Sir,
Lanxin Xiang’s analysis of the potential for EU-China cooperation was interesting and challenging. If he is right, a powerful Eurasian coalition could rule the world later on in this century. I nevertheless have a few questions about this “third encounter” of Europe and China and its consequences for transatlantic relations.
As do many others, Prof. Xiang divides the world into “poles” that have a strategy in order to manage world affairs. But how solid and uniform are these poles? China is a "country" and there clearly is a central government in China that has its own approach to securing its diplomatic and economic interests. China looks like a very solid "pole" in world affairs, but how will different regional problems, policies and practices in China influence central strategic thinking in the coming decade? And what will happen when China’s present breakneck economic development loses some of its speed?
The second pole, Europe, is very interested in everything Chinese. At EU level and through national and regional efforts, our contacts with China are many and varied. But can we speak of a European strategy towards China? Is there any sort of framework that gives guidance to those who trade or exchange with China? I know that the European Commission has worked hard on this, but it would be false to say that Council and Commission have yet agreed on an overall approach.
Would we – Europe and China – be ready and able, then, to actively cooperate on changing today’s unipolar, US-centred world into a multipolar one? Europe and China clearly have a number of things in common. We both have several millennia of history behind us. Although I find much of the discussion about cultural superiority absurd, if you want to differentiate between Europe and China on the one hand and the United States on the other, we can certainly say that our roots go much deeper and that we have more cultural "experience". On a practical level, Europe and China have a different approach to land use planning because so many of their regions are much more densely populated than in the US.
Do these issues generate differences between Americans and Eurasians, and if so to what extent? These are questions for sociologists and psychologists. But it is clear that Europeans and Americans have things in common that distinguish them from China.
Parliamentary representative democracy is one of them, as are respect for the rule of law (pace Guantanamo), checks and balances on the power of the state, and freedom of speech and information. That is why both Europeans and Americans are nervous when they see how China deals with some African regimes.
When Prof. Xiang says that “laissez-faire America” produces less harmonious societies, I wonder what laissez-faire China is going to end up with. Here I see a striking resemblance between China and the US as I don’t have the impression that prosperous coastal regions in China are willing to slow down so that other regions can catch up. Even if the central authorities in Beijing were to make this official policy. Europe is different from these two poles in that it is slowly becoming a society that is allergic to risk and lacks entrepreneurial spirit.
I am not knowledgeable enough by far on Chinese history and culture to judge these issues. The relationship between the poles is very complex, and we should not forget such other influences as Latin America, Russia and Africa. It often seems to me that the world is a much more chaotic place than strategists are ready to accept.