The European Union’s progress in shaping its foreign and defence policies has been undeniable. Despite the present atmosphere of crisis and malaise, they both remain promising areas for constructive cooperation where the European framework is still a positive asset and not a political liability. The inter-governmental nature of the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) renders it relatively immune to Brussels ups and down. And the pressures to develop a strategic outlook for Europe will continue to come from outside rather than from some dubious internal logic. This was the essential message of Javier Solana’s security strategy document, itself a direct consequence of the Iraqi fiasco that still casts a persistent but decreasing shadow over the EU’s ambitions to develop its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

 

The European Security Strategy was a crucial stepping stone towards a more responsible Europe in world affairs. Its opening premise was the recognition that “… the European Union is, like it or not, a global actor; it should be ready to share in responsibility for global security”. For all the vain and outdated debates about the compatibility of NATO and the CFSP, no one can nowadays deny this imperative.

 

Yet the crisis of confidence triggered by the EU’s constitutional debacle is affecting Europe’s external role in three ways. First, Europe is now increasingly inward-looking. One of the few areas of common ground linking the Dutch “Nee” and the French “Non” was enlargement fatigue, even though the Union’s enlargement has so far been a perfect success story; in foreign policy its new members have contributed significantly to an increased awareness of Europe’s vulnerabilities and dependence on Russia and to a new assertiveness on “frozen conflicts” in Europe’s still unsettled neighbourhood. The risk is that Turkey could become a casualty of this widespread belief that enlargement has been less than successful, with significant strategic consequences for Europe, and for the drive to prevent nuclear proliferation.

 

In the second place, Europe’s foreign policymaking is much too process-oriented, following intricate rules of financing that remain unintelligible to the outside world and that push Europe soft power to the verge of bankruptcy. Third, the Union remains largely risk-averse. The persisting gaps in military capabilities, the prevalence of national commitments, be they in Iraq, Afghanistan or Ivory Coast, drastically reduced the room for manoeuvre. The fragile consensus on the EU’s role in Africa and the severe caveats imposed by national parliaments in actual deployments, be they NATO or EU badged, lead to a paradox: European forces are deployed where they can be, not where they must be. The dramatic expansion in the geographical areas of European interventions in the shape of Petersberg missions, – from Aceh to Rafah, from EU rule of law mission in Georgia to a border assistance mission in Moldova – has been at the cost of their impact and their strategic relevance.

 

Missions should follow a strategy, not make it. It is a welcome development to see Germany undertaking new responsibilities in Africa, but it took Berlin months to make a decision about the actual deployment. To be able to undertake such lengthy deliberations is a sure sign of the benign environment in which EU countries operates. If the Union was serious about safeguarding the electoral process in Congo, it would have deployed troops where trouble is the most likely to arise – in the east of the country, not in Kinshasa. And if the EU was serious about failed states, it would have intervened two years ago to prevent a genocide by at least policing the refugees camps in Darfur that are now spreading into Chad. The entire EU strategy for Africa, based on quick-fixing by the battle groups and devolution to the African Union, is a risky gamble. As the Congo mission has shown, it is far from obvious why the EU’s battle groups should be adequate force packages; they may lack the force to be quick enough at their entry point, and their exit may be delayed by many months, as well as by the African Union.

 

Learning by doing has always been the European modus operandi for its deployments around the world. But the gap between what is politically possible and what is strategically necessary cannot continue without making a mockery of the EU as a strategic actor. Europe’s role regarding Iran is clear testimony that the lessons of Iraq have been learned. Europe has of late also rediscovered the power to say no: to Serbia, to Belarus and to Hamas. These are encouraging sign of a renewed assertiveness in defence of European interests and principles. Yet, they remain reactive policies. Europe still has to learn to shape its environment rather than be subjected to it. That’s where the next steps of the nascent European strategic culture must focus.