Sir,

Karl von Wogau and Alyson Bailes both address the central issues facing European policy makers and defence planners: what are Europe’s ambitions in the field of defence and security?; What kinds of forces does it need to fulfill these ambitions?’ and in what sort of relationship with NATO? They both speak to the central dilemma of shaping armed forces to match political goals. 

 

Von Wogau notes the point of departure as defined in the EU’s security strategy is that major aggression against any European state is precluded and that Europe faces more diverse, less visible, less predictable threats, frequently from abroad and which cannot be tackled by purely military means. In fact, the term used is not “precluded” but rather “improbable”, which is less definitive and also reflects a nuance which could become more pronounced as the enlargement of the EU produces different perspectives.

 

Nevertheless, the obvious implication of this analysis is that the preparation of armed forces should move from the defence of territory to the ability to deploy abroad, the so called expeditionary capabilities – a trend which is well underway in most European countries. However, notwithstanding this trend both authors suggest that it is homeland defence that continues to provide the most evident rationale for armed forces. Inherent in this observation is a central problem that confronts both the EU and NATO.  Despite extensive efforts by both to cultivate a collective approach to defence, it is still nations and national interests that determine the development of armed forces. It remains to be seen whether the EU can do better than NATO at subordinating these national interests to the collective good of the Union.

 

So can the more traditional rationale for armed forces be reconciled with the more ambitious European goal of playing a greater role on the world stage? In terms of armed forces personnel, the answer is yes. One of the things that European nations do well is precisely the deployment of highly trained and adaptable armed forces capable of a wide-spectrum of missions, whether under NATO, EU or UN command. The quality of these forces is a crucial, if frequently overlooked, element in the successful completion of these missions in all of their various phases.

 

Providing the pool of forces necessary to cope with the extraordinarily demanding nature of such missions in terms of sustainability and rotation and to match future demands is a real constraint on ambitions but one that is being tackled. The more substantial impediment to EU aspirations lies in providing the logistical wherewithal to transport these forces and equipping them so that they can operate together. Absent more money, the only solution to these deficiencies lies in well-known recipes such as specialization, pooling, joint procurement etc, “spending smarter”, this again is an area where it is to be seen whether the EU can make more progress than NATO.

 

The real answer to coping with these shortcomings and matching goals and means - to which von Wogau does not refer but which is noted by Alyson Bailes - is the need for cooperation between the EU and NATO which would ensure the effective exploitation of the comparative advantage of either organization. For the EU, this lies in the unique mix of assets it can bring to conflict management and resolution and for NATO in its unique experience in deploying military forces and its access to US military capabilities. There are promising examples of cooperation between both organizations, and official reassurances that “joined up” government in the 19 capitals belonging to both will ensure coordination and coherence. And yet whenever a fresh crisis arises, there is always a strong sense of institutional rivalry and competition, as for example, in the initial exchanges over Darfur.

 

An agreed division of labour - either functional or geographic - is probably unrealistic. Both organizations will continue to want to do it all.  Nevertheless, the current international agenda calls for consultative arrangements which minimize unnecessary duplication and maximize synchronization of effort, in outreach as well as in military areas. This should not be beyond the wit of reasonable people as long as national agendas and institutional blinkers are put to one side.