At long last, Europe's institutional crisis seems to be over and we can start looking forward again. So what will the new Reform Treaty mean for the Council, the Commission and European Parliament? What does it imply for EU policies and practice? Some changes are already evident: politics are back on the agenda, driven by the new guard of Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, Gordon Brown, José-Luis Zapatero and José Socrates. Other institutional and policy changes will, naturally, take longer, one thing is already certain. The Union will either become more political or it will stagnate. That is the real choice.
The new generation of EU leaders experienced nothing of World War II, and so share a more pragmatic view of European unification than did the old guard. They practice a style of politics that is both more direct and more transparent and is certainly closer to people's main concerns. They are also more demanding about getting results. Therefore, under the new Reform Treaty we can expect the European Council to abandon the tired old ritual of ending with set-piece communiqués devoid of real decisions. Its members will "do the politics and make policy" not only in their own capitals but in Brussels and Strasbourg as well.
The Reform Treaty implies a shift in the way people view the respective roles of the European Parliament and the Commission. The Parliament will be strengthened by the treaty, which expands its areas of competence and makes it increasingly capable of negotiating and mediating. It thus has a chance to at last become a genuine embodiment of European democracy. This would usurp the image of the Commission as the most legitimate pan-European "representative". The Treaty of Nice had effectively handed this function to the Commission when it guaranteed every member state would have at least one commissioner. Hence the composition of the Commission remains a serious and tricky political issue. Now, however, we can expect the Union's only directly-elected institution to claim pride of place in representing the general interest.
The new treaty also raises questions over the future regulatory powers of the Commission. For instance, can the Commission continue to act both as impartial judge and partisan player in the single market? Is it possible for one institution to work out new competition or liberalisation rules and enforce them as well? Does that fit with our concept of fair play and the rule of law? The Commission's dual role in the internal market has already been challenged by economic actors, citizens and even the Court of Justice, notably in the Schneider case. Increases in the number and complexity of European competences had already led the Commission to delegate some of its powers to executive agencies, and these independent authorities could well become even more numerous under the new treaty, perhaps under the auspices of the Court of Justice, the Parliament or even the single European Court of Auditors. New bodies along these lines might regulate the internal market or make the initial legal rulings in the case of specific disputes, so the Union would thereby move towards more decentralised control, and that would unquestionably be a change for the better.
There is, of course, already a trend towards transferring some functions to organisations outside the Commission. For example, both the European Central Bank and the European Patent Office are independent institutions. Of the Union's 31 agencies, only three deal with community programmes; six concern the "third pillar", i.e. intergovernmental cooperation, while some of the remaining 22 agencies are semi-independent, such as the European Medicines Agency (EMEA). There is a strong likelihood that European regulators will be established in other areas of EU competence, starting with energy, television and telecommunications.
These trends are transforming our understanding of the "community method" of organising the Union. The community method rests on the assumption that Europe is driven by an ongoing process of integration, in line with the ideals of the founding fathers. It provides the basic logic behind Union decision-making systems that are designed to guarantee that the position of each member state is taken into account, while also allowing a "higher" or shared European interest to be expressed. However, this community model must evolve if it is to survive.
Intergovernmental cooperation is already a long-standing alternative to decision-making in the Council and other EU institutions. But a multiplicity of national exemptions, opt-outs and opt-ins undermines the coherence of community-wide policies. The Prüm Treaty of 2005, for example, introduced a system of cooperation between EU police forces and the judiciary, originally in seven member states. It established how operational efficiency among state bodies can be achieved outside Union institutions. London, though, demanded that the new Reform Treaty should allow the UK to avoid any future commitment to police and judicial cooperation; instead, the UK is being allowed to opt-in to EU justice measures if it so chooses. This marked a significant retreat from the basic principle of deepening cooperation on home affairs. We must therefore expect that more areas of government cooperation will pivot around EU institutions, without actually being incorporated fully into the community model, just like the Prüm convention, the Schengen agreement and the euro.
A more serious threat to European integration came from Britain's refusal to enforce the Charter of Basic Rights through the Reform Treaty. This constitutes a grave attack on the movement towards European unification since it concerns the fundamental values of European society that ought to be shared by all member states. We can be sure that the British will try to win support for their position from other countries to avoid being isolated on such a crucial issue. This example illustrates one of the dangers of accepting intergovernmental cooperation in the hope that a more community-minded approach will develop over time. Now we are left with a situation where a national exemption is effectively being applied to a core principle of European unity.
As areas of intergovernmental cooperation become more specialised, so does the Union itself become more segregated. This represents a real threat to the European polity as a whole. Unfortunately, the Reform Treaty's provisions for enhancing cooperation seem pretty hard to implement. It is unclear why member states are so unwilling to show a greater "community" spirit when so many of the basic rules of the game are being broken. In these circumstances, perhaps people power is the best hope for a more united Europe. From now on, pressure from our citizens could drive advances in the internal market, just as consumer demand created the worldwide telecommunications revolution. It had nothing to do with the wisdom of national parliaments or the boldness of the Commission. EU institutions could then take refuge behind the collective will of Europe's consumers; customer charters would proliferate and lists of new rights would lengthen.
So what new policies can we expect to see from the Union once the ink has dried on the EU reform package? Some advances are likely to come well beyond the realm of treaties. For example, we can rely on Nicolas Sarkozy to try to make progress on immigration and his big idea of a Mediterranean Union. He doesn't expect unanimity on the issue, so he can press ahead with member states which like the idea or think it is in their best interests.
With regard to foreign and security policy, the new Reform Treaty would appear to keep decision-making firmly on the intergovernmental track. That's fortunate as the Commission – and even some member states – have demonstrated a lack of strategic thinking over defence procurement and the need for member states to retain control over home-grown defence technologies. The Union must not forfeit its independent defence industries, whose technological capabilities determine our ability to operate on the international security scene.
Contrary to received wisdom, Europe has made a great deal of progress on security and defence coordination. These advances may not be evident in abstract policy debates but they are obvious out in the field where our armies now routinely work hand-in-hand. Our armed forces already have interoperable systems and a great deal of joint experience, and what they need now are better quality tools to match their expertise. To deliver these technologies, the Union needs a proper strategy to develop the defence industry. It is one area of security policy where a community bias makes sense. There are clear benefits to the European economy as a whole from of a strong defence industry, especially now that nearly all military technologies have alternative uses in civilian life. Dual-purpose technologies mean that defence research and development impacts across the spectrum of European research policy, and so this should become an EU priority.
Those EU countries that disagree with this analysis will − inevitably − be reluctant to make the necessary effort to guarantee the success of a common defence industry policy. But the international situation demands that all the member states should pull together. The Atlantic alliance should not be used as an excuse for ducking the issue, nor should old loyalties to the notion of neutrality. In a world where the balance of power is constantly shifting, a neutral Europe makes no sense – it would simply jeopardise the EU's model of peaceful economic and social development.
If the EU remains divided over defence, those countries that believe in a strong European security policy will have a clear duty to act. Over the years ahead, they must take the initiative and respond effectively to the threat of terrorism, the growth of cross-border crime, increased insecurity and the proliferation of weapons. This would certainly appear to be another policy area where the future of EU cooperation is likely to lie well beyond the scope of traditional treaties.
Sheer necessity may also drive other community policies forward, chiefly in the fields of energy, the environment and immigration. First, however, certain conditions need to be met. Our institutions need to learn to put all their cards on the table rather than treating some subjects as taboo. For example, how can we discuss energy policy without talking about nuclear power, since it probably represents the only way that the EU can meet its carbon emission targets? Okay, so there is no political consensus among the people of Europe on nuclear issues. But most countries already produce nuclear power and many of them intend to develop the industry further. All member states must address the subject of future energy supplies clearly, no matter how difficult this may seem.
In similar vein, we Europeans must face up to our own dreadful demographic situation before we try to design a common immigration policy. According to some forecasts, the Union will have about as many people of working age in 2050 as it had in 1950! Is it not high time we discussed family policies together? It will also be vital to harmonise our immigration policies and turn them into a collective device that we can control, while still respecting the rights of the individual.
Last but not least there is the serious matter of the Union's boundaries, and relations with our neighbours beyond them. Most member states seem to be paralysed over this issue, which so often impinges on their diplomatic interests. But the loyalty of our citizens will depend on it. People's sense of belonging is not a trivial or theoretical concept, but one that relies on a clear definition of territory. Therefore the EU must debate its borders, whether the diplomats like it or not. And European institutions would be well advised to make sure that this discussion is open and easily understandable.
No matter what the final outcome of this debate, it should include fresh ideas about the way that the EU relates to external partners. It is no longer enough to offer affiliation or a policy of good neighbourliness as the only options. If the EU can find practical ways to forge stronger alliances, it will show the world that it has real diplomatic clout and is pressing ahead with framing a genuine foreign policy. The EU also has to accept that it is no longer enough to apply economic criteria as the sole yardstick for EU membership. The Union needs to talk to applicants about wider policy issues like the environment, weapons proliferation, democracy and their views on the world. This holds especially true for the Balkan countries, whose hopes of joining need to be sustained.
In summary, there is no hiding the fact that the European Union will become more political under the new treaty. Economic union is now almost complete and monetary union largely accomplished. Our goal now must be political unity. The EU must acquire the legitimacy that is still primarily vested in the nation states. This challenge means that the EU will somehow have to devise higher-level democratic rules while still respecting national identities, and that will call for real commitment from the new generation of leaders, along with great political dexterity and a certain amount of "chutzpah". A number of our current leaders have these qualities in spades, and now need to make use of them to persuade the Union's institutions to "politicise" their work, in the noblest sense of the term, and to banish knee-jerk bureaucratic reactions.
Under the Reform Treaty, change will be inevitable for the European institutions, for community practices and Union policies. Will all 27 member states come along for the ride? Nothing could be less certain. The whole edifice could yet unravel in the process, just as some people have long dreaded. That is why it is important that we should all reflect deeply about Europe under the new treaty so as to keep the Union moving forward together.