It is easy enough to agree with Sir Roderic Lyne's message that EU-Russia relations need to build on common interests. Economic relations and in particular energy trade stand at the very core of those interests and, as Lyne suggests, this also means that the EU needs to develop a single energy policy instead of the current bilateralism where its member states lose collectively vis-à-vis Russia.

But contrary to what Lyne says, this does not pre-suppose developing a "new paradigm" or dusting off the term "strategic partnership". Our existing institutions (and vocabulary) are enough to engage Dmitry Medvedev's Russia. By this I do not mean that the term strategic partnership is perfect. For some, like Lyne, it means too ambitious an agenda; for others it means an agenda that is too narrow and that is characterised by the unilateral and strategic visions of both the EU and Russia, and thus accommodates their clashing interests in the traditional mould of great power politics.

Rather than get into this sort of abstract terminological debate, we need to make our point of departure a definition of what the term "strategic partnership" means to both parties. For the EU and Russia, today it represents a mutually acceptable basis for their relations after years of cat and mouse games. It recognises both entities as having something close to a great power status. And it grants Russia the all-important label of recognition and equality that for centuries it has longed for from Europe. This is something that western Europe has finally understood.

The real challenge is therefore to use the existing terminological framework and institutions effectively so as to make the EU-Russia energy dialogue the flagship project. There are already enough regular meetings and working groups for this to succeed.

The first task is to make the energy dialogue the main channel for EU member states' energy relations with Russia. In that way, the geographical scope of the dialogue would be enlarged into an all-European affair. The EU Commission should be equipped with an adequate policy planning and negotiating mandate. In the medium to long-term, it would also need additional competences regarding energy mix, infrastructure and transport routes issues. To the extent that it is possible, Norway should be involved to avoid a confusing cacophony of different energy dialogues with Russia. Getting the north-eastern and south-eastern EU member states on board will also be pivotal, as energy transit projects are shifting into these areas at the expense of the traditional central European route.

The second task is to enlarge the issues covered by the energy dialogue. The focus should not only be on what hydrocarbons Russia can sell to whom and who can participate in their transit, but on what the EU can offer in return. This includes renewable energy technology, where companies in Germany and Denmark are global leaders. It also includes learning from hydrocarbon reduction programmes like Sweden's, as well as energy saving and efficiency measures common to many EU area economies. This will help Russia to curb its high domestic use and its waste of hydrocarbons, to realise its own renewable energy potential, and to meet the Kyoto and post-Kyoto CO2 targets, while ensuring that enough oil and gas is left for cash-generating exports in the long-term. The development of EU-Russia electricity networks and trade integration should also be given high priority, as there are decent market opportunities on both sides, with relatively little risk of political controversy. The experience of the Nordic electricity market already points the way.

The overall goal should be that the energy dialogue is presented as a means for Russia to achieve its self-declared aim of modernising both its economy and society. Only by enlarging the energy dialogue's agenda both geographically and sectorally can the EU maintain its privileged relationship with Russia in the face of rising Asian interest in Russia and its increased courting of Russian energy resources.