INTERNATIONAL
Frozen conflicts 1: How the EU can help bring peace to the South Caucasus
Summer 2007
South Caucasus, long a backwater of international politics, is now seen as a strategically important region of great potential wealth. George Tarkhan-Mouravi of Georgia’s Institute for Policy Studies says the European Union can do much to help resolve its frozen conflicts, including declaring countries there eligible for eventual accession
Azerbaijan says its economy grew by 34.5% last year, the highest in the world. It may be true. Even if it is a trifle exaggerated, no one doubts that it is doing well and is giving new importance to South Caucasus, a region that until recently was considered more of a liability than an asset.
The European Union, forever peering beyond its more obvious borders, includes in its European Neighbourhood Policy the three countries of South Caucasus, Azerbaijan, the most populous (about 8m), Armenia and Georgia. The new neighbours are offered a number of opportunities, although little hope in terms of accession: “everything but institutions” had been Romano Prodi’s famous promise. Nevertheless, it is gradually dawning on some in the EU that if it is to achieve its goals in South Caucasus, it should keep alive the hopes of accession.
The wealth of Caspian oil and the accompanying transit routes through the region are obvious attractions. The Caucasus straddles the Euro-Asian energy corridor between the Black and the Caspian Seas. It is becoming a major transportation hub between Central Asia and the West, and may evolve into an equally important north-south route.
South Caucasus sits between traditional rivals, pro-western Turkey, and assertive Russia. Iran, increasingly a source of concern because of its nuclear ambitions, lies to the south. Conflicts, coups and civil strife are part of the history of this crossroad of civilisations, in which orderly change of political leadership is rare.
All three South Caucasus states suffer from the Soviet legacy of authoritarian governance and nationality policies. Nationalism and ethnic conflicts exploded as the Soviet empire fell apart. Despite some achievements in nation building, attempted reforms have been hindered by weak institutions, poor governance and political volatility. Large amounts of international reconstruction and development aid have yielded little progress.
Russia dominates peacekeeping negotiations, though some perceive it as more a party to conflicts than a neutral mediator. It seeks to block the region’s pro-western aspirations and western access to Central Asia’s oil and gas reserves. Russia is intent on reversing its waning influence, and is keen on punishing states such as Georgia that have openly pro-western attitudes. Russia stations peacekeepers (or peace-blockers) in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two former autonomies that broke away from Georgia in the 1990s. Russian passports are issued en masse in Georgia’s break-away territories to create a pretext for future “protection” of its new citizens. In January 2006, referring to “precedents that exist in international life”, President Putin portentously asked: “If someone believes that Kosovo can be granted full state independence, then why should we refuse the same to the Abkhaz or the South Ossetians?”
Turkey is the other important power in the region. Since the start of the war in Iraq it has pursued what seems a dual foreign policy. In seeking influence in South Caucasus, it has improved relations with Russia (and cooled those with the United States). It wants to establish common interests with Russia in the Black Sea region. It fears losing control over the Turkish straits, and is increasingly dependent on Russian gas. However, Turkish traditional interest in the region has been to weaken Russian influence and to represent western interests. About a seventh of Turkey’s population originates from the Caucasus and that strongly influences Turkey’s Caucasian policies.
The three small countries of the South Caucasus may seem more divided than united in their relationships, but a single shared ambition now drives them in a single direction: Europe.
Geographic proximity, strategic significance, security concerns, the need for energy and challenges posed by developments in the Middle East make South Caucasus of immediate relevance to the EU. But the EU’s political engagement in the region has nevertheless been minimal, even if a lot of money (about, €1.2bn) has been provided in assistance during recent years. Many European policymakers continue to see Russian interests as a reason not to engage too strongly in the region, and the EU has not even held observer status in three forums set up to deal with its conflicts.
The EU lacks a comprehensive policy for the region. When plans for a stability pact for South Caucasus were floated just before Germany took over the EU’s presidency, EU officials responded that the European Neighbourhood Policy would make such a pact redundant. It is the United States and Russia that determine the pace and direction of political processes in South Caucasus. The EU relies on its aid, moral authority and “honest broker” image, which appear less effective when the strongest component of its “soft power” – the prospect of EU accession – is lacking.
The EU needs a vision for South Caucasus that would reflect the geopolitical realities there and that would also be in line with the Union’s policy towards Russia and Turkey (and perhaps the United States too). The introduction of conflict resolution and diplomatic mediation as part of the EU’s policy for the region, combined with a more comprehensive strategy towards the Black Sea and Middle East regions, are matters of importance that go far beyond South Caucasus.
Resolving conflicts has to be a key EU priority in South Caucasus. Without it, durable development and political stability stand no chance. But does the European Neighbourhood Policy on its own provide a strong enough framework for dealing with territorial conflicts in the region?
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are the breakaway Georgian enclaves bordering Russia. With Russian soldiers stationed there, and the majority of the people given Russian citizenship, it would be virtually impossible to achieve conflict resolution without first persuading Russia that this would be in its own best interest, or by persuading the populations that they can expect a brighter future if they remain part of Georgia. Dealing with these conflicts internationally seems to be the only way forward, and the EU should discuss this with Russia. However, neither the EU nor any other western power has sufficient influence over Georgia’s conflicts. While proceeding with a piecemeal approach, along with strengthening and democratising the Georgian state, the EU should concentrate on the more tractable conflict in Nagorno Karabakh.
The Karabakh quarrel is between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Azerbaijan lost Karabakh, mostly populated by Armenians, in a secessionist conflict. The conflict is frozen, although Azerbaijan regularly threatens to take Karabakh back by force. Russia is only indirectly involved but gives military support to Armenia. Some modest initial steps towards re-starting deadlocked negotiations are still possible, and that would boost the EU’s authority in the region. Armenia is also interested in resolving the conflict in Abkhazia, and has some influence there through the large Armenian community. But the European Neighbourhood Policy alone does not have sufficient instruments to influence the process significantly. A much stronger commitment on the part of the EU is now needed.
Cooperation between the EU and the United States is crucial on this and other matters in South Caucasus. The two have many common interests in the region: democratisation and rule of law; stable energy supply and transit; concerns over security, organised crime, nuclear proliferation, drug trafficking and terrorism; regulating migration and borders. Such cooperation could, among other things, be a factor in influencing Armenia and Turkey to improve relations, which broke down partly as a result of the Karabakh conflict when Turkey supported Azerbaijan. Armenians feel isolated except for Russian support.
South Caucasus is a dynamic yet contentious region. It has all the seeds of instability, but it also has the potential to become a great success story, as Azerbaijan’s economic performances would seem to demonstrate and as the people of the region share the clear ambition of wanting to join the European Union. The states of South Caucasus therefore need to be assured that the doors of Europe are not closed to them, and that European Neighbourhood Policy is not an alternative to EU membership. Only the eventual prospect of accession could provide them with a real incentive to move more quickly to adopt European standards of democracy, and at the same time provide the EU with the levers of influence it needs to achieve its strategic objectives.