Turkey’s long road to last October’s opening of EU accession talks was only made possible by the seemingly boundless enthusiasm of Turkish decisionmakers and the general public for almost all things European. Polls have consistently demonstrated a pro-membership sentiment in Turkey of 70% or more, the highest in any candidate country. But unless a sound risk management strategy is put in place, coupled with a communications policy capable of convincing European citizens of the case for Turkish membership, the equally long journey ahead could see Turkish public support beginning to dwindle, leaving the accession process at serious risk.
In the aftermath of last December’s European Council we now know that the years ahead promise to be difficult not just for EU-Turkish relations but for the future of the EU itself. There is already much confusion amongst Europeans as to whether Turkey, with its large and comparatively poor population, will exacerbate the EU’s declining competitiveness, or whether Turkey’s preponderance of young people will represent a vital opportunity for the EU to rejuvenate its ageing economy. This fundamental confusion will feature as a major argument in future electoral battles, as has already been the case in Austria and Germany. Opportunism in the domestic politics of EU member states will doubtless be more of a hindrance than a help in Turkey’s journey towards accession. It will also frustrate successive Turkish governments’ efforts to retain public support. An anti-EU backlash has long been feared in Turkey, and already the polls show that support for EU membership is losing momentum and has dropped to around 60%. Of course, any anti-EU backlash in Turkey is also fed by a number of extraneous political issues. But it is fair to say that disputes like the Cyprus issue or the minority rights question that at present dominate Turkish-EU discussions are certain to shrink into near-oblivion when placed beside the economic transformations that will be needed on both sides if Turkey is to become a full EU member.
Major risks will accompany the structural transformation of the Turkish economy, and the EU enlargement process is more likely to raise the costs of transformation than reduce them. Following the crisis that hit it in 2001, the Turkish economy has undergone structural reforms to adapt it to global market conditions. Some 23m Turks, a third of the population, still earn their livelihoods from the land, and to judge by the transformation away from agriculture into industrial sectors that Greece, Spain and Portugal underwent, the impact on Turkey will be dramatic. With registered unemployment already at 10%, Turkey’s job creation problem is going to be massive.
The country’s transformation from traditional to modern activities in almost all sectors will bring with it other major risks. The retail industry is a good example; since the late 1990s, Turkey’s leading retail chains have rapidly been winning market share away from traditional small retailers. If the Turkish retail market follows the same trends as Spain’s, 86,000 traditional retailers will be pushed out of business over the next five years. Social and political discontent in Turkey is likely to be channelled toward the anti-globalisation movement.
Identifying prospective losers and defining compensation mechanisms while reforming the social security, education and health systems will soon become priorities in Turkey’s risk management strategy. That means they will also be key areas where Turkey will need assistance and guidance from the EU as part of the accession process.
So what can Turkey offer in return? The answer may well be our demographic window of opportunity. Turkey’s ratio of working age people to the total population is rising steeply, in marked contrast to that of Europe. From 2010 onwards, Turkey will have a large and productive population with fewer dependents, whereas the situation in Europe will increasingly be the opposite. Turkey’s aim of attaining a GDP of $1 trillion by 2015, with an average per capita income of $10,000, does not seem unrealistic given the non-inflationary growth performance of recent years and rising productivity.