European countries’ very different histories mean EU governments often lack a firm basis for policy appraisals. Former Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski traces the growth of common attitudes to global issues despite these differences
Does the EU have a “World View”? It does, and has had in the past, yet that’s no reason for pride. A whole range of institutions and organisations across Europe dealing with international affairs have some kind of world view, with the result that the EU has too many. The fashionable motto “think global, act local” underlines the fact there’s no escape from global issues that affect us all as human beings. In this age of international media and immediate communication, of nuclear weaponry and global terrorism, having a world view is not so much a privilege as an obligation.
So why do I say that the European Union has too many world views? As Europeans, our common experiences and interests mean we should indeed have shared views on global issues. But the unfortunate reality is that political, social and economic pressures tend to push us in the opposite direction because the histories and strategic interests of European nations are not a firm basis for shared policy appraisals. Napoleon once remarked how fortunate are those nations which do not have history, and Europe has both a tragic history and a good memory. Our comparatively experiences span the division of Europe and the Cold War period and shape not only our different world views but also our visions of how Europe should engage with the rest of the world.
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| History is not the only problem – it’s probably not even the main one – determining all these different world views. We Europeans spend much time discussing our shared values because they are an important point of departure when we set out to create a community of attitudes. Yet, like history, shared values are not enough. An attempt to define and systematise shared values when Europe was putting together its Charter of Fundamental Rights pointed to the limitations of a “top-down” model that tried to shape the attitudes to be shared rather than – as we had hoped – ensuring a greater convergence of attitudes. A number of issues proved too difficult to be acceptable to all EU member states, with the result being that Britain and Poland adopted an opt-out clause in the Charter.
So how optimistic should we be? The familiar truth now being confirmed yet again is that the more pragmatic the policies Europe pursues, the greater the chances of their success, not least when it comes to global issues. Europeans have a shared vision of many aspects of the world’s problems, and often put forward common methods and strategies for coping with them. On climate change, immigration and development aid there is growing consensus, as there is on energy policy and the further development of the European Security Strategy. None of these are areas that could be referred to as lowest common denominators because for each of them Europe has contributed important added-value at a global level – Europe’s community of attitudes is becoming synonymous with the world community of problems.
These problems are far from banal; climate change, energy security and demographic challenges have for many years been part of the European discourse, and now they are starting to be shared by other parts of the world. The global financial and economic crisis may also be a catalyst for promoting Europe’s vision of a new world order. The EU vision of a capitalist economy that is harnessed to social progress and development aid is also subject to regulation rather than left to loose laissez-faire policies. New economic powers like China, India and Brazil must find their own ways of addressing social injustice and encouraging equal opportunity for all, and the European model must look an increasingly attractive model for them.
The idea that Europe has developed a community of attitudes towards global problems should not obscure the many differences that still separate societies in the European Union. There are diverging views on many of the global problems that are likely to remain the daily bread of European politics for some time yet. And although these differences seem to grow smaller in the course of time, they occasionally take on an alarmingly clear-cut form, as in the case of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. It is nevertheless comforting that Europe’s differences of opinion on global issues have not had an excessive impact on the internal dynamics of the EU. The war in Iraq did not delay the Union’s “big bang” enlargement, and was certainly not the main reason for the failure of referenda in France, the Netherlands and Ireland on the Constitutional and Lisbon treaties. But of course Europe needs to develop structures and decision-making processes that limit conflicts of interest by instead offering compromise solutions. This has been the crux of the Lisbon treaty that is designed to usher in new institutions and mechanisms that can create greater political cohesion of EU external policies. Transferring more external relations competences to the EU institutions is the other side of the same coin. Transferring areas of responsibility like aid and development policies helps the EU to adapt to new international realities by underpinning Brussels' growing importance as Europe's decision-making centre.
It is a truism to say that shaping a shared vision of the world in which Europe has an important role should start with Europe’s immediate neighbourhood. Yet it is something that needs to be firmly restated as it is precisely in the EU’s neighbourhood that we have so much to offer. NATO and EU enlargements have embraced a dozen or so states in Central and Eastern Europe and in the western Balkans, but in spite of these achievements the European integration process is far from completed. It will remain so until all European countries can take the sort of development path they want. This was largely the reason for the Balkans tragedy of the 1990s, but fortunately the time for armed conflict in the region appears to have come to a definite end now that Balkan states are on the path to NATO and EU membership. But eastern Europe, especially Ukraine and Moldova, today needs to be treated as a region of special importance. Ukraine’s population of 46m means it is far too big and important to be left out of any vision of Europe’s future. Yet the EU’s strategy towards Ukraine has been ambiguous and obscure. The Orange Revolution’s reform drive has been slowed or even halted by political and economic crisis.
Brussels and the EU’s national capitals lament the political divisions and slow pace of reform so often found in Ukraine, and many of these criticisms are justified and need to be addressed by the country’s political leaders in Kiev. But Ukraine’s lack of progress is also to a considerable extent a reflection of the EU’s failure to embrace it closely enough to play a full role in European affairs. Reform of a country’s political and economic initiatives and its accession to the EU and NATO usually go hand in hand, because the prospect of membership makes painful decisions electorally acceptable. In short, it hasn’t been realistic of the EU to expect European outcomes from countries like Ukraine and Moldova without itself making a full commitment to them.
Fortunately, the West’s approach is changing. The recent Gas Memorandum about cooperation between the EU and Ukraine on extension and exploitation of Ukrainian gas pipelines is a perfect example; in return for political support and for funding of the extension of Ukrainian gas pipelines, Ukraine has agreed to adopt EU rules governing management and access to the gas transmission line. It also agreed to implement the relevant EU energy Directives in the coming years as part of its membership of the European Energy Community. It is a first step towards the Ukraine’s eventual full integration into the EU Single Market.
The European Union has thus been building the firm foundations for a shared world view, and its lack of unanimity on many issues is no reason for despair. Different opinions on the challenges of today are inherent to the realities of the modern world. The trick is to develop shared solutions and to take joint foreign policy actions, even when various EU governments see things differently. We Europeans have achieved much during the years that have yielded the Lisbon treaty. The capabilities and instruments it offers may not be a major breakthrough, but the time is coming when we’ll “cross the European Rio Grande”. |