops in the restless southern Afghan province of Uruzgan to be replaced, no other European nation was prepared to volunteer. The headline goal of 50,000 readily deployable EU troops, or the 25,000 NATO Response Forces (NRF) and the promised 3,000-strong EU Battlegoups meant nothing. No European troops were willing to go to Uruzgan, and it was embarrassing to see NATO’s Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer take out his begging bowl for a handful of European troops, and even more so when it turned out that only Georgia – a NATO wannabe – could find 200 infantry men.
Most European nations are unwilling or unable to contribute worthwhile numbers of troops to Afghanistan, and particularly to the southern provinces where the fighting is toughest. Eastern European countries lack the military capability for expeditionary stability operations, and Scandinavian countries prefer peacekeeping to counterinsurgency operations. Some EU member’s troops are prevented by the national rulebook from carrying out truly challenging operations.
The issue is not only one of military muscle. Some EU countries have been incapable either of providing timely and sufficient non-military assets in such crucial areas as upholding the rule of law, governance, reconstruction and political reconciliation. Europe’s civilian contribution in Afghanistan can be characterised as too little, too late, and too haphazard. An ESDP police mission was launched only in mid-2007 after alarming reports on the quality of the Afghan police, but EUPOL had trouble recruiting only 170 police trainers for the complete overhaul of the police training there. A European Commission justice programme has only just begun, and although the Commission has been a major financial contributor to reconstruction and relief, capacity-building efforts for local and regional administrations have been either absent or disjointed.
If Europe’s ambition is to be a global security player, Afghanistan is its chance to get it right. Six years after toppling the Taliban regime, the situation in Afghanistan is at a tipping point. Either the country stabilises or it again falls to prey to Islamic extremism.
The need and opportunity is for a stronger European commitment in three areas that are key to achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan: Local governance and the rule of law, political process and regional cooperation.
The key constraint in local governance is the absence of an overarching policy framework. The Afghan central authorities want a strongly centralised state, but iIf history is anything to go by, that won’t work. The fiercely autonomous tribal areas will not recognise the expansion of the central state without a role for their traditional leadership. Given its unique experience with minority issues, Europe could contribute to establishing local governance through a mix of expertise and assistance programmes.
Turning to the overall political situation, many thousands of Taliban were killed last year. That may be a military success. Yet, peace won’t be won without a political solution. Killing Taliban in high numbers even runs the risk of creating more as the Pashtun code of honour obliges revenge killings.
A political solution requires negotiations with the Taliban, who are not a homogeneous group but a loose structure that adapts flexibly to the changing security environment. Some leaders have ties to Al-Qaeda, whose hard core is in Pakistan, and is definitely not an acceptable negotiating party. The majority of Taliban, however, are local Pashtun from the tribal areas, and they cannot be excluded from a future Afghanistan. They are not driven by ideology and could be convinced by the advantages of reconciliation and political participation.
It is up the Afghan authorities to talk to the Taliban. Some elements have indicated a willingness to do so. Negotiating with the Taliban is not the prerogative of the international community. Europe could, though, discreetly encourage the process and play a role in facilitating such a dialogue. Encouraging negotiations with the Taliban should be part of an exit strategy of foreign troops and therefore be part of a comprehensive European approach towards Afghanistan. The EU, with its Special Representative in Kabul, is particularly well-placed to play a stronger diplomatic role.
Afghanistan cannot be stabilised without addressing the wider issue of the unrecognised border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and how to extend state control over the Pashtun tribal belt. Extremist Islam is a threat to both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and as long as Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements find sanctuary on either side of the border, stability in Afghanistan will be an illusion.
The key question is whether Pakistan considers Islamist extremism a threat, or an instrument to destabilise Afghanistan. If the former, Pakistan has enduring strategic interests in a stable Afghanistan and vice-versa. The international community has strategic interests in both. Rather than pursuing separate initiatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, our efforts to create stability should be aimed at easing Pashtun relations with both. This could be done by treating the tribal Pashtun area straddling the border as a “special development zone”. This would make sound sense as UNHCR estimates that 50,000 people a day informally cross the Durant line. The international community should also help Afghanistan and Pakistan to meet in regional and bi-lateral fora to explore common approaches to stability in the region.
The Peace Jirga last August with the presidents of both countries marked a step forward. Afghan, Pakistani and ISAF forces now meet regularly, and more cross-border initiatives could be developed at local level to address cross-border issues.
A coherent regional strategy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan is needed that encompasses development, institution building and governance in the Pashtun area and facilitates a regional political dialogue. Europe is in a unique position to do this. It has long-standing relations with both countries and is respected in Asia for its regional cooperation approach. The European Commission’s 2007-2010 strategy for Afghanistan recognises the need for complementary development plans for provinces on the border. A joint commission with Pakistan meets annually to discuss issues that include good governance and regional cooperation. The EU is Pakistan’s largest trading partner and Afghanistan’s second. Europe could also use its position as observer to the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) to enhance regional co-operation and dialogue.
Their experience in Afghanistan offers European nations an opportunity to transform the nascent European Security Strategy of 2003 into an operational and political reality, and to reduce tensions between NATO and the ESDP by moving beyond Berlin-plus. The strategy recognised that if Europe is to make a contribution to peace and security that matches its potential, it needs to be more active, coherent and capable in pursuing its strategic objectives.
Now is the time to debate the military and civilian expeditionary capabilities it should be developing, and how these should be deployed in relation to NATO and the UN. In the end, whether the designation be national, European or NATO, these will be the same military forces and the same judges, lawyers, administrators and police, doing the same job in the field. What matters is their effectiveness and sustainability in countries that Europe cannot afford to loose. For the sake of security on its own streets as well as for the people in the countries concerned.