The reasons Europe has so disappointed Putin’s Russia

The break-up of the Soviet Union brought with it new hopes of a united continent. The progressive integration of the European Union further encouraged the belief that once the barrier of the Berlin Wall had been removed, Europe could work with the new Russia – so much of which was anyway in Europe – to the mutual benefit of both. But the end of the cold war failed to remove all the old antagonisms, and even gave rise to new misunderstandings: the frustrations felt by many Russians after their defeat in the cold war, the lack of sensitivity shown by its American victors and the persistence of old fears among the liberated peoples of eastern Europe.

For several years now we have seen relations deteriorate between Russia and the west, and most notably the United States. There is talk of a new cold war, even though the disagreements are played out in a strange and somewhat artificial atmosphere. Verbal confrontations have often been strident, yet the military of both camps carry out a secret programme of mutual inspection in a perfectly cordial manner. Meanwhile, Russia’s Vladimir Putin alternates his normally unexceptionable comments on United States policy with denunciations and threats that are wholly disproportionate.

The US plan to install what it insists are purely defensive missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic has produced a Russian reaction that is so extreme that it goes far beyond the limits of the dispute. Russia complains that the US, ever since Bill Clinton’s presidency, has been keen to admit the Soviet Union’s former allies to NATO. It is, Russia says, mainly the US that has pushed for the expansion of the alliance to include the three Baltic states, all of which are former Soviet republics. It was also the US that in 1999 led NATO into mounting military operations against Serbia over its province of Kosovo, and which is now insisting that Kosovo should gain independence as soon as possible despite Russia’s call for caution.

Europeans are also being blamed. As westerners, they are lumped in with the US. And indeed the Europeans and the Americans act in concert when criticising human rights violations in Chechnya or elsewhere in Russia. But there are also subjects where European and American interests differ. Their concerns are, for instance, far from identical on energy. The part played by Russia in various European countries’ pursuit of oil and gas supply control, reflects a fear of dependency not felt by Americans. The Americans have their own concerns: they have sought to deprive Russia of the controlling power it would have if all the gas and oil from the Caspian Sea were piped through Russian territory. Europeans and Americans both complain that their companies have been harmed by Russian decisions. The Russians claim that they are only redressing the situation created by the excessively generous concessions granted to western interests by Boris Yeltsin.

With its most recent enlargements, the European Union as a whole has now inherited the issues that have long existed between some of its new members and Russia. Russia has accused Estonia and Latvia of human-rights violations against the Russian-speaking populations in both countries. Monuments to Soviet soldiers have been destroyed; for the Russians, they were liberators, but for the majority of citizens in all three republics, they were occupiers.

Difficulties over Russian gas exports to the west, and its transit via Belarus and the Ukraine, raised new fears about the security of future supplies. Some western newspapers have called this type of commercial disagreement “blackmail”. But these disputes, all fairly minor, should be seen in the context of Russia’s recovery from a period of recession and humiliation. Although Russia has not resolved its basic problems – demographics, the environment and corruption – it has rectified its economic situation and re-established its political presence and its capacity to make itself heard. The increase in the price of hydrocarbons has strongly contributed to this recovery. After being close to bankruptcy in 1998, Russia has now repaid all of its external debt and is feeling very self-confident.

This recovery has gone hand-in-hand with Vladimir Putin’s efforts to strengthen central power. Although Putin has not abolished democratic laws, he has bent them, favouring political parties that support him and restricting the independence of radio, television and other media. Several journalists have been murdered, yet their murderers have not been brought to book. Putin has pandered to the xenophobic feelings of Russians by denouncing foreign ‘plots’, such as the support given to democratic movements in Georgia and the Ukraine. Does the Russian regime fear that one day there will be opposition within its borders relying on outside support such as the “rose” or “orange” movements in Georgia and Ukraine respectively. Putin’s regime should have more confidence in itself; its leader is very popular and the opposition is impotent.

For Russians, a particular worry is the status of the space between the western border of Russia and the current boundaries of NATO and the European Union. The Americans pressed for the eastward expansion of NATO without much consideration for Russian concerns. The notion that this was a policy that could complicate relations with Russia did not apparently occur either to the Clinton administration or to President George W. Bush and his advisers. The European allies were scarcely more sensitive; France may not have been very enthusiastic about enlarging NATO, but found it difficult to oppose. The entry of formerly communist countries into NATO had in any case been verbally agreed to by Yeltsin, even if they were to be condemned by his successor.

During the Yeltsin years, relations between Russia and Europe had been fairly cordial. The buzzwords in Russia were democratisation and privatisation. Yeltsin claimed that his country had its roots in Europe. He wanted to be recognised by the Europeans as a partner, and raised no objections to the EU’s enlargement strategy. All this coincided with Europe’s decision to play a more active part in foreign affairs. Relations with Russia were selected as one of the first initiatives to test the Common Foreign and Security Policy proclaimed by the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. The Europeans proposed a cooperation and partnership agreement, which was signed in 1994 and took effect in 1997. The outlook at that time was very different to the attitude of the Soviet Union, which had refused on principle to consider the EU’s member states as a single entity and to deal with Brussels.

Yet even during this generally positive interlude, relations lacked real substance. The political tools that the EU used to deal with Russia were insufficient. The “common strategy” adopted by the Europeans was based on vague generalisations, such as Europe’s wish to cooperate with a “democratic, peaceful and prosperous” Russia. This anodyne text was adopted in 1999 and no one felt the need to change it until 2003, when Russians and Europeans drew up four “areas of cooperation”: the economy; freedom, security and justice; external security; and education and research.

But the promised cooperation in these various fields has not borne fruit. Perhaps the Russians expected to gain advantage in sensitive areas where Europe was not prepared to give, such as the direct distribution of oil products in Europe, or the taking of stakes in the EU’s arms industry. The equal treatment in all matters that Moscow had hoped for was not forthcoming. The result of these experiences is that Russia now understandably concludes that it has not in any genuine sense been “admitted to the club”.

The main reason for the present ill-defined, even ghostly relationship between Europe and Russia is the lack of unity among the Europeans themselves. For historical reasons, the different nations of Europe have highly individual views on Russia’s internal development, its conception of security and its “diplomatic” use of its energy assets. Former members of the Soviet empire like the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary see a revitalised Russia as a problem, self-confident once again, yet motivated by its bitter memories of the humiliations that followed the Soviet empire’s collapse.

So the EU countries feel neither a psychological unity nor a sense of common action. To come up with a working common policy towards Russia, one would have to start with the energy question. There is no common European line on this key topic, and indeed how could there be when there is no common policy on the whole vexed question of EU energy policy? It may be just one example of what needs to be done to build worthwhile relationship with Russia, but it would be a useful start.