The recent enlargement of the eurozone up to fifteen member states is perceived, at least in the popular view, as though it has been a great success. Flanked by low inflation and sustained by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the Euro–insiders weigh up economic problems and monetary stability, to finally reach the conclusion that a wider European monetary deal is worth continuing. However, the move towards Euro–unification seems a relatively small step beyond the time of its outset which was initiated by twelve countries nine years ago. A strategic goal of the EU nowadays is a reasonable – and not too slow – pace of full Eurozone enlargement.

This merits careful consideration. For a start, there will be no full European integration, if the member states are going to be differentiated with regard to their status or standard of living, or the length of their membership in the EU. The success depends on the persistence of political solidarity binding the faster and the slower together. Yet, as for Euro–zone insiders, the vision of the EMU is very much of an exclusive character and the adoption of the common currency is becoming the last stage of economic integration, the „coronation”. It is said that the fast process of adjustments to the EMU membership may jeopardize the economy of countries with poor economies. Frankly speaking, this justified argument questions some of the intentions of the „old rich Europeans” towards the speed and scope of monetary enlargement, which refers to the newcomers that are not as well–off as the older member states.

Such a problem was much debated by the EMU establishment in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The idea of dividing member countries into the prosperous and the not so prosperous was rejected. It would undermine the common interests of the EU. This was the view of member states when signing the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, with its central idea of a monetary union. This is why in 1998 the sufficient flexibility of the stronger states allowed Spain and Italy to join the eurozone, followed in 2001 by Greece, the member state with the weakest financial credentials. Today, the flexibility has been abandoned. Moreover, less enthusiasm to speed up the monetary enlargement is justified by the same arguments which ten years ago were good enough to make the EMU as big as possible. One implication, for example, is that in May 2006, the European Commission turned down Lithuania’s application, despite the Baltic state’s great efforts to meet the criteria. It was explained that inflation in Lithuania exceeded the level set by the Commission of 2.66%, although by only 0.06%. In consequence, new EU member states join the eurozone one at a time on individual merit. This is why the eurozone has, in recent years, been enlarged only with the addition, in January 2007, of the small country of Slovenia which met the criteria for public debt, budget deficit, interest rates and inflation. Two other small countries, Cyprus and Malta, also joined in January this year.

Another problem is that there is no general plan for new member states to join the eurozone. They are not offered such a scenario, as it was prepared for „old” member states by the Treaty of Maastricht. It included both the outline of establishing the union and the specific date of introducing the common currency. At the same time, it did forbid any independent action by a state to speed up the introduction of the Euro. One opposing idea has been “euroisation”, in which a state could unilaterally introduce the Euro as legal tender. It was advocated for use in Poland in 2000 by two economists, one of whom, Jacek Rostowski, recently went on to become the Finance Minister. The EU rejected the idea. An independent Euro, said the eurozone, would not remain in line with the fixed exchange rate condition.

Finally, serious political consequences for the process of European monetary enlargement are created by the exceptional freedom of many of the 15 states, especially its largest members, Germany and France, in applying the standards of the SGP, called the “monetary constitution” of the EU. Their behaviour, especially in the period 2000–2005, led to serious changes in the clauses of the SGP. It was their sustain pressure surrounding the Pact that made Sweden reject the possibility to join the Euro zone in the September 2003 referendum. It is the French policy of today, not to mention the Italian ones, which creates an uncertainty around the future of the Pact and the EMU as a whole.

The application of coronation „theory” occuring in coincidence with the optional interpreting convergence criteria creates fears that the right of the Euro–zone outsiders to full participation in one of the realms that regulates and orders the system of the European Union, will be unneccessarily questioned for a long time. As a result, a state that wants to be a member of the monetary union has to radically improve its economic credentials and, in the meantime, passively watch the policy of „old” states breaking the principles of the Pact. It has become the political agenda of a very destructive character. It is better to stick to a national currency, at least until the ”old” members treat the Union as a body with common rights, economic as well as political ones.

Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty requirements have to be fulfilled in the long run. Such an approach to the economy is important not only for Euro–zone outsiders but for the Union as a whole, if it wants to perform properly as a global actor. However, in the case of unacceptable behaviour of large countries it has created an adverse effect where the less prosperous countries have sought to emulate the need to implement reforms. As a result, a positive impact of the economic imperative of the EMU could be driven off its course. This evidence suggests that newcomers are witnessing a Prisoners’ Dilemma anew. It asserts that the role of a collective hegemon, which is necessary to organize and maintain the monetary regime, is provided not by the EU as a whole, but by those countries within the Council which are able to force the regulations up to their own national interest. As it is underlined by plenty of studies, such a role is carried out mainly by Germany and France. It is creating what Amitai Etzioni, an American sociologist, called the community deficit, a lack of shared values and bonds that is producing divisions within the enlarged EU.

Just how divided are the EU’s 27 member states over the operation of the EMU? Despite some predictions of a crack in European monetary unity and the Czech authorities’ bold declaration that they want the Euro no earlier than in 2019, the divisions are not that clear. Whatever the problems, many politicians and economists in the EU do not doubt that the common currency helps growth. Think–tanks in the Union generally approve the Euro. Opinion polls conducted in new member states in 2006 showed that a majority of those questioned were in favour of signing up for the eurozone in the next few years.

These remarks suggest that the enlargement of the eurozone, in a given time and according to specific procedures, seems to be a logical and practical development of parallelism rather than the adamant „coronation” strategy. The legitimacy of such an approach to the EMU project was indicated by the key document related to the establishment of the union, i.e. Delors’s report, which quotes the European Council’s conclusions from Hanover in 1988. It is stated there that states resolve to produce “... gradual realisation of economic and monetary union”. Indeed, it gave warning that “perfect parallelism…would be impossible.” Simply, parallellism was its word for the common development of the EMU. But taking a broader view, particularly in the context of the outrageous practices of some member states, „implicit” recognition of parallelism is less important than its „indirect” dimension. This would provide for more EU–wide dialogues, leading to any necessary reforms.

The narrowly–led strategies of the EMU enlargement do not favour development, or the reforms of the EU. It is enough to bring to mind the idea created by Juan Márquez, a Spanish Jesuit from Salamanca and adviser to Philip III of Spain, who in 1612 was the first to suggest that all states in the continent should adopt an equal value of coinage in order to eliminate the inconvenience of converting one currency into another, and avoid the risk of loss through the exchange rate. The 400th anniversary of this very European concept falls in 2012. Neither this nor later plans to introduce a common European currency were accomplished. Perfection was not possible. European political leaders would be wise if they adopted Márquez’s proposal and did what is possible, so that by 2012, all member states could enjoy the Euro on an equal footing. Indeed, it would be an act of political common sense.