EUROPE

Autumn 2009

by Otto Schily

Enlargement “fatigue” and Europe’s economic woes have seen the membership hopes of most western Balkan countries dwindle and fade. Otto Schily, a former German Interior Minister, warns of potentially disastrous consequences if the accession drive isn’t revived

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Sarajevo 1914 saw Europe enter almost a century of internecine war and conflict that eventually come full circle with the Yugoslav wars 10 years ago. Now we must commit to a better Europe of lasting peace, stable democracies, and vibrant economy, in which a continent previously divided by the Cold War is firmly united. But without the countries of the western Balkans in the EU, the process of unification will remain incomplete. To make a united Europe become reality, the European Union must demonstrate its own commitment to the western Balkans.

It is the attractions of the EU model that make significant change in the western Balkans possible. But if the EU were to water down the Balkan countries’ accession hopes or to postpone the prospect of eventual membership to some distant day, that would have the effect of denying those countries their rewards for the improvements they’ve already made, undermine the EU’s own credibility and remake the most important incentive for the difficult and unpopular reforms the whole region has still to undertake. And in that case, the western Balkans could once again find itself a hotbed of unrest, instability and nationalism.

To avoid there being a “Non-Europe” at the centre of the European Union, the EU now has to show that it is able to develop a comprehensive security and foreign policy designed to open its doors to the western Balkans.

Yet in spite of the commitments made by EU heads of government at their Thessaloniki summit in 2003, when they reaffirmed the membership prospects of all the western Balkan countries provided they can meet all the necessary criteria, the integration process is now stumbling; the EU is hesitating over how to proceed with its next enlargement round. Another bout of enlargement fatigue has gripped the European Union, with the global financial and economic crisis drawing much attention away from the Balkans accession issue.

The result of all this is that the 20m or so inhabitants of the Western Balkans are becoming increasingly aware that enlargement is no longer fashionable in the EU, so they themselves have begun to recognise that EU accession is no longer a convincing political prospect. Croatia’s accession negotiations have advanced remarkably well, but the outlook for Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania seems blurred.

Without strong and credible EU hopes, the western Balkans could relapse back into being a genuine threat to security and peace in Europe. The dwindling likelihood of EU membership will also mean the weakening of Brussels’ soft power and of the EU’s influence on the reform process in the region. Along with that there will be an increasing danger of destabilisation and disintegration of the Balkan’s region’s fragile, multi-ethnic countries. Nationalist movements there are already gaining influence, and an erosion of democratic politics is a real threat in democracies that have never been very strong. The western Balkans has also been affected particularly by the global financial crisis and its economic shock waves. The worst-case scenario throughout the western Balkans is that once the combination of inadequate economic growth and weak state institutions is compounded by the dashing of EU membership ambitions, the region could again become a dangerous trouble spot.

But it’s not too late to avert this dire scenario. The EU membership perspective continues to be a crucially important incentive for stabilisation, democratisation and modernisation to continue in the western Balkans, and should be given high priority, and supported in a sustainable way. Far from being allowed to slow down, progress of the Balkan countries towards EU membership should be accelerated and given fresh impetus.

EU member states should strongly reaffirm their Thessaloniki commitment, and so even further by giving their support to EU accession proposals for the western Balkans in the European Council.

To offer the region a credible prospect of EU membership, the Copenhagen Criteria and the EU’s own institutional capacity should be the only preconditions for accession negotiations to begin. Indeed, when any European country can meet these longstanding conditions for accession it should be accepted as a member. Applying double standards to the western Balkans would be a fatal mistake.

Unhindered visa-free travel to the EU for citizens of the western Balkans would give a considerable impetus to its European perspective. The recent proposal by the European Commission to allow citizens of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro to travel to Schengen countries without visas was an important signal for these countries and is at the same time a significant step on the road to EU membership. But, visa-free travel must also be extended to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo as soon as these countries fulfil the criteria of improving passport security, strengthening border controls and reinforcing the institutional framework needed to fight organised crime and corruption. Keeping these countries out of the visa-free travel would quite possibly see a further rise in the unwanted practice of people there instead obtaining passports from privileged neighbour states. As this could lead to serious conflict between the states concerned, none of the western Balkan countries should be left behind in the EU’s visa free travel policy.

Allaying Balkan countries’ fears about their European prospects would also help to overcome some of the worst consequences of the financial crisis. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement process and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) are both important tools for reviving economic growth and creating jobs, and the EU should also increase its efforts to promote cooperation with the countries involved in the areas of science and research, education, culture, employment and social issues and environmental protection as well as the field of freedom and security. Wider contacts and cooperation initiatives embracing scientific and educational institutions does much to support the development of civil society. It is up to the EU to implement these policies that would give the region a chance to catch up with the rest of Europe.

To avoid jeopardising the successes achieved so far, and to make headway towards the further enlargement of the EU, the accession processes for both Croatia and Macedonia must now be allowed to proceed quickly so that two clear successes can be chalked up. This would send a clear and unambiguous message to the whole region that the prospect of EU membership is still alive.

It is already essential that any negative trends should be reversed. In July this year the new Croatian Prime Minister, Jadranka Kosor, declared that she would continue on the pro-European course of her predecessor, Ivo Sanader, but the worrying truth is that nationalistic forces in the ruling HDZ party have been gaining influence. With decisive Croatian elections due either next year or in 2011, it is of the utmost importance that pro-European political forces in the country should be strengthened by clear signals from the EU – like a concrete accession date.

As to Macedonia, it should be given EU support for a new reform dynamic that could minimise any risk of the country becoming destabilised. The possibility of opening accession negotiations would pressurise Nikola Gruevski’s government to accept the political responsibilities it took on when elected in 2008 and focus on Macedonia’s neglected domestic reform programme. For this strategy to be successful in Skopje and Zagreb, the EU must act to prevent the Slovenian-Croatian border dispute and the Greek-Macedonian name quarrel from further dominating the respective accession processes.

It will be up to the leaders and the people of the western Balkans to determine through the determination with which these reforms are implemented whether their country moves towards a future inside the EU. Reform and reconciliation have yet to become well-established in most Balkan countries, and their drives on state-building and better governance are far from over. On inter-ethnic issues there is not nearly enough spirit of compromise, while corruption and organised crime remain issues of major concern. But it has to be emphasised yet again that hard and painful reforms are much easier to implement if a Balkan government has concrete and realistic targets in sight.

It is far from being only in the interest of the people of the western Balkans, that the region should be able to press ahead with political and economic reform and reconciliation between its peoples. It is in the wider strategic interest of the EU. But here again, the consolidation of stability and the enhancement of reform in the western Balkans can only be achieved once there is definite progress in the accession process.

In geopolitical terms, the EU’s security will obviously be all the greater once the western Balkans are an integral part of the Union. And organised crime and corruption clearly pose much more of a threat to European Union member states if the Balkan countries remain outside the EU. The international community has already invested enormous sums of money, goodwill and human resources in the region, but unless these investments are accompanied by credible EU prospect they risk being wasted. So far, the EU’s successive enlargements have made it stronger, and there is every reason to believe that further enlargements will also do so.