Mr Van Aartsen calls for Europe to build a vast network of energy infrastructure and institutions linking the Union, its "neighbourhood" and, beyond, energy producers of the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa. This network would serve as a vehicle to ship energy to Europe and it (or the process of building it – what Mr Van Aartsen calls "energy co-operation") would export Europe's energy and environmental regulations, political stability, economic prosperity and even European values.
I do not understand how such a scheme would work, or even what it would concretely look like. I fail to appreciate why third countries would participate in it (except those with a credible prospect for membership). Finally and more importantly, I do not understand why Europe needs it.
Mr Van Aartsen's claim that "without energy independence – broadly interpreted – no democracy can be truly sovereign" is dubious. No democracy is anywhere close to energy independence. Almost all countries in the world, democratic or not, are becoming less energy independent by the year. Legally speaking, a country's sovereignty seems entirely independent from the way it sources its energy. Practically speaking, globalisation has hollowed energy independence from any meaning. To take but one example, China now imports significant volumes of oil on behalf of Western consumers to which it sells its manufactured products.
If energy independence "broadly defined" means relying on diversified, well-functioning energy markets then most countries in the world are energy independent. Global oil supply has never been more diversified than today and the market is deeper and more liquid than it has ever been. Natural gas supply is diversifying rapidly and markets have become much more integrated and flexible, which brings an increasing level of supply security to consumers.
The proposal of a NATO-inspired energy solidarity pact in Europe is a misguided response to fears about Russia. Three large gas markets in Western Europe – Germany, Italy and France – import a meaningful share of their gas from Russia (between 20% and 40%) and together consume 54% of all Russian gas imported into Europe. For them the most effective way to increase their supply security is to create an integrated and competitive gas market which should of course include large Western European gas economies which consume no or little Russian gas (the UK, Spain, Benelux). Integrated and competitive markets are the most powerful way to create de facto solidarity between countries and to hedge against supply disruptions, whatever their origin and causes.
The 12 new member states altogether consume 32% of all Russian gas exported to Europe. Most of these countries have very small gas markets but tend to rely heavily on Russia for their supply. To the extent possible they should eventually be part of the Western European gas market but full integration is unlikely for infrastructure reasons. In those countries more supply security will likely mean more competition against natural gas itself.
Europe does not lack access to global energy markets; its energy supply is highly diversified and still diversifying; energy security is less of a problem than politicians love to think but could still be cost-efficiently improve by completing the internal markets for gas and electricity. There is very little foreign policy can do to improve Europe's energy security. The proposals put forward in the article seem unrealistic, unneeded or both.
Finally, I must say that I do not understand the logic behind the claim that an ambitious international energy policy would help Europe export its values (the article does not specify to whom).