French President Sarkozy’s proposal for a new “Mediterranean Union” underlines the fact that the EU’s policies in the region have so far fallen short of expectations says Eduard Soler I Lecha
The early months of 2008 saw the Mediterranean become a key element in European foreign policy. It all began in February of last year, when Nicolas Sarkozy as a French presidential candidate criticised in a speech in Toulon the results of the Barcelona Process, a cooperation framework launched in 1995 between the EU and Mediterranean states to develop their political and economic relationship. Sarkozy suggested that a “Mediterranean Union” should be created to bring together all the countries bordering the Mediterranean. Its effect, of course, would be to exclude most of the EU’s member states.
On the night of his election victory, the new French President declared that the Mediterranean Union project would be one of his foreign policy priorities. Yet no one seemed quite sure of the details of Sarkozy's initiative − there were question-marks over how this new Union would be structured, which countries would be invited to join, how it would function and how it would fit in with existing regional cooperation frameworks and policies such as the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy.
Last December, the project was renamed "Union for the Mediterranean" and some details emerged. France planned, at that stage, to have as full members of the Union the countries bordering the Mediterranean, to hold regular summits and establish some kind of institutionalisation. Its main objective would be to set up projects in fields such as the environment, energy, infrastructure and civil protection, while business conglomerates would be encouraged to invest in the projects. It was said that all member countries − as well as third countries and regional or international entities − would be able to participate in these projects, though only a small number of states would be needed to execute each project.
The French initiative awoke suspicion both in Europe and among Mediterranean countries, though it also generated a certain amount of expectation. Italy was the European country that showed the greatest enthusiasm. Spain later agreed to the initiative, while stressing that it should not replace the Barcelona Process, but should complement it. Germany and northern European countries expressed their unease at not having been included, while the United Kingdom was sceptical about the project’s viability. The European Commission noted with suspicion that most of the projects being mooted by the French President were already being implemented within the Barcelona Process.
Turkey stressed that it would not accept the Mediterranean Union as an alternative to joining the EU. Egypt agreed in late December to work with France on a common work programme. Libya and Tunisia reacted positively as the project did not seem to include any political conditionality. Algeria was ambivalent. Morocco appreciated France's interest in Mediterranean issues, while noting that its priority was to achieve an "advanced statute" – a deal to improve political and economic relations with the EU. The countries of the Near East paid little attention to the French proposal.
Sarkozy’s individual style − and especially the fact that he first announced his proposal and only then started to seek support and ways of implementing it − did not help to create a consensus. He underestimated German unease at this example of French unilateralism; the French President had thought that the Mediterranean represented a minor issue in the eyes of Berlin.
It was the German government's resistance (and particularly that of Chancellor Angela Merkel) which forced Sarkozy to seriously reconsider his proposal. In a climate of deteriorating French-German relations, Merkel and Sarkozy held a tense meeting on March 3, where they agreed to present a bilateral proposal for the Mediterranean Union at a European Council meeting 10 days later.
This meeting resulted in the Europeanisation of the French proposal. Its name was changed again, this time to “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”, ample proof of a shift of emphasis. It was decided that all EU states would be invited to attend a summit in Paris on July 13. Finally, the European Commission was asked submit proposals for the development of this stage in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The big question now is whether it amounts to anything more than a cosmetic name-change.
The virtue of the French initiative is that it drew attention to the Mediterranean and to the Barcelona Process, which had become eclipsed (though not entirely replaced) by the European Neighbourhood Policy. The development, freedom and security of the Mediterranean area is of great importance to European interests.
Sarkozy’s initial proposal would have endangered the coherence of the EU’s Mediterranean policy. It could have produced contradictions in areas such as human rights. It could have resulted in an unjustified dispersion of political and financial efforts. It was unclear who would select the projects to be funded and what criteria would be used in their selection. And it was unfair to exclude countries such as Germany and the Scandinavians, which have greatly contributed to the EU’s Mediterranean policy.
Even so, the French proposal contained several interesting points that should be considered during preparations for the forthcoming summit. Institutionalisation is one. After years of waiting, it seems that the time has come for the creation of an EU secretariat and a co-presidency. It will not be an easy task. The European Commission could be deprived of some of its work. Arabs and Israelis might object. Could an Arab state ever agree to be represented by an Israeli co-president, or vice-versa? In designing the two organisations, a bureaucratic logic should not end up being imposed on political logic and, secondly, that Euro-Mediterranean relations should not be held hostage by the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The second point might be dealt with by working multilaterally, but without the need for all the member states of the Barcelona Process to participate in each and every one of the projects. In some cases, it may be that only the countries bordering the Mediterranean, or only the members of a smaller regional area (for example, the western Mediterranean), would be interested in implementing a specific action. What EU’s jargon calls “variable geometries”. A lack of consensus between the 39 members of the Barcelona Process should not become an obstacle to intensify cooperation. But to prevent any sense of exclusion over a particular project, the new Union should involve a minimum number of participating states and be open to any new country wanting to collaborate.
In the past, it has to be said, the EU’s Mediterranean policy has fallen short of expectations. In 1995, when the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was launched, it was frustrated by fresh outbreaks of tension in the Middle East, and later by the realisation that the objectives set down in the ambitious declaration that founded the Barcelona Process were not being achieved. In 2005, the “Year of the Mediterranean" – Barcelona plus 10 − the first Euro-Mediterranean summit of heads of state was held. But whatever renewed interest in Euro-Mediterranean affairs the summit achieved soon faded. In 2008 we may go through a similar situation
If Euro-Mediterranean relations were a car, getting it to its desired destination will depend on three factors. The first is the skill of the driver (that is, the political determination of European and Mediterranean leaders to reach agreements). Secondly, the car has to have enough fuel (money for projects). And thirdly, the weather has to be suitable for the journey (Middle East tensions must not, once again, wreck the efforts being made to create a Mediterranean that is safer, more democratic, more prosperous and more integrated).
This final point does not depend on the European Union, and weather tends to be unpredictable. Still, it is worth making another attempt, this time with improved instruments and better resources.