Russia apparently believes its growing economic power and revitalised military influence entitles it to a bigger role in the transatlantic security dialogue. Janusz Onyszkiewicz argues that Europe should be cautious – Russians still believe in the idea of “Great Powers” rather than multi-lateralism
It seems a very long time since Russia and the European Community shook hands on a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) to enshrine “commonly-shared values”. Signed in 1994 during the hopeful early days of Russia’s first-ever democracy, the PCA was bolstered in 1999 by the creation of the EU’s fully-fledged Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP). Relations were further enhanced four years later by the concept of “common spaces” – areas where EU-Russian co-operation was felt to be critical. Among these was a common space on external security, covering a vast range of issues encompassing crisis management and common peacekeeping operations, anti-terrorism co-operation and common effort to halt nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction.
|
Advertisement |
|
| This desire to forge closer relations was often referred to on both sides as a “strategic partnership”. But Russia appears to be changing the terms of this nascent friendship, so Europeans increasingly wonder whether the partnership can continue to develop. They had looked wide-eyed at Russia’s apparent departure from democratisation under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, and at the war in Chechnya, after which the EU employed more cautious language with respect to Russia, sounding less optimistic about the prospects of a real partnership.
The European Security Strategy adopted at the end of 2004 says only that “we should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership”. Russia’s August 2008 war with Georgia produced even franker language in a CFSP resolution by the European Parliament in February 2009, which thundered: “No strategic partnership is possible if the values of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law are not fully shared and respected”. In a later resolution, the European Parliament weren’t on to say that Russian conduct in the war has put a “question mark over Russia’s readiness to build together with the EU a common space of security in Europe”.
If Europe is reviewing its stance towards Russia, it appears that Russians too are struggling to reconcile their disparate views on Europe. Some profess to be “sick and tired of dealing with Brussels’ bureaucrats”. Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the foreign relations committee of the Russian Duma, has said “In Germany, Italy, France, we can achieve much more.” Mr Kosachev and others do not believe the EU is committed to serious talks on “hard” security, which is an imperative for Russia.
Equally, how to deal with Russia on security issues, and in particular on energy security, is after Iraq the most divisive issue within the EU. Despite their commitments to speak to Russia with one voice, various EU countries negotiate with Russia bi-laterally whenever possible (especially over lucrative business contracts), congregating under the EU umbrella only when necessary. That gives Russia great scope to play one country off against another.
In spite of these irritants, Russia sees Europe as a powerful partner because of its financial and economic strength, and the EU’s ability to wield “soft power” is something that Russia is often said to lack. That has inspired many Russian politicians to develop the idea of a special Russia-Europe relationship which would present a united front to the U.S. It’s an idea about which Russia has long been obsessed, and foreign minister Sergei Lavrov believes that the U.S. policy of containment is targeted not only against Russia, but against Europe too because it is one of the contenders for leadership of the new world order. He believes Europe can barely refuse closer relations with Moscow because the “current problems of the European Union cannot be solved without constructive and forward-looking relations with Russia that are based on mutual trust”. Others within the echelons of Russia power, such as Yabloko’s deputy chairman Alexei Arbatov, dream of combining the potential of Russia and the EU to form “economically, militarily, geopolitically and culturally the mightiest global centre of power. This centre will forever eliminate the threat of unipolarity.”
An attempt to form a counterbalance to the U.S. became clearly visible when Russia tried to create a coalition of European countries to block the U.S. plan to invade Iraq, and it was also reflected in Moscow’s praise of French President Nicolas Sarkozy for being even-handed when representing the EU in negotiations over the Russian-Georgian conflict, in which Georgia was seen by Russia as a U.S. proxy. In a less confrontational approach to the U.S., Russia is running a parallel strategy of advocating close co-operation between the U.S., Russia and the EU in the hope that Russia and the EU will ultimately be partners in engaging the U.S.
Russian thinking on international relations and security is determined by a number of factors, and not all of them are widely understood outside the country. First, there is deep disappointment with the West for its actions after the fall of communism. During the Gorbachev era it was recognised that the West would maintain the containment policies that dated from the darkest days of the Cold War. But it was also assumed that once Russia was seen to be no longer openly confrontational and expansionist, and to be a more open and market-oriented economy, it would be recognised as a legitimate partner. This would mean its unquestioned territorial integrity, and that it would be left to arrange its own internal matters without external interference or criticism. Most important of all, it would retain its status of being an equal partner to the U.S. on the world stage. Instead, Russia found itself treated as a defeated nation and was forced to watch from the sidelines while political actions were taken without its consent and at times against its interests.
A second factor is that Russia is unable to believe that the international community has been strengthened by the reinforcement of multi-lateral institutions. It thinks that everything is a zero-sum game and that the strengthening of others is its own loss. Amid the liberal concept of international security based on transparency, interdependence and co-operation, Russia still adheres to the concept of spheres of influence and balance of power, harbouring an enduring penchant for the concept of “Great Powers”. Needless to say, for Russians, the loss of their Country’s superpower status is completely unacceptable.
Recent events, however, have put the proponents of a strong Russia back into a position of strength. Economic growth resulting from skyrocketing gas and oil prices combined with the outcome of the war with Georgia – which was regarded inside Russia as the beginning of a great political comeback– has given the country the confidence to try and re-model the transatlantic security architecture. This is not the first time Russia has taken such an initiative. At the end of the 19th century, realising that the coming arms race would be fatal for the very survival of the Tsarist regime, Russia came up with the idea of a world disarmament conference that would impose a freeze on the stockpiling of weapons and would establish arbitration as the main mechanism for settling international disputes. Then, almost a hundred years later in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union sponsored a European Conference on Security and Co-operation that was designed to replace the post-war treaty arrangements and so ratify the status quo in Europe, thus legitimising Soviet post-war political and territorial gains.
The Medvedev plan is eerily similar. His proposed treaty would enshrine the principle of avoiding external force to settle national disputes and so would mean no interference in the problems in the northern Caucasus, including Chechnya. Reinforcement of the status quo would be enhanced by a further principle that no country should be allowed to increase its security to the detriment of another – although it is unclear who would decide if a particular measure taken by one state was detrimental to the security of another. The freedom to join military treaties, stipulated in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 as well as in other major international agreements like the Charter of Paris for a New Europe or the Charter for European Security, is ominously omitted. The expansion of military alliances, such as NATO, would be declared a threatening measure.
What, then, should be Europe’s reaction to the Russian proposal? First, it must be said that Russia has a critical role to play in transatlantic security and should be treated not only with caution but with respect. But there already exists a range of institutions dealing with the issue: OSCE, the NATO-Russia Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to name but a few. There is no need to create others, even though it would be appropriate to review the existing institutions and perhaps reinvigorate and fortify them. The principle of the indivisibility of European security and the security of the U.S., so fundamental during the Cold War, of course remains valid. Security initiatives should therefore be discussed first bi-laterally within the NATO-EU framework, and only then should a common position be presented at the OSCE. Speaking to Russia with one voice is absolutely essential.
The idea that was implicitly but not openly voiced in President Vladimir Medvedev’s plan – that Russia should have a power of veto on all security-related decisions of NATO or the EU – must be firmly rejected. Russia should not treat NATO as a threat, as has been set out in the new Russian Military Doctrine as this is anyway incompatible with previous documents, including the U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration of 2008, which states: “The era in which the U.S. and Russia considered one another an enemy or strategic threat has ended”. NATO enlargement cannot therefore be treated as undermining Russian security as it is not a zero-sum game.
Russia should nevertheless be consulted on all major security issues, and these consultations should have substance. NATO-Russia consultation during the drafting of the latest NATO Strategic Concept is a good example. On the other hand, one could deplore the absence of such an approach by Russia before the adoption of the Russian Military Doctrine. Consultations on the Medvedev Plan should also include other former Soviet bloc countries such as Ukraine.
The best way to resolve this issue would be an OSCE declaration similar to the one adopted in Istanbul in 1999. It would be a political declaration but not a legally binding treaty, and would allow the EU and also organisations without international legal status such as the CSTO, CIS and NATO, to sign it – as was envisaged by President Medvedev. Needless to say, entities like Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus and South Ossetia would not qualify.
Russia should certainly be accorded more formal recognition as a great power, despite the shadow the recent war with Georgia cast on the sincerity of Russian commitments to the norms of international behaviour. Neither the EU or the U.S. can just carry on “business as usual” in the light of this war, but an attempt to engage Russia in serious dialogue on the future of our region is an absolute necessity. |
This desire to forge closer relations was often referred to on both sides as a “strategic partnership”. But Russia appears to be changing the terms of this nascent friendship, so Europeans increasingly wonder whether the partnership can continue to develop. They had looked wide-eyed at Russia’s apparent departure from democratisation under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, and at the war in Chechnya, after which the EU employed more cautious language with respect to Russia, sounding less optimistic about the prospects of a real partnership.
The European Security Strategy adopted at the end of 2004 says only that “we should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership”. Russia’s August 2008 war with Georgia produced even franker language in a CFSP resolution by the European Parliament in February 2009, which thundered: “No strategic partnership is possible if the values of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law are not fully shared and respected”. In a later resolution, the European Parliament weren’t on to say that Russian conduct in the war has put a “question mark over Russia’s readiness to build together with the EU a common space of security in Europe”.
If Europe is reviewing its stance towards Russia, it appears that Russians too are struggling to reconcile their disparate views on Europe. Some profess to be “sick and tired of dealing with Brussels’ bureaucrats”. Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the foreign relations committee of the Russian Duma, has said “In Germany, Italy, France, we can achieve much more.” Mr Kosachev and others do not believe the EU is committed to serious talks on “hard” security, which is an imperative for Russia.
Equally, how to deal with Russia on security issues, and in particular on energy security, is after Iraq the most divisive issue within the EU. Despite their commitments to speak to Russia with one voice, various EU countries negotiate with Russia bi-laterally whenever possible (especially over lucrative business contracts), congregating under the EU umbrella only when necessary. That gives Russia great scope to play one country off against another.
In spite of these irritants, Russia sees Europe as a powerful partner because of its financial and economic strength, and the EU’s ability to wield “soft power” is something that Russia is often said to lack. That has inspired many Russian politicians to develop the idea of a special Russia-Europe relationship which would present a united front to the U.S. It’s an idea about which Russia has long been obsessed, and foreign minister Sergei Lavrov believes that the U.S. policy of containment is targeted not only against Russia, but against Europe too because it is one of the contenders for leadership of the new world order. He believes Europe can barely refuse closer relations with Moscow because the “current problems of the European Union cannot be solved without constructive and forward-looking relations with Russia that are based on mutual trust”. Others within the echelons of Russia power, such as Yabloko’s deputy chairman Alexei Arbatov, dream of combining the potential of Russia and the EU to form “economically, militarily, geopolitically and culturally the mightiest global centre of power. This centre will forever eliminate the threat of unipolarity.”
An attempt to form a counterbalance to the U.S. became clearly visible when Russia tried to create a coalition of European countries to block the U.S. plan to invade Iraq, and it was also reflected in Moscow’s praise of French President Nicolas Sarkozy for being even-handed when representing the EU in negotiations over the Russian-Georgian conflict, in which Georgia was seen by Russia as a U.S. proxy. In a less confrontational approach to the U.S., Russia is running a parallel strategy of advocating close co-operation between the U.S., Russia and the EU in the hope that Russia and the EU will ultimately be partners in engaging the U.S.
Russian thinking on international relations and security is determined by a number of factors, and not all of them are widely understood outside the country. First, there is deep disappointment with the West for its actions after the fall of communism. During the Gorbachev era it was recognised that the West would maintain the containment policies that dated from the darkest days of the Cold War. But it was also assumed that once Russia was seen to be no longer openly confrontational and expansionist, and to be a more open and market-oriented economy, it would be recognised as a legitimate partner. This would mean its unquestioned territorial integrity, and that it would be left to arrange its own internal matters without external interference or criticism. Most important of all, it would retain its status of being an equal partner to the U.S. on the world stage. Instead, Russia found itself treated as a defeated nation and was forced to watch from the sidelines while political actions were taken without its consent and at times against its interests.
A second factor is that Russia is unable to believe that the international community has been strengthened by the reinforcement of multi-lateral institutions. It thinks that everything is a zero-sum game and that the strengthening of others is its own loss. Amid the liberal concept of international security based on transparency, interdependence and co-operation, Russia still adheres to the concept of spheres of influence and balance of power, harbouring an enduring penchant for the concept of “Great Powers”. Needless to say, for Russians, the loss of their Country’s superpower status is completely unacceptable.
Recent events, however, have put the proponents of a strong Russia back into a position of strength. Economic growth resulting from skyrocketing gas and oil prices combined with the outcome of the war with Georgia – which was regarded inside Russia as the beginning of a great political comeback– has given the country the confidence to try and re-model the transatlantic security architecture. This is not the first time Russia has taken such an initiative. At the end of the 19th century, realising that the coming arms race would be fatal for the very survival of the Tsarist regime, Russia came up with the idea of a world disarmament conference that would impose a freeze on the stockpiling of weapons and would establish arbitration as the main mechanism for settling international disputes. Then, almost a hundred years later in the early 1970s, the Soviet Union sponsored a European Conference on Security and Co-operation that was designed to replace the post-war treaty arrangements and so ratify the status quo in Europe, thus legitimising Soviet post-war political and territorial gains.
The Medvedev plan is eerily similar. His proposed treaty would enshrine the principle of avoiding external force to settle national disputes and so would mean no interference in the problems in the northern Caucasus, including Chechnya. Reinforcement of the status quo would be enhanced by a further principle that no country should be allowed to increase its security to the detriment of another – although it is unclear who would decide if a particular measure taken by one state was detrimental to the security of another. The freedom to join military treaties, stipulated in the Helsinki Accords of 1975 as well as in other major international agreements like the Charter of Paris for a New Europe or the Charter for European Security, is ominously omitted. The expansion of military alliances, such as NATO, would be declared a threatening measure.
What, then, should be Europe’s reaction to the Russian proposal? First, it must be said that Russia has a critical role to play in transatlantic security and should be treated not only with caution but with respect. But there already exists a range of institutions dealing with the issue: OSCE, the NATO-Russia Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to name but a few. There is no need to create others, even though it would be appropriate to review the existing institutions and perhaps reinvigorate and fortify them. The principle of the indivisibility of European security and the security of the U.S., so fundamental during the Cold War, of course remains valid. Security initiatives should therefore be discussed first bi-laterally within the NATO-EU framework, and only then should a common position be presented at the OSCE. Speaking to Russia with one voice is absolutely essential.
The idea that was implicitly but not openly voiced in President Vladimir Medvedev’s plan – that Russia should have a power of veto on all security-related decisions of NATO or the EU – must be firmly rejected. Russia should not treat NATO as a threat, as has been set out in the new Russian Military Doctrine as this is anyway incompatible with previous documents, including the U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration of 2008, which states: “The era in which the U.S. and Russia considered one another an enemy or strategic threat has ended”. NATO enlargement cannot therefore be treated as undermining Russian security as it is not a zero-sum game.
Russia should nevertheless be consulted on all major security issues, and these consultations should have substance. NATO-Russia consultation during the drafting of the latest NATO Strategic Concept is a good example. On the other hand, one could deplore the absence of such an approach by Russia before the adoption of the Russian Military Doctrine. Consultations on the Medvedev Plan should also include other former Soviet bloc countries such as Ukraine.
The best way to resolve this issue would be an OSCE declaration similar to the one adopted in Istanbul in 1999. It would be a political declaration but not a legally binding treaty, and would allow the EU and also organisations without international legal status such as the CSTO, CIS and NATO, to sign it – as was envisaged by President Medvedev. Needless to say, entities like Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus and South Ossetia would not qualify.
Russia should certainly be accorded more formal recognition as a great power, despite the shadow the recent war with Georgia cast on the sincerity of Russian commitments to the norms of international behaviour. Neither the EU or the U.S. can just carry on “business as usual” in the light of this war, but an attempt to engage Russia in serious dialogue on the future of our region is an absolute necessity.