INTERNATIONAL

Spring 2011

by Philippe Le Corre

The increasingly assertive role in international politics being promoted by Bejing since the Group of 20 was set-up has been accompanied by a strategy of cultural diplomacy designed to project soft power to the rest of the world. China appears more anxious than ever to nurture its image, but Philippe Le Corre argues that image is not the same as leadership

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Over the past five years, Confucius Institutes have been opening across the world. The Beijing central government’s International Council for Chinese Language gives each institute a starting budget of €850,000 and an operational budget of €200,000 per year. To help spread the word, Chinese academics are offered trips abroad to attend these centres.

The Confucius Institutes are just one facet of China’s new cultural diplomacy. Another has been this year's Shanghai World Expo, which played host over six months to 250 exhibitors and more than 70m visitors. Rarely has a world expo been used to such an extent by a government to display its soft power. It was certainly something to see Chinese families making their way round the site, admiring the theme pavilions and national pavilions on both sides of the Huangpu River, starting with the biggest: China’s. Like London and Paris at the end of the 19th century, China has aimed to use this record-beating expo to show the world that it is a force to be reckoned with.

The expo’s theme of “Better City, Better Life” was divided into five sub-themes showcasing China’s modern urban ambitions: blending diverse cultures; prospering economically; fostering scientific and technological innovation; remodelling communities; and encouraging interaction between urban and rural areas. There is little doubt that with its broad scope and its location at the heart of China’s “first city” the expo aimed to show the world what the nation can achieve in areas that like architecture, infrastructure, town and country planning, the environment, urban transport, technology, culture and sustainable development.

So did the expo achieve its goal? With regard to the (rare) foreign visitors, only partly; with regard to the Chinese, substantially. Shanghai, whose aspirations are more economic, social and cultural than political or military, has become the capital of Chinese soft power. With its artistic and cultural offerings, it has no need to envy other Asian metropolises. As well as the expo, Shanghai can boast the splendid museum of Chinese art in People’s Square – thanks in part to largesse from the Chinese diaspora – which has provided a model for many Chinese cities that are developing high-quality museums. The Museum of Contemporary Art, opened more recently, offers cosmopolitan and often unusual exhibitions. Chinese cinema also occupies a prominent place on the banks of the Huangpu River thanks to the Shanghai International Film Festival, which attracts industry professionals from all over the world and whose 12th edition drew attention by giving its top award to the Scandinavian film “Original.”

If the Shanghai Expo is a symbol of the new China’s claims to be open and tolerant, its extravagance pales in comparison with Beijing’s long-term strategy.

The government has recognised the weakness of its international communication after a succession of crises. Its handling of the SARS epidemic in 2005 and avian influenza; scandals over contaminated Chinese toys, tainted milk and other products; hitches during the torch relay for the 2008 Beijing Olympics; criticism of China’s conduct in Tibet and its human rights record – all these have only added to the confusion surrounding China’s image.

The global economic crisis also seems to be fuelling anti-Chinese sentiment. In the United States, opponents of China range from Republican Party supporters who see the steady increase in China’s military spending as evidence of Beijing’s potentially aggressive rivalry with North America, and Democrats – often trade unionists – who denounce the number of U.S. jobs being lost to China. And in Europe the Left seems to be leaning towards the same opinion. Beijing made a bid to counter anti-Chinese sentiment at the beginning of 2010 with its TV advertisement “Made in China, Made With The World,” broadcast on major international channels like BBC World and CNN.

According to a BBC study – denounced by Beijing, unsurprisingly, as biased – scepticism towards China shows few signs of diminishing. During the past year, China’s international image has declined sharply, with its popularity in the U.S. slipping from 40% to 34%.

In response, Beijing – which several years ago had already started to promote its attachment to concepts such as “the harmonious society” and “peaceful co-existence” – has given its international public relations efforts a considerable boost, even creating an Office of Public Diplomacy within the Department of Foreign Affairs, while the State Council Information Office focuses on the media and on think tanks.

As well as the Confucius Institutes and the Shanghai Expo, media offerings for foreign audiences have been strengthened. The official Xinhua news agency has launched a 24 hour English news channel called China Network Corp. Xinhua’s president, Li Congjun, says the agency’s aim is to “offer an alternative source of information for a global audience and aim to promote peace and development by interpreting the world in a global perspective.” China’s state-owned CCTV domestic television station – which broadcasts channels for English, French and Spanish speakers – has opened about 50 overseas offices. The newspapers China Daily and the English edition of People’s Daily (Global Times) are growing in importance along with the foreign-language programmes offered by China Radio International and even the Internet search engines Sina.com and QQ.com.

What we have, in short, are the makings of a major public diplomacy effort directed by the Communist Party and the highest levels of the Chinese government, which is estimated to have invested about $8bn in this sort of international propaganda.

These initiatives reflect China’s desire to redeem its reputation abroad from Europe to Africa, from the Middle East to the U.S. But they also present us with a curious paradox. Is it Beijing’s desire to conquer, even to exact revenge? Does China want to establish its place within the concert of nations while imposing its diplomatic will? If so, the public diplomacy that seems to have become the trademark of modern China should be accompanied by a genuine international strategy that includes active involvement in resolving conflicts along with diplomatic and even humanitarian crises. Yet nothing so far points to a major shift in this direction, whether it be close to home in the Korean Peninsula, or further afield in Afghanistan, Africa or the Middle East.

It will be several years before we can assess the political impact of Beijing’s public diplomacy push. Although it is clearly backed by considerable financial resources, its ultimate goal remains uncertain at a time when Chinese priorities are, to the dismay of its G20 partners, still very unclear on a number of economic and strategic issues,.

Over the past five years, Confucius Institutes have been opening across the world. The Beijing central government’s International Council for Chinese Language gives each institute a starting budget of €850,000 and an operational budget of €200,000 per year. To help spread the word, Chinese academics are offered trips abroad to attend these centres.

The Confucius Institutes are just one facet of China’s new cultural diplomacy. Another has been this year's Shanghai World Expo, which played host over six months to 250 exhibitors and more than 70m visitors. Rarely has a world expo been used to such an extent by a government to display its soft power. It was certainly something to see Chinese families making their way round the site, admiring the theme pavilions and national pavilions on both sides of the Huangpu River, starting with the biggest: China’s. Like London and Paris at the end of the 19th century, China has aimed to use this record-beating expo to show the world that it is a force to be reckoned with.

The expo’s theme of “Better City, Better Life” was divided into five sub-themes showcasing China’s modern urban ambitions: blending diverse cultures; prospering economically; fostering scientific and technological innovation; remodelling communities; and encouraging interaction between urban and rural areas. There is little doubt that with its broad scope and its location at the heart of China’s “first city” the expo aimed to show the world what the nation can achieve in areas that like architecture, infrastructure, town and country planning, the environment, urban transport, technology, culture and sustainable development.

So did the expo achieve its goal? With regard to the (rare) foreign visitors, only partly; with regard to the Chinese, substantially. Shanghai, whose aspirations are more economic, social and cultural than political or military, has become the capital of Chinese soft power. With its artistic and cultural offerings, it has no need to envy other Asian metropolises. As well as the expo, Shanghai can boast the splendid museum of Chinese art in People’s Square – thanks in part to largesse from the Chinese diaspora – which has provided a model for many Chinese cities that are developing high-quality museums. The Museum of Contemporary Art, opened more recently, offers cosmopolitan and often unusual exhibitions. Chinese cinema also occupies a prominent place on the banks of the Huangpu River thanks to the Shanghai International Film Festival, which attracts industry professionals from all over the world and whose 12th edition drew attention by giving its top award to the Scandinavian film “Original.”

If the Shanghai Expo is a symbol of the new China’s claims to be open and tolerant, its extravagance pales in comparison with Beijing’s long-term strategy.

The government has recognised the weakness of its international communication after a succession of crises. Its handling of the SARS epidemic in 2005 and avian influenza; scandals over contaminated Chinese toys, tainted milk and other products; hitches during the torch relay for the 2008 Beijing Olympics; criticism of China’s conduct in Tibet and its human rights record – all these have only added to the confusion surrounding China’s image.

The global economic crisis also seems to be fuelling anti-Chinese sentiment. In the United States, opponents of China range from Republican Party supporters who see the steady increase in China’s military spending as evidence of Beijing’s potentially aggressive rivalry with North America, and Democrats – often trade unionists – who denounce the number of U.S. jobs being lost to China. And in Europe the Left seems to be leaning towards the same opinion. Beijing made a bid to counter anti-Chinese sentiment at the beginning of 2010 with its TV advertisement “Made in China, Made With The World,” broadcast on major international channels like BBC World and CNN.

According to a BBC study – denounced by Beijing, unsurprisingly, as biased – scepticism towards China shows few signs of diminishing. During the past year, China’s international image has declined sharply, with its popularity in the U.S. slipping from 40% to 34%.

In response, Beijing – which several years ago had already started to promote its attachment to concepts such as “the harmonious society” and “peaceful co-existence” – has given its international public relations efforts a considerable boost, even creating an Office of Public Diplomacy within the Department of Foreign Affairs, while the State Council Information Office focuses on the media and on think tanks.

As well as the Confucius Institutes and the Shanghai Expo, media offerings for foreign audiences have been strengthened. The official Xinhua news agency has launched a 24 hour English news channel called China Network Corp. Xinhua’s president, Li Congjun, says the agency’s aim is to “offer an alternative source of information for a global audience and aim to promote peace and development by interpreting the world in a global perspective.” China’s state-owned CCTV domestic television station – which broadcasts channels for English, French and Spanish speakers – has opened about 50 overseas offices. The newspapers China Daily and the English edition of People’s Daily (Global Times) are growing in importance along with the foreign-language programmes offered by China Radio International and even the Internet search engines Sina.com and QQ.com.

What we have, in short, are the makings of a major public diplomacy effort directed by the Communist Party and the highest levels of the Chinese government, which is estimated to have invested about $8bn in this sort of international propaganda.

These initiatives reflect China’s desire to redeem its reputation abroad from Europe to Africa, from the Middle East to the U.S. But they also present us with a curious paradox. Is it Beijing’s desire to conquer, even to exact revenge? Does China want to establish its place within the concert of nations while imposing its diplomatic will? If so, the public diplomacy that seems to have become the trademark of modern China should be accompanied by a genuine international strategy that includes active involvement in resolving conflicts along with diplomatic and even humanitarian crises. Yet nothing so far points to a major shift in this direction, whether it be close to home in the Korean Peninsula, or further afield in Afghanistan, Africa or the Middle East.

It will be several years before we can assess the political impact of Beijing’s public diplomacy push. Although it is clearly backed by considerable financial resources, its ultimate goal remains uncertain at a time when Chinese priorities are, to the dismay of its G20 partners, still very unclear on a number of economic and strategic issues,.