The EU needs to stage a political comeback in the Middle East if the revived peace process is to succeed, says Oded Eran, Israel’s former ambassador to Brussels. But he warns that Israel’s relations with the EU are now at a low ebb
Europe’s absence from the Middle East peace process is striking. After all the years of George W. Bush's Middle East policies that distanced the U.S. even from moderate Arab states, the least one might expect is a more visible role for the EU in the current efforts to breathe new life into the peace process. Yet it is primarily the U.S. that is trying to impress on Israel the need to freeze its settlement activity while at the same time cajoling moderate Arab states to respond with gestures that could eventually normalise their relations with Israel. So, in spite of eight years of heightened tensions between the U.S. and the Arab Middle East, and regardless of the EU being the largest single contributor to the Palestinian Authority as well as Europe's many economic ties to the region, it still plays second fiddle at best to Washington in the effort to bring the Arab-Israeli conflict to an end.
The reasons for this wide gap between today’s reality and European ambitions for a more central role in the Middle East peace process are well known. First there has been the absence of a single, coherent European voice. And with the advent of the Obama Administration a better transatlantic dialogue on Middle Eastern issues may in turn lead to a more coordinated division of labour between the U.S. and the EU. Applying the principle of engagement to U.S.-EU relations would certainly contribute to this, while President Obama’s own crowded and ambitious Middle East agenda may well mean that the U.S. finds itself very much in need of a European partner.
Some of the obstacles to a more robust EU role in the peace process may therefore vanish, but there will probably still be the central hurdle of Europe’s relations with Israel. Leaving aside the historic love-hate relationship between the Jewish people and Europe, there is the uneven and rocky record of relations between some EU players and the modern State of Israel. France, for example, performed a volte face from being virtually the sole supplier of arms to Israel between 1950 and 1967 to imposing an arms embargo when Israel was in the existential crisis of the 1967 Six Day War. And Britain went from its 1917 Balfour Declaration – one of the key milestones on the road to the Jewish state – to imposing its own arms embargo at the time of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. These two early examples of how Europe lost Israel's trust and confidence were followed by the EEC’s 1980 Venice Declaration that amounted to a call for a Palestinian state. That occurred more than two decades before the idea was enshrined by President George W. Bush along with the Roadmap towards a two-state solution, and what may today be seen as evidence of Europe’s political farsightedness. It was at the time perceived as a sign of Europe's inherent hostility towards Israel.
In the wake of the 1991 Madrid Conference, Europe agreed to open negotiations with Israel for a wider Free Trade Agreement. Soon after, the 1993 Oslo Accords and Israel’s 1994 peace treaty with Jordan accelerated the conclusion of these negotiations. With Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in sight, and following the EU’s 2004 “big bang” enlargement from 15 to 25 member states, the EU agreed to an Action Plan for the upgrading of relations with Israel. Significantly, however, both the EU’s Association Agreement with Israel in 1995 and the Action Plan in 2004 were linked to wider policy developments embracing Europe's neighbours, notably though the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy. This means that while Israel is able to benefit from these policies, it has also been left with the distinct impression that its relations with Europe are indexed to the progress of the Middle East peace process and must also be part of a wider European strategy that goes well beyond upgrading the EU’s relations with Israel.
These are all past irritations that still matter, but the more important point is that even if only partial progress is made in the revived peace process an international presence will be needed in four areas:
- Assistance in the two bilateral tracks of Israel-Syria and Israel-Palestinian Authority as well as the multi-lateral one.
- Support for security arrangements between the negotiating parties.
- Support for economic arrangements concluded between the negotiating parties.
- Support for institution-building in the Palestinian state.
Given the level of mutual distrust and rancour that exists between them, a reluctance by Israel to cooperate with the EU in these four areas is only to be expected. The EU’s reactions to Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, European attitudes towards Prime Minister Netanyahu's centre-right government and episodes such as the Swedish Aftonbladet newspaper article about the Israeli army’s “atrocities” have put paid to any chances of Israeli receptiveness to a meaningful European role.
Only four years ago, a new and uncharted road that might lead to greater Israeli amenability towards Europe was opened. Necessity rather than any strategic decision had forced Israel to accept a European presence on its borders in areas affecting its security – EUBAM operating on the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt; EUCOPPS which operates in the West Bank; and the strengthened UNIFIL in southern Lebanon. But the old pattern of relations prevailed, with Israel and the EU both returning to their familiar and thus more comfortable roles – the EU in harshly critical mode, tightly linking any progress in bi-lateral relations to progress in the peace progress and Israel pointing at the Europe’s horrible past, the degree of anti-Israeli European sentiment in the present, and the prospect of an “Islamised” Europe in the future.
If there is way out of this vicious cycle, it has to be found jointly by the leaderships of both sides. The EU’s Czech Presidency in the first half of this year had planned an Israeli-EU summit, but in the wake of Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza and then the general elections here the idea was scrapped. Yet such a summit is long overdue and possible positive developments in the peace process now make it more necessary than ever. If held, it would force the two sides to reconsider their traditional roles, and might even cause the Israeli government to determine its strategic ambitions in relation to Europe and central institutions that include NATO. It would force both sides to decide whether they truly want to conduct a dialogue on long term objectives, or prefer to keep each other at a distance.
For Israel, these are decisions that touch on both concrete issues and on national identity; they transcend matters like trade, arms supplies or permission to associate with one EU institution or another. These are decisions about orientation – east or west? It’s a question that does not denote judgment on either, nor does it mean making a zero-sum choice. It means channelling national efforts and investment, and it means taking on commitments and obligations. And for Europe, the very fact of holding the summit would be a sign of political courage. It would be evidence of a readiness to take bolder action against anti-semitism and libels against Israel and Israelis. It would also be a sign of a European readiness to treat Israel on its own merits rather than merely as one of several neighbours who have very little in common with each other, and certainly not with Israel.
This summit could usher in a constructive dialogue on the wider aspects of the peace process and Europe's role in it. The 2004 Action Plan provided for that, but both sides failed to use the opportunity provided and left it to mid-level bureaucrats to conduct the dialogue.
A visit by Israel’s prime minister to the EU institutions in Brussels has yet to take place in this century, and in any case just one summit would not remove the deep residue of mutual distrust and suspicion. EU-Israeli summits should be seen as part of several confidence-building measures and a structured plan to save Israel-EU relations from further deterioration. Israel could rediscover the positive role Europe can play in the peace process, and especially in the web of mechanisms that will have to be built to support any new agreements reached between Israel and its neighbours.