Sir,

Charles William Maynes missed one important point in his assessment of Europe’s policy approach to Russia. This is that many of the Russian elite share a perception that imported western political and economic ideas contributed to the country’s economic failure and the threat of disintegration under President Boris Yeltsin, while Russia’s part in ending the Cold War – which is emphatically not seen as a defeat – went unrecognised. When NATO enlarged eastwards, it was widely seen as breaching an unwritten agreement and eroding Russia’s influence in its own immediate neighbourhood.

 

As Baranovsky’s excellent commentary points out, Moscow’s current assertiveness and its refusal to accept the “civilising influence” of Europe (as Russia’s ambassador to the EU himself has put) is partly a reaction to that period. Current western criticism is, in Russian eyes – and not without justification – often based on double standards, and that is also causing problems within the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

 

The “alarm” felt by many at Russia’s “resurgence” should be put into context. In its external policy, Moscow has largely (albeit sometimes grudgingly) proved to be a responsible player, adhering to arms control agreements, contributing to efforts to deal with new security challenges, playing by the rules of regional organisations and developing cooperative relations with NATO and the EU. Its foreign policy positions, notably on the Middle East, do not differ much from those of a number of major European powers. The “new military relationships” in Central Asia referred to by Maynes are strictly confined to ensuring regional stability and do not presage an “Eastern NATO”. And while it most certainly will jealously guard its “crown jewels” – oil and gas and the infrastructure which supports them – Russia also depends on access to western markets and technology.

 

There are, however, valid concerns in Europe about, first, diverging interests in the unsettled shared neighbourhood – the drive to join NATO and eventually the EU, especially in Ukraine and Georgia, could create a number of political and economic problems; and, second, over the nature of governance in Russia, in particular the dominance of the executive and bureaucracy and the relative weakness of the legislature and judiciary.

 

As for Maynes’ “soft power” prescriptions, Europe has scope for action but must recognise its limitations. Soft-pedalling over Russia does not go down well in several European Union capitals, not least the new member states of central and eastern Europe. Securing collective agreement on Russia’s place in Europe will therefore be difficult to achieve. However there are signs that the EU is no longer relying on grand rhetoric about a “strategic partnership” and is engaging in more serious dialogue with Moscow, including on the shared neighbourhood, aimed at achieving what is possible rather than what Brussels unilaterally desires.

 

The new agreement being negotiated to replace the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which expires next year, must fill the four “common spaces” with substance and be based on wide ranging but incremental steps aimed at bringing Russia closer to European standards and practices. This applies to energy, trade, infrastructure and the environment, as well as to external security where there are shared concerns over the threats identified in the European Security Strategy. On internal security, a delicate balance still needs to be found between freedom of movement and stemming the threat of terrorism and crime. Moscow accepts Europe’s crucial role in facilitating Russia’s modernisation, but as President Putin made clear during the G8 summit in St. Petersburg last July, Europe now has to reckon with a Russia whose role as a global security player and key regional power is growing, and whose confidence in its own version of democracy will mean rejection of unwanted external interference in its domestic affairs. We Europeans need to put much more effort into understanding these trends and devising a more coherent policy of engagement.