The new EU concept of rapid reaction Battlegroups is to be a reality by early 2007. But Tim Williams of the UK’s Royal United Services Institute reports that there are still some big question marks over the political decision-making process needed to deploy them
The plan to develop EU Battlegroups, of 1,500 troops each has quickly become the focus of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) since its launch in 2004. The Battlegroups are set to become fully operational early next year, when two will be on duty at any given time. The EU hopes to be able to undertake two concurrent Battlegroup operations should the need arise and these “ready-to-go” forces are intended for particularly rapid deployment in response to crises and/or requests from the UN. They are designed to be in place and be able to implement their mission within 15 days of an initial green light, and no later than 10 days after the formal decision to launch an operation. So what is a Battlegroup, what sort of tasks is it intended to carry out, who will hold the political reins and will they be able to wield that power effectively?
The Battlegroup concept is a cornerstone of the EU’s current “Headline Goal 2010” action plan to improve European military capabilities – but its origins lie in an earlier EU capability target, the Headline Goal 2003. This goal was set in 1999 and called upon EU countries to be able collectively to deploy by 2003 a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 troops within 60 days that would be sustainable for a year. The force was intended to carry out humanitarian, peacekeeping and crisis management missions – the so-called Petersberg Tasks – but despite claims to the contrary, the Rapid Reaction Force never became fully operational. Consequently by early 2004 EU leaders were in urgent need of something to show for the years of political effort that had gone into ESDP – a visible, deployable military capability. Drawing largely on existing forces and requiring more capability coordination than generation, the Battlegroups appeared the perfect remedy to the EU’s capability (and credibility) gap. Battlegroups were seen, in short, as the fast track to a genuine boots-on-the-ground EU military capability.
Battlegroups are designed to be capable of both the Petersberg Tasks and other non-combat roles such as stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries. They are conceived as just one component, alongside non-military instruments, of the EU’s broad approach to managing crises. The Battlegroups are to be rapidly deployable, held at high readiness so they can be on the move within five to ten days and able to serve either as a stand-alone force or as the initial phase of a larger operation. They should be sustainable in a foreign theatre of operations for 30 days, extendable to 120 days if re-supplied. Most of the declared Battlegroups are multinational configurations, though some are purely national packages, and a six-monthly rotation system is designed to ensure that two Battlegroups are on call at a time.
As the only countries in Europe capable of deploying hard military power, the UK and France have driven ESDP since its inception, with the project’s ultimate direction largely a compromise between the two countries’ rather different visions. When it comes to Battlegroups, however, the levers of control are likely to be shared more equitably. Formally, the power to deploy a Battlegroup rests with member states in the Council, and, as has been the case with previous EU military deployments, all EU countries will have to agree if a Battlegroup is to be sent to an operational theatre. In practice, though, it is those countries contributing to the Battlegroups on call that are likely to have most influence on the decision-making. After all, it is those countries’ parliaments that will have to approve the deployment of their forces.
In addition to EU countries’ leading role in the UNIFIL force in Lebanon, to date the EU has launched five military operations of its own: in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; in Bosnia; in Darfur, supporting the African Union alongside NATO; and most recently a second operation in the DRC. On each occasion there has been broad agreement within the Council over the need to dispatch a military mission, and it would be reasonable to expect that in most future cases such cohesion is likely to be maintained. Battlegroup deployments are in any case particularly likely to generate political unity because the initiative draws upon two reliable consensus-builders when it comes to EU military operations – Africa and the UN. When the Battlegroups idea first emerged, specific mention was made of missions in Africa, and the framework documents also make explicit reference to UN requests for assistance. Looking at the history of ESDP, it would be difficult to identify any better unifying factors for EU military operations.
But what has proved problematic in the past is agreeing the specific details and functions of some EU military missions. The most recent EU deployment to the DRC was not a Battlegroup operation, but an ad hoc German-led force, despite the fact that the Battlegroups had achieved Initial Operational Capability and it was the German-led Battlegroup that was on call. As it transpired, however, it was a blessing that the EU decided not to use the DRC as its first testing ground for the Battlegroups. This is because the months before the operation were marked by political indecision, with the EU displaying few of the rapid response characteristics embodied in the Battlegroups initiative. Initial agreement on the DRC mission took about three months, during which time the size and geographical scope of the mission, along with a good many other issues, became the subject of intense political debate. The lesson to be drawn from the DRC operation is that if Battlegroups are to prove successful, and the EU is to achieve rapid response, a cohesive vision of what EU missions should accomplish, precisely where and how, must be clearly spelt out at an early stage.
In time, the rationale and objectives of EU military deployments are likely to become somewhat more self-explanatory, once the European Union’s strategic culture becomes better defined and more widely understood. From a British perspective, an EU strategic culture must complement that of existing organisations and should focus on bringing added-value to crisis response and conflict resolution. The EU’s ability to deploy the full-range of both military and non-military assets is increasingly regarded as its major advantage, but this is neither a new idea nor a capability unique to the EU. NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan, for example, is employing a comprehensive approach – the Effects-Based Approach to Operations that seeks to combine military, civil, political and economic instruments – and ISAF is doing so on a scale that the EU cannot hope to match. The EU must, therefore, continue the process of sober reflection as to how it can make a valuable contribution to security matters in the long-term.
Winning timely political support at national level for an EU mission will also be essential for Battlegroup operations, and this demands not just explicit and consensus-building objectives but also some well-oiled political machinery. To complicate matters, some countries’ constitutional arrangements mean that their governments need formal parliamentary approval for military deployments, while others merely require parliamentary notification. For a Battlegroup to begin implementing a mission within 15 days of an initial decision, the usual timetable for parliamentary consideration will have to be dramatically speeded up in a number of EU countries.
The EU recognises this and is trying to address the problem. In November 2005, a seminar was held in the Czech Republic to consider strategic-level decision-making issues for Battlegroup deployments. The improved synchronisation of national procedures drawn up at this meeting has, though, still to be tested. Of course, if problems are foreseen at national level, an EU decision could be artificially delayed – to allow for speedy deployment once national approval has been secured – but if the EU is to achieve the sort of rapid response it aspires to, this would be no real solution.
And further political difficulties could well arise in the future that are particular to the Battlegroups. The multinational Battlegroups have all been developed, and various command and control arrangements established, after the EU announced the initiative. They are, therefore, force packages that have been created in an EU context. But this is less true of the national Battlegroups, which are essentially pre-existing capabilities. This means that it is quite conceivable that an EU government or parliament might in some circumstances be reluctant to deploy its national Battlegroup under the auspices of the European Union. Exposing oneself to the allegation that political control of national armed forces must be shared with 24 other non-contributing countries is a prospect that would probably give most politicians pause.
In reality, it will not be possible to employ the EU’s Battlegroups in a wide-range of scenarios. They are small force packages, capable of relatively short deployments and, in all probability, suitable only for operations of choice. It is therefore of central importance that Battlegroups do not merely become an end in themselves, but are used as a catalyst for further capability development across the EU. The Battlegroup initiative has already helped to make smaller, less useable forces more easily deployable, and has also proved to be a catalyst for defence reform in countries with less experience of expeditionary operations. In the coming years, however, it is critical that the broader capability targets of both Headline Goals 2003 and 2010 are not forgotten and that European countries make real progress towards meeting them.
As Battlegroups become widely employed in EU military operations, there may well be a need for practical improvements in force generation and certification. But any such requirements will become clearer with time. Once fully operational, the Battlegroups will fulfil the immediate aim of giving the EU the military capability to respond quickly and visibly to crises. Beyond that, most EU countries have yet to develop agile, deployable military capabilities necessary to meet today’s challenges. And governments must also decide exactly what role they wish the EU to play in ensuring global security.