Why EU and US geopolitical interests are no longer the same

The Cold War’s “Free Europe” thus united rather than divided Americans among themselves. It also fitted comfortably with the idea of a bipolar world divided ideologically between two superpowers. It recalled classic geopolitical theories separating the world into a Eurasian continental bloc and a maritime fringe – between Eurasian autarchy and global free trade, with the rest of the world up for grabs. In this grand geopolitical construction, the states of western and central Europe were gathered into a “West” dominated by the United States, where the overriding geopolitical interests of Europe and the US could be seen as “largely the same.”

While the Cold War soothed divisions within America, it also fed tensions among Europeans. In a bipolar Europe, the very idea of a “central” Europe was superfluous. But Mitteleuropa never really disappeared from European consciousness. In West Germany, a persistent undercurrent favoured taking a more neutral stance vis à vis the superpowers. In return, it was hoped, the Soviets might relinquish East Germany. As the imperial Soviet grip loosened, German geopolitical interest in détente strengthened. Growing trade and cultural exchanges encouraged a new “pan European” identity that could ease Germany’s reunification. Meanwhile, General de Gaulle had blessed détente with his own de-Atlanticised geopolitical vision of a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.” As the French president saw things in 1967, a reformed Russia, shorn of its Asian conquests, would eventually rejoin Europe. These Franco-German ideas alarmed the Americans, who vaunted their own version of détente, one where the USSR and the US stabilised their relations, thus preventing any precipitate collapse of the European status quo.

Meanwhile, the West-European states were conducting a further revisionist policy – building a regional political-economic bloc of their own. At first a European Economic Community, ultimately to become the European Union. In many respects, however, even while laying the institutional foundations for a collective identity, the bloc seemed to complement rather than contradict the Atlantic system. West-European states had little interest in shedding their Atlantic protectorate so long as the Cold War continued. As they grew more competitive economically, they grew less inclined to protectionism. Europeans and Americans built up huge investments in each other’s economies.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 dealt new geopolitical hands all around. In the new dispensation, the transatlantic alliance became an old idea confronting new realities. The interests of both the EU and the US are both expansively redefined. To start with Europe’s geopolitical redefinition: With no massive Soviet army in the middle of Germany, Europe was no longer firmly divided into Western and Eastern hemispheres. Mitteleuropa revived and Germany was reunited. Western Europe evolved from a “Community” to a “Union.” As the Soviet Union itself imploded, West European states were less firmly bound to American protection. Analysts began predicting the end of NATO. These expectations underestimated the influence of “New Europe” – those European states formerly under Soviet control where Cold War fears of Russia still persist. For these states, joining NATO seems the most reliable way to consolidate their independence. Post-Cold War American administrations, eager to preserve NATO and leery of leaving the definition of Europe entirely to the EU, strongly favoured NATO’s enlargement. This predictably upset the Russians and prompted them to try and reassert their old regional dominance. This, of course, only reinforced the eagerness for American protection among Russia’s neighbours. These reactions and counter-reactions to some extent reconstituted the Cold War’s bipolar system, but with the Russian sphere much reduced.

Americans, meanwhile, have grown eager to turn NATO from a defensive regional alliance into a global intervention force. European states have found themselves sending troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. This transformation of NATO has been part of a more fundamental shift in America’s own geopolitical perspective. The Soviet demise has encouraged America’s political elites to construct a “unipolar” view of their country’s global position and interest. This trend accelerated as the Bush administration attempted, after 9/11, to construct a unilateral global hegemony out of the “War on Terror.” This expansive redefinition of America’s geopolitical identity provoked growing disquiet in “Old Europe.” America’s invasion of Afghanistan was widely seen as justified, given the Taliban regime’s intimate relations with the terrorists of 9/11. But the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq produced an open break between the US and its two major continental allies – France and Germany. Both refused to support the UN resolution legitimising the invasion. Both were supported in the Security Council by Russia and China. A great Eurasian bloc suddenly appeared in opposition to America’s hegemonic global pretentions. These manoeuvres prefigured if not a tectonic shift in geopolitical alignments, at least a new fluidity in geopolitical relationships.

The effectiveness of Franco-German resistance to American hegemony was greatly qualified, though, by the reactions of other European states. The UK’s Prime Minister Tony Blair did his best to resurrect Churchill’s special relationship, and Britain was joined by Italy and Spain together with nearly all the states of New Europe. The Franco-German couple suddenly could no longer claim to speak for the EU as a whole. European plans for a Common Foreign and Security Policy and for closer defence cooperation seemed brutally discredited. Slowly, however, Europe has seemed to grow more cohesive in its opposition to American unipolar policies and pretensions.

Public opinion in most European countries was from the start firmly opposed to the Iraq war. In both Italy and Spain, governments that had supported the American invasion soon found themselves out of office. Numerous European polls kept revealing a stunning collapse of American popularity and this was paralleled by a decline in respect for American military power. After easy initial victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ensuing guerrilla wars went badly. American forces were clearly overstretched, and Europeans were reluctant to assist. European diplomacy grew more united, and the prospect of an American attack on Iran induced Britain to join with France and Germany to pressure the Americans against it. Again, Russia and China supported the Europeans in the UN Security Council.

After his re-election in 2004, Bush grew more conciliatory. The departure of Tony Blair left him increasingly isolated diplomatically, with changes of government in Berlin and Paris bringing only superficial improvements. Both Americans and Europeans seemed progressively disillusioned with NATO. Deteriorating financial structures and economic conditions suggested stricter limits on America’s global interventions. Meanwhile, Europeans muted their criticism and hoped that a more traditional and less adventurous government might result from the presidential election in 2008. Europeans and Americans had amply demonstrated their capacity to damage one another. Neither was eager to risk further direct confrontation.

It is difficult to know where this uneasy transatlantic détente of 2008 will lead. By now it should be clear that European and American geopolitical interests are not automatically in harmony. Europeans do not accept the Bush administration’s strategic vision and the United States is unable to pursue that vision with success without European support. The reasons for Europe’s defection are eminently geopolitical. They have to do with Europe’s own neighbourhood. To Europe’s east lies Russia, to its south the Muslim world. For their own safety and prosperity, Europeans need good relations with both. Not only do these neighbours offer growing markets and investments, but they are Europe’s natural sources for raw materials and energy. Europe also needs good relations with the Muslim world for the sake of its own domestic stability. It is not surprising that many Europeans feel the US is following policies that alienate these regions. A Europe closely allied with these policies and militarily dependent on America is therefore at risk. If left to their own devices, Europeans believe they would have a better chance of surrounding themselves with collaborative governments promoting prosperous harmony. Instead, American policies generate bitter intractable conflicts that point toward incipient wars of rival civilisations. Europeans fear that they will be the principal victims. In short, in the geopolitics of Europe’s neighborhoods, America seems Europe’s problem rather than its solution. Under these circumstances, the transatlantic alliance survives less from genuinely shared interests than from inertia – a dependency path leading to increasingly unhappy outcomes.

At heart, today’s transatlantic differences spring from contrary readings of recent historical trends. American political elites have seen the Soviet collapse opening the way to their own global hegemony. Americans project their own continental model on to the world at large. They see the United States fated to be the globalising world's federal centre. Europeans tend to reject this unipolar vision and foresee, instead, a plural world of several important powers. When Europeans think of how such a plural world might be governed, they naturally think of their own post-war model. Since World War II, Europeans have built in their own region a regional confederacy with federal elements – a constitutional superstructure that engages sovereign nation states in a cooperative matrix. Their hybrid Union is, many Europeans believe, a constitutional invention of great potential – a necessary evolution for a peaceful system of nation states. This European view of international politics is not at all on the same wavelength as the Bush administration’s vision of a unipolar global system. But that geopolitical view is by now deeply implanted in America. Several generations have known no other.

Can anything restore the old transatlantic harmony? A forceful revival of Russian imperialism, or a war of civilisations with the Muslim world, might provide a threat so overbearing that a frightened Europe would seek shelter by resuming its Cold War dependency on America. But Europe will not be eager to embrace such a future. It may be careful not to alienate America, but it will struggle to build a collaborative relationship with its regional neighbours. Insofar as America’s hegemonic world view seems to stand in the way of such collaboration, the Atlantic seems more likely to count as a barrier than as a bond.

Of course, America’s definitions of its role in the world may change. America’s unipolar expectations have not been ratified by events. The unipolar policies of the past decade have been notably unsuccessful, and have weakend rather than strengthened the country. By now there is considerable opposition to the unipolar vision in the United States itself. The US may evolve a more modest definition of its interests, together with a greater appreciation of the need for a strong Europe. Europeans, after all, have no monopoly on constitutionalism. Americans have a rich constitutionalist tradition of their own, together with a long and successful experience with international cooperation. But following the demise of the Soviets, America seems to have lost its way. Something has gone wrong with its system of checks and balances; the Roman Republic has been turning into the Roman Empire.

America’s recent evolution suggests a broader lesson. Nowadays, too much power is agglomerated in Washington to be contained successfully within a purely national constitutional structure. Checks and balances at home require a correlative balance of power abroad. Constructing such a balanced state system for itself on a regional scale has been post-war Europe’s great achievement. Successfully implementing that balanced system has depended heavily on a supportive America. Perhaps it is time for Europe to return the favour. Balancing, it seems, is always necessary, even among friends. And among friends balancing is also more likely to be successful. That Europe can find the will, the means and the confidence to rise to the occasion – to be America’s balancing partner – can hardly be taken for granted. What does seem clear is that a Europe that wants to be cohesive and strong, and on good terms with its neighbours, will not fit easily in a close transatlantic alliance with an America actively pursuing global hegemony.