While it is certainly true that the European Union (EU) acts as a single actor within the World Trade Organization (WTO) based on its Common Commercial Policy, it should not be forgotten that the EU’s ‘single voice’ is the result of intense internal negotiations, where member states have to agree on positions that are both acceptable to their own domestic constituencies and ‘winning’ on the international stage.
In the analysis of these processes no individual theoretical approach has a monopoly on wisdom or truth; different perspectives may, under certain circumstances, offer valuable insights. The contributions in this paper use Robert Putnam’s approach of two-level games. However, when he wrote his seminal article, he did not have the EU in mind: his case study was the Bonn Summit of the G7 in 1978. Those were times when the international system was characterized by a (simple) bipolar structure, and the theoretical debate was dominated by systemic theories. These theories could hardly explain international negotiations involving multiple actors at different levels, fluid coalitions, and changing national preferences. Two-level games, by contrast, open up the ‘black box’ of the state and focus on the interaction between various players instead of analyzing only one level or a sequence of levels.
"At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments."
However, a mere two-level approach lacks the intermediate layer needed for an explanation of the behaviour of the EU in international negotiations. Intra-EU negotiations and compromises take place before the Union ‘goes global’, and these involve a pyramid of interests ranging from the private sector over domestic politics up to the ‘European interest’ distilled in the Council of Ministers. In order to reach an international agreement, the ‘win-sets’ of both sides (that is, all possible agreements that would be ratified in terms of gaining the necessary domestic support) must overlap.
This paper offers intriguing insights on the EU’s foreign economic relations, both within and outside of the WTO, as interpreted through a multi-level game approach. The eight case studies provide original analyses of some of the ‘hot’ issues currently on the table by applying and expanding, but also criticizing Putnam’s approach. The contributions first address the EU’s bilateral trade relations through the examples of the free trade agreements being negotiated with South Korea and MERCOSUR.

Click here to read the full article