One of the most commonly shared judgements on the death of the European Constitution is that it reflected the EU’s lack of a credible platform for explaining why we needed it. Bill Clinton’s celebrated election slogan “It’s the economy, stupid” seems applicable to the European Union today. When it comes to public opinion, the sin of the EU and of Europe’s political elites has been poor economic performance and the consequent lack of social progress. As Prime Minister Tony Blair pointed out to the European Parliament when the UK took over the EU presidency, “the Constitution became the vehicle for the people to register a wider and deeper discontent with the state of affairs in Europe”.

 

The European Council’s decision at about the same time to stick with the ratification process, albeit with a delay of a couple of years, was no answer to the public mood. The reality is that Europe is entering a long period of what we might call “de-institutionalisation”, meaning a break from the treaty reform exercises that now stretch back almost 20 years to the Single European Act in 1986.

 

Right now, though, the challenge is how to understand and respond to public discontent, and how to keep political Europe moving. It may be useful to look back at the past for success stories in the hopes of learning from them.

 

In the early 1980s we witnessed a similar wave of euro-scepticism. That was shortly after the second oil shock, so economic performance was bad and the Treaty of Rome was hardly the blueprint for managing the Greek and Iberian enlargements on Europe’s emerging foreign policies and the still precarious European Monetary System (EMS). The newly-appointed President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, was advocating a two-phase initiative that would eventually produce a decade of growth and deepen European integration. His first goal was to complete the internal market; later, his second was the launching of the euro.

 

Both were based on clear and easily understandable criteria. In the first case the implementation of the four freedoms (goods, services, people, capital), and a strong monetary identity in the second.

 

Another decisive element was that the European Commission was the essential partner of national governments. The Commission was the tool needed to move from a process of negative integration to a positive one, or from rules to politics. Public opinion in Europe today, at times influenced by the accusations of national governments themselves, is that the Commission is bent more on setting limits, obstacles and sanctions in the path of national policies than it is on creating an environment that favours development and progress. The Commission is perceived as a guardian rather than as an initiator. Its norms and directives are not seen as the outcome of a truly democratic process. We the public know that this is not entirely true, but a degree of inaction on the part of the Commission itself, coupled with its difficulty in acting “politically”, have done nothing to restore to Brussels the image of accountability that is so badly needed at times of crisis and bewilderment.

 

We Europeans therefore need to turn this trend around. We need too strengthen policies that give European integration a more positive aspect and emphasise its concrete achievements. It is urgent to address European public opinion through practical initiatives rather than just through messages.

 

First, we should move towards a more consistent “government of the European economy” so as to save the euro. Someone, starting with Tony Blair and Commission President José Manuel Barroso, should suggest a revamp of the Lisbon Agenda. But Lisbon as such is not a popular and easy message for public opinion to respond to. And even though it is a project that has recently been reorganised, it still doesn’t work properly. We therefore have to choose a few priorities from among the many, and add some initiatives in the micro-economic field that will favour European industries. At times like this, when the economic cycle has been turning down, a strategy of important European public investments in infrastructures could do much to help recovery, and a “Lisbon plus” agenda should be launched by the Commission and the Council. It would have to be supported by a credible common budget, which is not the case today. But who could object to the need, so sharply described by Tony Blair, to revitalize the structure of the EU budget so as to help the Union regain competitiveness and growth? For the budget to be fully credible, we also need to start thinking – not for the 2007-13 budget but in a longer-term perspective – about a new system of Own Resources that would include some kind of “carbon tax”.

 

Europe must also move to take care of its international agenda, which has been moving unexpectedly quickly in crucial areas like Iran, the Middle East, the Balkans and Africa. The EU is taking on increased military and political responsibilities abroad, so we therefore need to reinforce our foreign and defence capabilities, the CFSP-ESDP elements that had been such an important part of the constitutional treaty’s new rules. This means that we’ll have to reconsider some of the institutional aspects of managing CFSP and ESDP. In the end, the EU’s institutions will bring in through the backdoor some of the Constitution’s key features, as has already happened with the, European Defence Agency.

 

EU democracy needs to be enhanced through a special effort to keep European political leadership in constant contact with public opinion. This is a task not just for national leaders but for the European Commission too. Its members must travel more often and more extensively, the EU must favour more youth exchange programmes, support the networking of universities and research institutes, it must turn national parliaments into privileged interlocutors and when preparing legislation it must give much greater importance to consulting with regional and local powers. All these actions should all be part of a strategy aimed at restoring the Commission’s political role and at convincing public opinion of the democratic nature of the Union.

 

The darker reality is that such a programme for brightening the future of the Union may not prove to be feasible. As Tony Blair has pointed out, we are living in a time of deep crisis over our political leaderships. Governments and political leaders in France, Germany and Italy – all founding members – are weak. Coalition building within the EU will be a hard task for the EU’s presidencies, at present the British, soon the Austrians. Time is short and the coming months will be decisive in rebuilding confidence and constructive attitudes. Will Europe’s present crisis throw up the right opportunity? It is an open question.