What should Europe’s next move be now that US military action against Iran seems less of a threat? Michael Brenner warns the EU against the temptation of doing nothing when instead it should be playing a much greater role in the Middle East
Satisfactory relations with Iran are key to resolving, or at least containing, dangers elsewhere in the region. Some observers believe relations improved overnight with the publication in December 2007 of a United States government intelligence report that Iran had in fact suspended its nuclear weapons programme back in 2003. President George W. Bush continues to believe Iran is a threat, a view shared by his closest lieutenants who remain suspicious of an intelligence service that has been proved wrong in the past.
US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates has been particularly hostile to any easing of international pressure on Iran, and wants the military option to remain “on the table”. Nevertheless, publication of the report has changed the politics of the issue. The case for a pre-emptive American attack on Iran has become impossible to sell politically, both in the United States and internationally. Even Gates concedes that regarding Iran the United States is now wholly focused on diplomatic and economic measures.
The European Union may feel that it has been here before. In the autumn of 2005 the Europeans persuaded Washington to give its tacit backing to their diplomatic efforts with Iran. The EU initiative was a notable attempt to remove a serious threat, and was a move unprecedented in the history of the Union’s common foreign and security policy. It remains an admirable landmark, even though the initiative fell short of expectations. Its fatal flaw was an inability to deliver the one thing that could persuade Tehran to forego its nuclear ambitions, then assumed to be the bomb: a deal that guaranteed there would be no American attack, gave Iran a voice in shaping the future of the Persian Gulf and restored the country’s international standing. In April 2003, the Iranian leadership had proposed a comparable deal, with Iran pledging not to oppose America in Afghanistan or Iraq, and to restrain both its support for terrorism and its nuclear programme. That overture, too, was spurned by the Bush administration.
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MATTERS OF OPINION |
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Iraq and Iran - the US public's view
Most Americans expect US troops to stay in Iraq for several more years, regardless of who wins this year’s US presidential election. A majority (55%) of those questioned − in an October 2007 Gallup Poll − thought that keeping US troops in Iraq for four years or longer would be too long. Numbers were fairly evenly split on soldiers staying for two to three more years, with 44% saying this was about the right amount of time, and 45% saying it was too long.
When questioned on Iran, an overwhelming majority said they would prefer the US to pursue diplomatic and economic channels rather than use military action to compel Iran to end its nuclear weapons programme. Even should diplomatic efforts fail, opinion was equally divided between those who would support military intervention and those opposed to this.
Interestingly, 73% of those interviewed said they were very or somewhat concerned that America would not do enough to prevent Iran developing nuclear weapons. But slightly more – 76% − said they feared the US would resort to military force too quickly.
It should be noted that all the surveys were conducted before the publication last December of a US intelligence report saying that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003.
http://www.gallupworldpoll.com/ |
Where does that leave the EU now? The evidence to date indicates that a tough stance will not induce the Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to change course. Instead, threats seem to strengthen the hand of the hardliners. In any case, the unwillingness of Russia and China to approve the harsh sanctions proposed in the UN Security Council by the United States means that full pressure cannot be exerted. A strategy of non-military coercion backed by the now doubtful threat of military action is unlikely to work. The EU finds itself an observer of events, unable to decide what best to do.
It could do nothing; that is a decision of a kind. Any effort over the Iran problem is complicated by the changing of the occupant of the White House in a year's time. It is likely to be a long 12 months, for despite being already a lame duck, President George W. Bush seems devoted to using the same foreign policy touchstones that have served him for the past seven years. This is particularly true in the Middle East, although to be fair he is now taking seriously the need to give the Palestinians their own state. Bush's probably Democratic successor will be left the burden of the region’s unresolved problems. It is difficult to guess what new directions might be taken by a new administration, and indeed, the substance of American foreign policy may hardly change. Presidential candidates' public remarks so far suggested little in the way of fresh strategic thinking. This is especially true of Iraq, the most likely scene of new developments that will be unpalatable to Americans, who generally have a low tolerance of failure.
Should the EU therefore postpone consideration of further serious policy initiatives in the Middle East for the duration of the electoral campaign and its political interregnum in Washington? It’s a conclusion that is too facile, and too convenient. We cannot afford to continue along the current course of inertia for another year. Nor can we be sure that American strategic thinking in 2009 will be more sober, more alliance-friendly and will hold out a greater promise of long-term solutions.
A closer embrace between Iran and a Shia-led Iraq is inescapable. What remains an open question is the exact nature of that partnership, and the attitude of both toward minorities, their Gulf neighbours, Sunni Arab regimes and the Lebanon. The hope of using a pro-western Iraq to countervail Iran is illusory; Iraq is neither an answer nor an asset but a major liability. So the challenge is to neutralise that liability and to relieve other susceptible trouble-spots from the toxins Iraq has generated. A modus vivendi with Iran could well be crucial to that exercise.
There is absolutely no concrete evidence that a Democratic president would change these fundamentals. Quite apart from the fact that it takes close to a year for a new administration to pull itself together, we can already see that the fundamentals are not being squarely addressed. Democrats have been at pains not to allow any blue water to separate them on Iran from the present administration. All the major candidates also foresee a significant American military and political presence in Iraq for the indefinite future. The next president will be further handicapped by the general inability of the American public to understand the choices and trade-offs to be made; and by US diplomacy that is hamstrung by America’s loss of credibility and moral authority.
For Europe to shy away from the problem over the next 12 months would be tantamount to leaving the continent’s great interests in the Iran affair hostage to the calculations and impulses of players in Washington and Tehran. But a course of action in these unruly waters must be deep, it must be nuanced, and it must be adaptable to a wide range of possible contingencies.
The EU Reform Treaty recently signed in Lisbon visualises an enhanced High Representative, essentially a foreign minister, the job now held by Javier Solana. A cardinal weakness of multilateralism in the absence of a recognised leader is the tendency for difficult decisions to be postponed. Solana, or his successor, could be the catalyst for action, serving as custodian of the Union’s common foreign and security policy. He has to ensure that EU-level policy fits together with national policies. Coordination is always a challenge for any capital when dealing with complex, intersecting challenges such as those in the Middle East. Adding the supranational level compounds the difficulty.
Any rethinking of EU policy on Iran and the Middle East generally must involve Europe's relations with the United States. Until now, European governments − both collectively and individually − have been content to play two self-limiting roles. One is as a supporter of American strategy; the Union as such has supported the US in its problems with Iraq after the invasion, the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war, and most recently in dealing with the awkward fact of Hamas' electoral victory in Palestine.
Its other role has been to act in the diplomatic margins left over from American activities. Its attempts to nudge Iran toward a negotiated status over its nuclear programme have been an outstanding example of this. But neither of these roles has carved out a place in the arena of Middle East diplomacy commensurate with Europe's interests or latent influence. The Union needs to make a candid examination of its relationship with America, along with an analysis of its costs and benefits.
A passive Europe could pay a steep price for not trying to breath life into its foreign and strategic policy, and applying it in the places that count the most. The European Union’s competence as an international negotiator will be tested in how it deals with this challenge.