EUROPE
Why nobody loves Europe (1)
Autumn 2008
European integration has been under way for decades, but the citizens of Europe increasingly question the project’s relevance to their everyday lives. Constantine Papadopoulos argues that a new form of democratic dialogue is needed to reconnect the EU with the people.
An anxious discussion about how to “re-engage” the European citizen in the EU’s integration process has been under way for some time – certainly long before Dutch, French and now Irish voters delivered their damning verdicts. European citizens’ apparently growing indifference to the EU is a phenomenon with roots that go back at least to the mid-1990s, and with the benefit of hindsight one that may not be all that difficult to explain. There would seem to be four factors that came into play at about the same time, and which have had a significant impact.
To begin with, after nearly 40 years of integration the novelty value and the early excitement surrounding the European project began to be replaced by a more sober perception of the EU as essentially another level of governance – albeit a very unique one. After so many decades of peace and increasing prosperity, the citizens began to take Europe for granted.
The EU’s enlargement to 15 had also fashioned a Union which in terms of size and balance looked quite close to the optimal. Further expansion to the east and south might seem desirable to the political elite for historic or geo-strategic reasons, but European citizens did not necessarily view it as crucial – and financially it could even have fairly serious consequences. Maintaining the status quo therefore had its advantages.
The third factor was that the end of the Cold War made for a more relaxed continent. In Western Europe the desire to work together through new institutions, in both the economic and security domains, arguably eased as the Soviet threat vanished and a greater sense of security and contentment settled across the continent. The fresh challenges being thrown up by the realities of a more globalised world may have also created a relatively greater urgency for more practical policies designed to boost Europe’s competitiveness.
A fourth factor may have also played a part. Towards the end of the 1990s, U.S. enthusiasm for a further deepening (as opposed to widening) of European integration quietly began to wane. Throughout the Cold War, Washington had been highly supportive of European integration, but now it began to express ambivalent feelings about the EU project. This partly reflected concerns for the dollar’s supremacy when faced with the introduction of the euro, as well as concerns stemming from European efforts to mould a more distinct foreign and security policy infrastructure and identity.
The drift to indifference was discernable in both the richer countries at the heart of Europe and – with a time-lag – in countries like Greece where, contrary to popular stereotypes, European integration has always been seen as much more than just a question of structural-fund inflows or Common Agricultural Policy payouts. After a fairly tumultuous adjustment period, EU membership gave Greece a new economic, political and security self-confidence. Beginning in the mid-1990s, this found expression in Greece’s outward-looking policy of supporting and promoting the EU’s expansion in its own immediate region, including Athens’ famous volte face of 1999 and its more positive attitude towards the perennial rival, Turkey. This strategy was increasingly supported and validated by the expansion of Greek companies in south east Europe and by Greece’s growing economic ties with its neighbours.
Unfortunately, in the following decade the disconnect between the European project and Europe’s citizens continued to grow – a fact painfully confirmed by the four negative referenda results of 2001, 2005 and 2008. These setbacks did not arise because national governments failed to recognise the problem, but because the methods employed to address it remained within conventional modes of thinking.
When a feeling of malaise pervades the EU, national leaders often choose to embark on a fuite en avant, a new big project or treaty, after which in theory they are forced to scramble to carry out the actions necessary to its success. The single market, the Maastricht treaty’s economic and monetary union (EMU), the “Big Bang” enlargement and the constitutional treaty were all attempts to give new impetus to the integration process.
But what was the response of national governments in the latter 1990s to the widely acknowledged need to re-engage with European citizens? The Amsterdam treaty of 1997 was supposed to address many of these concerns. A large part of the negotiations were devoted to “The Union and the Citizen” as well as to internal security and migration. Judged on their own terms, many of the results achieved were substantial. But as is typical in such circumstances, practical results would have to wait. After all, many of the reforms were more in the nature of enabling clauses, designed to open the way to new implementing decisions and actions that would unfold slowly. Such was the case in the fields of the environment, employment, social policy, public health and consumer protection. The EU anyway didn’t hold exclusive competence in these areas, but rather shared it with national governments, thus blurring the lines of accountability in the eyes of ordinary people. This must have played a part in the Amsterdam treaty’s ensuing low profile.
Soon after came EMU and the euro. The citizens of the eurozone countries greeted the new currency with mixed feelings for both practical and psychological reasons. Over time, though, it is likely that more and more people will understand the euro’s benefits for the European economy, just as they already appreciate many of its practical advantages.
Undoubtedly one of the biggest projects ever undertaken by the EU – perhaps even bigger than the single market or EMU – was the Lisbon Agenda. The Lisbon strategy of 2000 was a direct and ambitious response to the real challenges of the day. It set as its goal the transformation, no less, of the Union within 10 years into the world’s most competitive knowledge-based economy. Again with hindsight, it is possible to argue that, however worthy the ultimate objective, the project suffered from a mix of poor PR and a lack of sufficiently binding instruments to ensure its thorough execution. Voluntary commitments, peer pressure and the open method of coordination are all very well, but if the resolve of EU governments begins to slacken and tangible results are not quickly forthcoming, ordinary citizens tend to lose interest.
Perhaps even more important is the way European governments have themselves been guilty of inadvertently sidelining the Lisbon Agenda with their attempt to push through yet another grand project, the constitutional treaty. Half a century on, Europe’s leaders are evidently still given to what can be described as “institutionalism” – a bias in favour of institutional reform per se as a means of addressing Europe’s problems and challenges.
Whatever the merits of the constitutional treaty, and they were neither few nor unimportant, the impression given to European citizens was that it was a complex and somewhat baffling text. It seemed to have the trappings of a constitution but somehow wasn’t one. All the same, it was meant to constitute a significant and distinct step towards political union at a time when people were increasingly doubtful of further attempts to improve and embellish Europe’s already highly-elaborate institutional architecture.
Perhaps most tellingly of all, nowhere did it refer, nor could it, to the Lisbon strategy and its goals. This contrasted with the Rome treaty and its emphasis on ever-closer union, and the Single European Act which established the single market. The unintentional effect was to raise the public profile of various esoteric legal arrangements and arcane institutional adjustments that were not perceived as directly relevant to the lives of Europe’s citizens. It may therefore have helped undermine, or perhaps even pre-empt, a pan-European debate about the policies needed to address people’s real worries – namely, the cost of living, unemployment, immigration, climate change and the protection of the environment. The dichotomy between institutional tinkering – no matter how useful, well-prepared and thoroughly negotiated – and real policies addressing real problems, was becoming increasingly obvious.
This is all the more paradoxical considering that Europe is at the forefront of efforts to solve some of the world’s biggest problems. For example, with all the commotion caused by the Lisbon treaty – once again a document largely beholden to institutionalism – very few European citizens have engaged in a public debate about, or are even familiar with, the draft EU directive unveiled last January on the promotion of renewable energy. This technocratic sounding piece of legislation is a potentially society-transforming blueprint for averting climate change at a time when global warming is foremost in people’s minds. It is also a good example of European soft power because it lays the foundations for an international agreement on this truly global problem. What has more potential to stir the European citizen’s imagination and forge a sense of purpose across Europe – saving the planet or saving the Lisbon treaty?
Still, if a new results-oriented policy agenda is the key to re-engaging the citizen and to narrowing the democratic deficit, then one must also be prepared for the types of response that usually accompany such political initiatives. That EU citizens on occasion show strong support for various EU policies does not mean that they will not be severe when judging the results. The EU is judged in political terms just as much as its national counterparts.
For a fruitful give and take to occur between the EU and its policies, on the one hand, and the citizen, on the other, then a different kind of democratic dialogue – as well as a new method of accountability – is needed. It will have to be quite different from today’s system of periodic elections to the European Parliament and haphazard recourse to referenda in selected countries. Both of these are still fundamentally grounded in a ”national” conception of Europe when what is required is a shift to a more European, more politically-mature approach. But that is another matter calling for much wider debate.