Ever since the EU’s ill-fated constitutional treaty was laid to rest in 2005, the notion has persisted in some circles that there is some form of Plan B. It’s a view that is especially popular amongst eurosceptics, for to them those who work to build a united Europe possess many ingenious methods of misleading and manipulating the citizens of Europe in their quest to create a European super state.
Given this mindset, it is perhaps inevitable that the Lisbon treaty has come to be seen by them as just such an agenda. To them, it looks compellingly like the agenda that could breathe life back into the constitutional monster that was so convincingly rejected in 2005.
There is of course no such agenda. In fact, and in strict accordance with international law, this treaty was negotiated and then signed by the EU’s member states. The ratification process was scrupulously democratic – each of the 27 member states was required to ratify the treaty through its own democratic institutions and it could only be adopted once the treaty had been ratified by all. But that hasn’t satisfied the eurosceptics. Many of them argue that even if the treaty wasn’t ratified, national governments will still find some informal way of implementing it – or at least its core institutional innovations.
But despite the near practical impossibility of pursuing such an informal agenda – given that each and every government action faces intense media scrutiny these days – it is nonetheless interesting to consider how this approach could be implemented. At a foreign policy level in particular, it’s possible to imagine two very different approaches. The first could involve a European foreign policy based exclusively around the oldest member states such as France, Germany and Italy. This group could perhaps also include the UK because as a major power it plays a key role in many international operations and global fora. In essence, this would leave European foreign policy in the hands of those who count for most in the world and who have helped bolster the EU’s status in the global arena.
But it’s not clear whether such a foreign policy would take a truly European form, or whether it would merely reflect the priorities of the major European states. There is also the problem of how the left would react. And it is unclear whether the UK and Germany would even be willing to contemplate the creation of such a core policymaking structure when it would be largely divorced from their smaller neighbours. Quite possibly, the existence of a European diplomatic approach that’s dominated by Europe’s great powers might only be tolerated by Europe’s smaller nations if it remained virtually invisible and focused exclusively on the most pragmatic issues.
The second possibility could involve the creation of an EU diplomatic body that developed into Europe’s only creator of foreign policy. And it’s true to say that the senior officials behind the Common Foreign and Security Policy have already become significant personalities on the international stage and often lead negotiations – usually under the watchful eye of Europe’s larger member states. The problem is that the creation of such a body could leave some national governments fearful that something of a coup d’état had taken place on the foreign policy front – effectively denying individual nations their freedom of action in foreign affairs.
The existence of some secret plan to push forward the European constitutional agenda is of course one of those ideas beloved by conspiracy theorists. Perhaps that’s not surprising given that European negotiations are usually in the hands of unelected bureaucrats, whether they be Eurocrats or from a national bureaucracy. But in reality progress on the road towards European integration has only ever been achieved democratically. And regardless of the issue – whether it was Maastricht, the constitutional treaty or the treaty of Lisbon – there has always been plenty of debate. The development of an EU-wide foreign policy must therefore be conducted in the same way, and must reflect the foreign policy objectives of the member states.
It also has to be recognised that an EU foreign policy must be subject to the same limitations, and meet the same requirements, as the foreign policy of any individual member state. Over past centuries, each nation has developed its own unique foreign policy approach influenced by events ranging from war to the economic needs of a country’s people. What’s more, a foreign policy approach cannot simply be dictated – it must express the objectives of an entire nation. So the development of foreign policy becomes subject to the same legal and political processes, including the media influence and public opinion, as any other policy area.
The most complete and decisive example of a European-wide foreign policy to date is the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), and it has helped to rank the EU amongst the world’s heavyweights. It would be wrong to perceive the CCP as somehow separate from the single market – it is its external manifestation, guiding the EU’s commercial relations with the rest of the world. The creation of the euro has similarly led to a single monetary policy, and therefore a single eurozone approach to monetary matters. The point here is that progress on integration within Europe is directly linked to the development of the EU’s external policy – the two are inter-linked and cannot develop independently of one another.
Enlargement of the European Union has in recent years been the main tool that has driven its foreign policy initiatives. It has been the means for bringing those on the outside of the European construct into the club. The process of enlargement is, though, time-consuming, typically lasting for several years. The negotiations involved are complex, demanding the ratification of treaties and even requiring some form of democratic approval by the citizens of the countries involved. One can only guess at what agenda the eurosceptic conspiracy theorists imagine might exist in this arena – perhaps it includes the transformation of Turkey, or the former Yugoslav states, into EU members by the waving of some form of magic diplomatic wand.
In traditional foreign affairs terms – essentially inter-state discussions or international crisis management – policymaking is still in the hands of the nation states. Virtually all of the EU’s member states, and especially major powers like France, Germany and the UK – jealously guard their sovereignty in this area. France and the UK aren’t prepared to give up their seats as permanent members of the UN Security Council, and their stance reflects the perception amongst many ordinary citizens that enough sovereignty has already been lost to the EU.
But, should despite all these obstacles a truly European foreign policy materialise, then it certainly won’t be the result of some sinister hidden agenda. It’s more likely to come about as a result of international events that individual nations have little control over. That could leave some of Europe’s main powers with less global influence than they currently enjoy – in such circumstances the international weight of, say, the UK’s Foreign Commonwealth Office or France’s Quai d’Orsay, might be much diminished. The attitude of states like China, India or Brazil – for whom only a united Europe really counts – might also prove significant. And the growing importance of diplomacy in tackling such technical issues as climate change could also become influential. Ultimately, whether individual nations like it or not, developments like globalisation increasingly leave them as cogs in a larger machine where their legal and political structures are influenced and re-shaped by proliferating international legislation.
There cannot therefore be a hidden agenda capable of directing the EU’s future course. Such a notion would require the existence of some secret group capable of manipulating the opinions of entire populations. Indeed, one of the greatest challenges facing the EU is to establish its own democratic legitimacy. It’s becoming increasingly urgent to convince Europeans to accept as positive a Europe that has been built by technocrats. The task is complicated by the lack of clarity in the minds of ordinary people about who actually represents them within the European framework – especially when both national governments and the European Parliament seldom miss an opportunity to blame the European Commission for any decisions that aren’t popular.
If the EU is to continue making progress – especially in foreign policy – then the people of Europe need to develop a degree of European political consciousness. It’s a lengthy process that cannot possibly succeed if pursued through an elitist and undemocratic agenda.