Soft power could put sharper teeth into the EU’s neighbourhood policy

Soft power works and is changing the world. The prospect of EU membership is itself a powerful tool for change, and together with such other instruments as diplomacy, trade and aid has contributed to changing the world in amazing and substantial ways.

 I grew up in a Europe that was divided by the Iron Curtain. The idea of the Cold War coming to an end seemed remote, yet within just a few years the Soviet Union had collapsed and the arduous process of re-uniting Europe had begun. Two years ago, that process culminated in the EU's historic enlargement to 10 new countries, eight of which had emerged from communist oppression. Today we also see a more peaceful Balkan region, with several Balkan states set on becoming EU members. The winds of change are still blowing across Europe.

 All this is by no means enough, for there is much still to be done. To achieve a more prosperous and democratic European "neighbourhood" the EU needs to invest more energy, money and commitment in the process. It also needs to develop different strategies for different parts of the neighbourhood. The Ukrainians, for instance, are tired of being dealt with in more or less the same way as the countries of northern Africa. Whenever I talk to Ukrainians or Belarusians they stress how different are the two regions and how unlike are their situations. Equally resented is the fact that the EU spends about ten times more money on the Barcelona process and its Mediterranean programmes than it does on its eastern neighbourhood, where it seems to operate only with the left hand.

 Now is the strategic time to focus on the EU’s neigbourhood policy looking east. The controversial Belarus elections, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and its aftermaths this year, and the so-called "gas war" last winter between Russia and Ukraine have all put the region in the spotlight and highlighted relations with Russia. Russia is the major player in our common neighbourhood, and if we don't want to be left behind now is the time to show the EU's commitment to these countries. To do so would mean we are also acting in our own best interests, because stable neighbours means stability for us too. History shows us that prosperous countries have prosperous neighbours.

 The prospect of eventual EU membership is a driving force for many countries in Europe, and is absolutely crucial to the development of the EU’s soft power. The EU has to trust in its own attractiveness and its competitive global position, and at the same time recognise peoples’ desire to live in peace and prosperity. Of course, the membership perspective will vary from case to case. Look at the different situations of the Ukraine and Moldova. EU membership for Ukraine may not be that far away (once stability is reassured), whilst for Moldova it is a much more long-term perspective and in the case of Belarus it won’t be on the agenda for many years to come. But that is no reason to shut the door on even the most distant prospective member; the EU’s policy on Belarus offers a good example of how the Union needs to develop a more active strategy.

 Belarus borders the EU, and almost half its trade is with EU countries. But the Union lacks a credible policy for promoting economic and political reforms there. As a reaction to Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko's antics, the EU has no official links with the country - not even a representative office. The result is that the Belarusian people, 60% of whom want to join the EU, are suffering from isolation even though a majority would like to see their country become a normal, democratic European nation. This was clearly to be seen in the demonstrations that followed the unfair elections in March.

 EU policy should therefore focus less on Mr. Lukashenko and more on winning the hearts and minds of Belarusians. At present, the EU cannot hold out the carrot of potential membership. But it should make clear that it would like Belarus to join its neighbourhood policy as soon as its political circumstances change. Belarus could then benefit from the trade concessions, cooperation programmes and EU funds available to other EU neighbours. The EU should start off by publishing a draft "action plan", spelling out both the reforms that Belarus would be asked to undertake, and the benefits that would then flow from the plan.

 The EU should also open a fully-fledged office in Minsk to promote contact between Belarus and the rest of Europe. It should make visas for Belarusians easier and cheaper to obtain. It should finance more student exchange programmes and more projects that help to develop civil society, such as training journalists, supporting independent broadcasters and encouraging trades unions.

 The EU needs to talk not only to opposition politicians in Belarus but also to the more moderate elements within the ruling regime itself. In the various "colour" revolutions that have swept across other post-Soviet states, most of the leaders did not come from the streets or out of exile. Many of the top bureaucrats in Minsk are competent, reasonable and silently opposed to Lukashenko. A number of them have resigned or have been forced out. These people are potential future leaders and the EU should not shun them. One day, Lukashenko and his immediate entourage will be gone, but his officials will still be there and will be influential.

 The EU cannot, and should not try to, replace Russia as Belarus' special partner, in terms of culture, history and language. But nor should the Union not avoid the question of Belarus' future in its dealings with Russia. The EU should be asking the Russians whether they consider it in their interest to have a neighbour that is stable and democratic and which runs a working market economy. The answer to that question will define whether Russia and the EU merely have common interests, or if they also share the same values. This approach would, needless to say, be equally valid in the cases of Ukraine and Moldova.

 The EU’s neighbourhood policy in the east is weak. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former republics and satellite states of the USSR needed a hand from outside to become not just sovereign but truly independent. An important lesson to be learned from the gas crisis in January of this year was that Russia still plays according to its own rules. Its neighbouring countries should of course have their special relationships with Russia, but that must not mean dependency. If the EU had, slowly but surely, helped them to adjust their domestic gas prices to world market levels, they would by now be truly independent countries, interacting with Russia and with the EU on their own terms.

 What alternative to full membership can the EU offer? It is a question often asked when discussing further enlargement, but I believe it stems from a somewhat backward way of thinking. The EU should offer a membership perspective to every country that wants it, and is ready to fulfil the necessary criteria. It is the process of transformation and the implementation of sustainable political and economic reforms that are the important achievements. The crucial point is not being an EU member, but wanting to become one. It is in this way that the EU can contribute towards transforming these countries into democratic, stable social market economies.