VIEWS FROM THE CAPITALS
NICOSIA - How Greek Cypriots see the stalled talks on a Cyprus settlement
Summer 2009
The climate of optimism last year in that a Cyprus settlement might be achieved has, once again, been mitigated by events. For Demetris Christofias’ election to the presidency of the Republic of Cyprus and the resumption of negotiations with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat last September, had raised hopes of “a Cypriot solution by the Cypriots”.
The underlying assumption had been that the major obstacle to a solution was former President Papadopoulos. But this somehow simplistic view has, so far at least, proved misleading. Although the bi-communal dimension of the Cyprus question is important, the problem extends to other aspects, and in essence these are far more important. It is the 1974 occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkey, the introduction of more Turkish settlers there, property rights and Ankara’s insistence on retaining guarantor rights over what is now a full EU member state that are the major issues constituting stumbling blocs to a settlement. The situation has an impact on Euro-Turkish relations, not to mention its influence on internal Turkish politics.
Yet, for all the setbacks, a real breakthrough may still be possible if a series of different objectives can be met. So far, Turkey does not seem to have had a strong enough incentive to make serious concessions over Cyprus, because in essence there has been no penalty to pay. The result is that Ankara would be prepared to accept any Cyprus solution provided it more or less legitimises what happened in 1974. If this is indeed the case, we may be moving towards a new deadlock, unless the settlement dialogue can be sustained by a determined effort both to reach a better understanding in Cyprus itself and also to facilitate Turkey’s EU ambitions.
Developments within Turkey are as crucial as those in the broader region. The U.S., Russia and Turkey have between them been taking different and inconsistent approaches to various issues of ethnic conflict. The U.S. supports the territorial integrity of Georgia, but also an independent Kosovo. Russia stresses the importance of the territorial integrity of states, but in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia its position is compromised. Ankara insists on a confederal solution in Cyprus based on two states (leaving the issue of Turkish guarantees aside), but is strongly opposed to a similar scenario in Iraq. And, of course, any talk of such a stance in relation to its own Kurdish question is considered a casus belli. Not surprisingly, the only constant in all this is that these powers’ own perceived geopolitical and national interests are to each of them the determining factor in their policymaking.
It is, in any case, difficult to achieve a breakthrough in Cyprus when Turkey continues to deploy 40,000 troops in the northern part of the island and when there are more Anatolian settlers there than indigenous Turkish Cypriots. As recently as mid-April, settler voters in the occupied northern part of Cyprus outnumbered Turkish-Cypriot voters, and contributed to the victory of Dervis Eroglu’s nationalist party. This development may well create additional complications for the Cyprus negotiations.
Curiously enough, though, when Ankara faces major turning points with respect to its relations with the EU there are always “new initiatives” and expectations for a fruitful outcome. But unfortunately there has been no major change in substance to Ankara’s policy on Cyprus. Οn the contrary, the pressure seems directed towards the weaker Greek-Cypriot side rather than to the Turkish-Cypriot side and to Ankara. In other words, a re-run of what happened to previous UN settlement efforts, including the one that culminated in the rejection by the Greek Cypriots of the Annan Plan.
The bottom line now is that if there is to be any momentum capable of delivering substantial progress towards a solution of the Cyprus problem, Ankara must first recognise and respect the Republic of Cyprus as an independent member state of the United Nations and of the European Union. Once Turkey is able to take this step, the rest will follow.