COMMENTARY
Sadly, the ESDP looks stronger from the outside than it is
Autumn 2008
What a wonderfully harmonious world it would be – at least from a Chinese perspective – if the EU were to develop in the way described by Dingli Shen . He correctly explains China’s view of the world and international relations, and at the same time he is also right in saying that the EU has in just a decade developed the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in a remarkable way. But from a European perspective things look a little different.
Two misperceptions need to be clarified. The first concerns what might be called the emerging new international order. Looking back at the history of Sino-European relations during the second half of the 20th century, China has always interpreted Europe’s integration process in the context of different theoretical concepts of Chinese foreign policy. At one time, the European integration process was observed rather sceptically by China, and then at another time it was seen as something positive. Today, Beijing views the whole concept of multipolarity in which the EU is so deeply embedded from a very Chinese perspective.
The problem for China is that the EU and its member states are rather hesitant to use the term multipolarity in the context of EU foreign, security and defence policy. With the possible exception of France, the multipolarity debate is not a European one. The term isn’t to be found in the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, and when the ESS talks about an international order based on effective multilateralism this should not be confused with multipolarity. It also seems a kind of wishful thinking that the EU and the US might be separated that easily. Transatlantic relations have certainly been undergoing difficulties, but the general interest on both sides of the Atlantic in keeping up the relationship remains strong.
The second misperception is linked to the nature and the potential of the ESDP. From the early days of ESDP in late 1998 until today, security and defence policy has become one of the most dynamic and fast developing policies of the European integration process. But not everything that glitters is gold. Apart from specific practical details concerning the implementation of this policy, one should be aware that it is far from being a common policy. It was never conceptualised as one, even though the wording of the Lisbon treaty might give the impression that there will be a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The whole project is an intergovernmental one. When reading the respective provisions in the Treaty on European Union, they underline the fact that the EU’s member states remain firmly in control of security and defence policy. And even if the ESS refers to the “need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention“, the EU is still in search of such a strategic culture, while there are diverging views amongst EU member states when it comes to the level and intensity of military engagement in any given conflict. A strategic culture, or a strategically guided foreign policy as in the case of China, is far from a reality in the case of Europe.
Expectations that the EU might develop into a “true security alliance” as Dingli Shen calls it seem to be higher outside the EU, than inside it. Even if the Lisbon treaty – or the parts that concern foreign, security and defence policy – eventually becomes a reality, the EU will remain a restrained security actor. Nevertheless, when looking at EU-China relations it would be worthwhile to start a concrete dialogue on global interests and to find out, where a common denominator might be developed.