Sir,
Sinan Ülgen´s analysis of the shift in Turkish foreign policy and its redefined NATO role of late is well informed. I would like to make some additional observations and complement his explanation of Ankara’s new "assertive and more independent policy". This leads to a somewhat more cautious stance on Turkey's role within NATO.
It is true that Ankara will not risk its seat among equals at the NATO table at a time when the alliance is trying to reposition itself in today’s changing world. It is equally true that NATO offers Turkey a valuable platform for engaging with its western allies at a time when EU-Turkish relations, including the foreign policy dialogue, are strained. But this does not alter the fact that Turkey has had notable differences of opinion with other NATO members over Iran, Israel and, most recently, Libya and Syria. Ankara is going to find it increasingly difficult, I believe, to formulate quick policy responses whenever NATO has to face up to one of Turkey’s neighbours.
I also agree with Ülgen that Turkey’s security environment has changed significantly since it joined NATO, and that Ankara now has less need for ‘hard’ military protection. This in turn has generally altered its position towards the West, allowing it greater leeway for its foreign policy, including for its relations with the West. But there is another element that is driving Turkey’s shift in its strategic thinking, and that is economic pragmatism.
Recent years have seen a strong commercial dimension to Turkey’s international engagement. Turkish involvement in its own neighbourhood has to a large extent been driven by economic considerations. Ankara’s declared foreign policy aim of having "zero problems" with its neighbours must therefore be seen in an economic light too. It is a strategy that plays well with the ruling AKP’s electoral base, which includes many entrepreneurs whose livelihoods depend on import-export markets.
In addition to what Ülgen calls "an astute balance between loyalty to the alliance and its own independence”, this economic pragmatism means that Turkey will in future have to master a delicate balancing act between its commercial interests abroad and its foreign policy choices. I myself hope that Turkey can turn its growing economic leverage into a form of soft power that will help its allies to shape foreign policy in the region rather than ending up in conflict with them.
Recent events have shown Ankara to gradually align itself with NATO on almost all contentious foreign policy issues. It recognised Libya's Transitional National Council and finally urged Gaddafi to leave. And it hosted a conference for Syrian opposition leaders, and is trying to mend relations with Israel. Turkey may take its time to consider each new case thoroughly – and that will certainly slow down NATO decision-making and so create frictions – but, more often than not, Ankara will in the end fall into line with the prevailing NATO view. After all, Turkey has limited power resources of its own and will therefore tend to go along with its western allies, even if that occasionally compromises its own delicate position in a troubled region. Whether, though, some unpredictable major issue may one day tip the balance, causing Turkey to break ranks with NATO, remains to be seen.