INTERNATIONAL
The growing powerlessness of the West
Summer 2007
A significant phase in history − the West’s political domination of the world − is coming to an end, warns Nicole Gnesotto. The issue is how to deal with this situation, and in terms of future global governance she believes that Europe and America must learn to share their power in order to retain power.
Clash of civilisations, a flat world, the new unipolar system, global disorder and the alliance of democracies against extremism were all interpretations designed to help us understand the way in which our post-cold war world has evolved. Yet what they reflect most of all is the opacity of the international scene. In these times of political transition, it is economic globalisation that has emerged as the international system’s only clearly recognisable and over-arching element.
Three trends have characterised this globalisation process. First, the ineluctable growth of trade and of global wealth: in 2020, world GDP will have increased by about 60%, to reach $44,400bn. Second, economic multipolarity has increased as a result of the rise of new competitors and primarily the Asian giants. China, which experienced a growth rate of 35% in its foreign trade between 2003 and 2005, should by 2025 have become the world’s primary exporter. The OECD countries will in future only produce 40% of the world’s wealth (as against 55% in 2000), while Asia’s share will, in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, go from 24% to 38%. In GNP terms, the five richest countries of the planet will be the United States, China, Japan, India and Germany. The third and last aspect is that globalisation is driving an extraordinary worldwide reduction in poverty. The World Bank estimates that the number of poor people in the world living on less than a dollar a day was, in spite of rapid growth of the global population, reduced by 400m between 1981 and 2001. India adds 15m workers to the labour market annually. In terms of global statistics, there has never before been such a dramatic reduction in the number of the world’s poor.
There is another side to globalisation, however, which has far-reaching political implications. Globalisation is in fact neither global nor total: it does not affect all states on the planet, nor all citizens within states. The economic marginalisation of some parts of the world is not declining: a third of the world’s population lives below the poverty line. If nothing is done to reverse this trend over the next 20 years, 36% of the entire population of Africa may be living in a state of extreme destitution. In developed countries, the pauperisation of swathes of the middle classes seems to be a consequence of globalisation: the number of poor people in the United States rose from 11.3% to 12.6% between 2000 and 2005, even though that four-year period saw strong economic growth in America. In other words, even if poverty is declining overall, the gap between rich and poor is widening dramatically, within nations as well as between nations.
And this is the conceptual paradox at the heart of globalisation. Even as it generates a dynamic of widespread enrichment which greatly benefits what were once known as Third World countries, it increases disparities between states and reinforces inequalities within states. It is a powerful vector of development but also of tensions, both nationally and internationally. As much as it generates solidarity and interdependence, it also creates fragmentation. And all this is happening in real time; the explosion in the world’s communication systems has made everything instantly accessible to everyone.
In this divided world, we can draw several conclusions regarding the evolution of the international system. We are, to begin with, now faced with a multipolar world. If after the collapse of the Soviet Union there ever was a unipolar system dominated by the American superpower, it now belongs to history. Yet to say that China, India, Brazil and others will be political actors in a multipolar world makes little sense. So the real question is what kind of multipolar world will prevail? Will it be aggressive, dictated only by the pursuit of national interests? Or anarchical and governed only by the law of the jungle or the vagaries of circumstance? Or will it on the contrary be a multipolar world regulated by a set of rules, institutions and standards decreed by all for the benefit of all? This would obviously be the ideal model for the European Union, but it is also the one beset with the greatest uncertainty. There can be no doubt that the way in which countries either regulate or fail to regulate this multipolar world will be one of the major strategic issues of the next decade.
It is already obvious that the emerging models of the future international system are inadequate for any form of collective global governance, The Chinese model is based on a blend of brutal economic globalisation and highly traditional realpolitik. As for the American vision of the world, it remains essentially based on the promotion of democracy as a recipe for stability on the one hand and on the other forging an alliance of democracies against all potential threats. It is true that the behaviour of many international actors, whether they be states, terrorist groups or radical movements, constantly lends credence to this scenario of a global confrontation. However, all the indications are that this new form of ideological bi-polarity between democracies and the rest of the world is not the most appropriate model for dealing with globalisation’s complexities.
The “shrinking” of the West is also intimately bound up with the rise of globalisation. This decline is primarily demographic: in 2025, the United States and Europe together will only represent 13% of the world’s population, whereas the Asian countries will represent more than 50%. But not only is the West “shrinking”, its population is also ageing much more quickly than the rest of the world. By 2025, the over-60s will account for 30% of the population in developed countries, against just 13% in developing countries. To have fewer people and older people is our demographic fate. In economic terms, although the western model of the freemarket economy is venerated as the only viable model, the western countries that have nurtured it for the past three centuries are gradually losing their once dominant position. We are therefore witnessing a major redistribution of power, to the benefit of other parts of the world. As for the political leadership that was once the prerogative of the West, and in particular of the United States, there is no guarantee that it will continue. It is already clear that the Americans and Europeans are no longer capable of resolving international crises on their own. Neither Iran, Iraq, North Korea, nor for that matter the other conflicts in the Middle East or major issues like global warming or health, can be dealt with without enlisting the aid of Russia, China or other regional powers. On its own, the West has become powerless, and is being challenged in a thousand different ways. It is difficult to ignore the way that the image and legitimacy of the United States as a dominant world power has deteriorated so dramatically since the March 2003 start of the war in Iraq.
With regard to international security, the main challenge is closely connected with the failures of globalisation. The increasing disparities in terms of wealth and modernity between important regional actors may fuel a whole range of dependencies, frustrations and resentment whose impact on international stability has yet to be seen. For those who feel themselves to be the “losers of globalisation”, this widening gap between the “haves” and “have nots” justifies challenging the political authority of the West, the notion of democracies as a model to emulate, and – most obviously – America’s claim to be the world’s leader. In geographical terms, the greatest areas of uncertainty are Russia, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Will these three regions manage to cope with the challenges of economic globalisation? Depending on the degree to which the answers to this question are yes or no, either the best or the worst of worlds lies ahead of us. The conjunction of at least three indicators – economic, demographic and ecological – means that negative scenarios cannot be ruled out, notwithstanding the fact that Russia is in a much stronger position than Africa or the Middle East, or that some countries within the latter two regions possess more assets than others. But what is incontestable is that these three areas contain virtually all of the energy reserves that are so vital to the future growth of globalising economies.
In the political sphere, democracy will doubtlessly remain the focus of the international debate, but it will undergo a dual transformation. In 20 years’ time, the key challenge will as much be the preservation of democracy in the old democracies as the promotion of democracy around the world. The combination of a certain number of elements – ageing populations, social tensions on the labour market, pressures resulting from immigration, fear of cultural difference, security measures to counter terrorism – means that we cannot discount the possibility that democratic systems will be undermined, including in western countries. At the international level, reconciling the objective of promoting democracy with the equally crucial objective of stabilising relationships between states will be at the heart of the security debate. The old dilemma between ensuring order and freedom, security and justice, to which democracy has never been more than a partial answer, presents us with a problem that is just as difficult to resolve as it would be irresponsible to ignore.
A significant phase in history is therefore coming to an end; that of the West’s political domination of the world. The way in which the West deals with this historic transition will be decisive for the evolution of the international system, and its own place in that system. Will it succumb to the temptation to pull up its drawbridge and disengage from the world? Or will it espouse a policy of systematic interventionism? Or alternatively, will it share responsibilities and manage the crises of the world in collaboration with others? Paradoxically, because the history of European integration has always been characterised by a gradual process of learning to share power and an awareness of the relativity of power, Europeans are more open than Americans to a new configuration of the world, and in a sense more adapted to globalisation. Nothing in the history of the United States, and certainly not the recently-ended century that witnessed the triumph of American power, has prepared them to be just one shareholder among many others. Even in their relations with their closest European allies, the implementation of a strategic partnership and the shared leadership which such a notion implies, has always been problematic.
But the ability to share leadership has become necessary and therefore inevitable. What is good for the West is not necessarily good for the rest of the planet, or in any case is not perceived as such. And it is here that Europe regains its relevance. True, the European Union is going through a major crisis. It is suffering from low morale, it is confused about its identity and it lacks political dynamism. In many member states, the goal of European integration now enjoys less popularity than the return of the nation state. And yet never before, not since the end of World War II, has the European model so powerfully symbolised political modernity – for the very reason that it so vividly embodies the sharing of power and solidarities. Never have the Americans had so much to learn from European integration in order to rethink the terms of future global governance. Share power in order to stay in power: the revolution in attitudes that Prince Salina, in Lampedusa’s The Leopard, had to accept in order to keep his dynasty alive, is a lesson that the West needs to learn. If the reform of the Union is to have a sense, it must first and foremost be to enable us to confront this coming transformation of the international system.