The European Union began to articulate a genuine security and defence posture only in 1999, so there can be little argument that much has been achieved since then. But it is a process that requires regular injections of urgency if it is to continue to develop satisfactorily. The European Parliament has taken a positive stance, not least by setting up the sub-committee for Security and Defence that I chair. And also within the Parliament the Kangaroo Group, which has long been a driving force behind the sustained development of the EU’s single market, has identified security and defence issues as a priority.
EU policy in this highly sensitive area has moved significantly forward in recent years, thanks largely to decisions in Helsinki in 1999 on the development of a European crisis intervention force, the setting-up of operational structures in Brussels, and the essentials of a common European security policy. Since then, armed forces under EU command intervened in Macedonia, the Congo and Bosnia. A European Defence Agency is up and running and the European Commission has endorsed preparatory steps on security research. All Europe’s “battle groups” are scheduled to be on call by 2007.
These developments are clear evidence that the forging of a European defence identity is gaining momentum. At the same time, a tentative public debate on European defence begun, and as a European parliamentarian I can vouch that this is not only ongoing but is being followed with increasing interest. That said, a number of fundamental issues still need to be resolved, not least the nature of the relationship between EU and NATO on security and defence. Are we looking at an unnecessary duplication of effort, are we to some degree jeopardising relations between Europe and the United States?
In Europe, the permanence of “peace” is often taken for granted, despite the fact that worldwide the last 60 years have seen more than 200 wars and conflicts with millions of lives lost. It is not only unacceptable but totally erroneous to consider “peace” as a fact of modern life. Peace has to be earnedand zealously promoted and protected.
EU leaders opted in December 2003 to pursue the security policy set out in a benchmark document by Javier Solana. This took as its departure point that the implosion of the USSR now precludes any major aggression against EU Member States. Yet Europe faces other threats that are less visible and less predictable.
The principal ones are those of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Europe must now reluctantly accept that it hosts terrorist activities, as Al-Qaeda networks have been uncovered in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. A very real fear is that terrorist groups will somehow come into possession of weapons of mass destruction. In today’s world, traditional distinctions between external and domestic threats are becoming more and more blurred.
A further European security concern is regional conflict. It would be to Europe’s eternal shame to one day find ourselves without the resources to pre-empt, prevent or resolve new conflicts comparable to those we have already seen in the Balkans. A decade ago in Srebenica, the EU was unable to prevent the slaughter of 7,000 men, and we must do everything within our power to prevent such a situation arising ever again. EU member states were tried and found wanting, unable to pool resources and make common cause. At that time, the EU had itself neither the organisational infrastructure nor the means to intervene militarily. It was only with the aid of the U.S. that peace returned to the Balkans.
A key component of European security and defence posture is the close coordination of civilian and military measures to pre-empt or resolve conflicts. The EU spends more on development aid than the US, and now that a civilian-military planning centre is being set up in Brussels, this aspect of security will be of overriding importance in developing an EU-led security structure in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
But "preventive action" is still a bone of contention between the EU and the US. Europeans are more reticent on this, even though Javier Solana has pointed out that the risks of proliferation are increasing and terrorist networks represent an escalating threat. The first line of defence often lies well beyond national borders, raising the question of which countermeasures are justifiable. In EU terms, our capabilities are such that in any case for the foreseeable future we must limit countermeasures to within Europe’s frontiers.
Defence strategies in the US are firmly anchored in America's global leadership role. The US is far and away the greatest military power in the world and clearly intends to remain so. Rather than working within the framework of the United Nations and NATO, the US reserves the right to act unilaterally or in a “coalition of the willing”. By contrast, the security strategy of the European Union is targeted towards a world order based on effective multilateral cooperation, where the United Nations Charter constitutes the fundamental framework for international relations. To my mind, however, the European strategy needs more detailed provision for the defence of our own territory, i.e., a “homeland defence”, surely one of the primary aims of any foreign and defence policy. The absolute prerequisite of territorial defence must lie in a commitment to a mutual and reciprocal support system. The European Union’s security strategy constitutes a very useful basis on which to analyse threat, but it is inadequate for responding to threat.
German Defence Minister Peter Struck has pointed out that a European yardstick would be useful – not to say, indispensable – for defining national procurement needs. At present, Europe’s security strategy is still embryonic and too abstract for such a yardstick.
Other major EU projects – the internal market and the common currency, to name but two – have demonstrated the need for both a strategic end-goal and for an assessment of the implications, together with a schedule for implementation. This lesson was uppermost in our minds when the European Parliament reviewed the report drafted by one of our members Philippe Morillon, with respect to Europe’s security strategy. Parliament went on to stipulate that by the end of 2009 the European Union should be in a position to cope – autonomously or in cooperation with its allies – with any conflict situations comparable, to say, to Kosovo. Parliament also urged that the essentially “conceptual” European crisis intervention force should instead be a standing force that can be deployed at very shortest notice. The Franco-German Brigade was originally thought a viable option, but since then, it is Anglo-French proposals that have been instrumental in the creation of the battle groups.
A step in the right direction would be a White Paperalong the lines proposed by the EU’s Paris-based Institute for Security Research. This could put forward a number of scenarios and evaluate potential strategic responses.
The political element in military intervention is twofold; to ensure that the leadership structure is up to the pressures it may be called upon to withstand and to ensure the arms and equipment needed to get the job done.
The Balkan crisis showed up the fundamental weaknesses of European military equipment more or less across the board, and especially when it came to air and sea transportation, satellite-based communications and airborne reconnaissance and intelligence. In some instances, different national systems with their own customised technologies, impaired interoperability. This reflected the lack of a common European market in security and defence technology. Cooperation has been improved in this area over recent years, but further progress is stalled by a lack of political commitment.
In the US, demand is essentially concentrated in the Pentagon. In Europe, procurement policies are spread over 25 national defence ministries, which greatly complicates the development and implementation of common projects and programmes. But two recent EU initiatives – the creation of the European Defence Agency and plans for a Security Research Institute – may go some way towards resolving these problems.
The Agency under has been got up and running within a remarkably short time frame, by EU standards, and is proof that the institutions of the Union can move towards common defence provided the political will is present. But when one skims through the list of tasks imposed on this new Agency, it seems evident that already it has too much on its plate.
Among the prime “deficit” areas to be addressed, one should single out mine clearance, where the application of new technology and methodology is a priority, bearing in mind the primitive disposal practices I observed in Kosovo. But arguably the most pressing need is for mutually compatible and fully interoperable satellite-based telecommunications and intelligence-gathering systems. There are at present five different satellite communications systems and three different satellite monitoring systems in the European Union. With the deployment of the “battle groups” planned for 2007, it beggars belief that the Franco-German Brigade, for example, should continue to use two different communication systems.
The Agency should be urged to focus exclusively on the central task of imparting greater cohesion to research and technology. The Security Research Institute planned by the European Commission will be primarily concerned with “ring-fencing”, or securing, the outer perimeters of the European Union and protecting key infrastructures like nuclear reactors, air transport and so on. It is intended that by 2007 a fully-fledged European Security Research Programme will be firmly in place.
To achieve a genuinely common market in defence procurement, and it is essential that tendering procedures should be “Europeanised”. At present, EU Member States routinely have recourse to Treaty Article 296, the loophole for avoiding the usual public tender rules. In certain sensitive areas where military secrecy is at a premium, there may be a case for this, but it is patently absurd to pretend that “exceptions” can be justified for mundane items as socks and shoes. The European Commission lately published a Green Paper, which addresses key aspects of procurement, while the European Court of Justice has handed down some interesting guidelines that differentiate between civilian and military applications.
The results of the referenda on the European Constitution in France and in the Netherlands have caused a serious crisis for the EU. We should not try to downplay this fact. The analysis as to the exact motivations of voters in opposing the Constitution is still going on, but one fact is already clear: The establishment of a common foreign, security and defence policy by the European Union is the least contentious part of the Constitution. Europe’s citizens respond positively to the argument that by joining forces our security policy becomes more effective. It is an important base to build on.