INTERNATIONAL
It's time to clarify the constructive ambiguity in the NATO-EU security relationship
Spring 2007
Transatlantic decision-making on security is based on consensus, and right now both sides can agree they are unhappy. Roberto Menotti and Paolo Brandimarte suggest a new basis for the NATO-EU relationship
In the aftermath of last November’s Riga summit, the NATO allies should be beginning to think in new ways about the alliance’s “transformation”. We Europeans urgently need to ask three fundamental questions: What do we want from NATO? Do we have a common political will to nurture NATO, if only because it still underpins the EU’s embryonic defence capabilities? And if so, how can this be achieved?
For good or ill, the US position after 9/11 has been rather clear. By acting as an independent military power – and with somewhat partial success as a coalition-builder the Bush administration has signalled the purposes it believes NATO should serve. It is a particular vision of the alliance that sees it making two main contributions: a limited rapid reaction capability for expeditionary warfare, and longer term troop deployments for robust peacekeeping. The US message has therefore been that so long as NATO guarantees these contributions on demand, and at the same time serves some residual “outreach” functions in the former Soviet sphere, it will be supported by Washington and may even become the core of wider coalitions in the future. America’s commitment to inter-allied consultations will depend on the mission and the circumstances, but the general framework is clear enough: for Washington, interoperability is NATO’s chief added value, and the way to increase interoperability is to “plug in” to American high-tech networks and war fighting doctrines.
In contrast to the Bush Administration, the Europeans have so far been collectively unable to answer the key questions about NATO’s future. In early 2005, Germany’s then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder paved the way for a debate at the annual Wehrkunde security conference in Munich. He surprised many observers by offering a frank assessment of the alliance’s deficiencies as a political decision-making forum after the rift over Iraq. Schröder argued that NATO “is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies” and added that the current transatlantic arrangement does not reflect the reality of the rising international role of the EU. He refrained, though, from offering a prescription for how Europeans should act to change the status quo, and nor has any other top-level official in Europe done so since. Yet, Schröder’s speech shone the spotlight on a critical point for NATO’s future. The current decision-making system is based on consensus, and both sides of the Atlantic are unhappy with the existing procedures, even if no one has come up with a demonstrably better alternative.
NATO’s Riga summit focused quite understandably on Afghanistan, but it also confirmed that not much has changed on the European side, while there continues to be no sign of American willingness to tackle the decision-making conundrum. The Bush administration may be less prone to go it alone, yet its views on the future of the alliance have not fundamentally evolved.
At least some of the problems that now bedevil the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, however, are precisely the result of the unresolved deficiencies of decision-making among the allies. Given the typically fluid and uncertain contexts in which NATO is called upon to intervene, “consensus” is not enough to ensure ironclad political commitments or the military resources that are needed on the ground. NATO’s European allies feel they cannot effectively constrain the US when Washington decides to take action, and at the same time the US feels it is unable to enforce discipline in action – or not enough discipline to justify sacrificing what it sees as the freedom to act effectively.
From a European standpoint, the present NATO system pretends to ignore the reality of shared interests among the EU members. EU cooperation is no longer confined to the economic field but is increasingly to be found in areas like border management, homeland security and, by extension, the EU’s own “neighbourhood”. On top of that, the EU intends increasingly to serve as the framework for peacekeeping missions which, with US support, may even have a global reach. On the American side, there has been palpable frustration with “war by committee”, as was the case with NATO’s Kosovo campaign, and also with alliance politics. The US Congress has expressed its concern with procedures in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis.
A number of interesting proposals have been made of late to streamline NATO’s planning and conduct of operations, including strengthening the NATO Secretary General’s mandate. But all of them seem to pre-suppose a greater degree of political trust among the allies, rather than proposing how to achieve that. One compromise that might reconcile the different visions and priorities on the two sides of the Atlantic might be to introduce two distinct NATO decision-making systems – one would be for security issues that originate outside Europe, and the other for security issues that are located on the continent itself or that immediately affect the EU’s own “homeland”.
When it comes to contingencies outside Europe, it would clearly be wise to maintain current procedures, which de facto grant the US a certain amount of latitude in building smaller coalitions within NATO as well as – or overlapping with – wider coalitions beyond NATO. This amounts both to a statement of western solidarity against most conceivable global threats, and a recognition of the reality of global US military prowess as the best projection-multiplier available to the Europeans.
The EU should explicitly designate itself as the second pillar of NATO on all matters pertaining to its own geographical perimeter, thus claiming a “right of first choice” vis-à-vis NATO structures. In other words, it should propose a reversal of the existing formal arrangement granting NATO a “right of first refusal”, known as Berlin Plus – which can be seen as a useful transitory clause but hardly as a long-term equilibrium.
Such a deal would imply a continuation of close transatlantic links. Under present circumstances, the EU pillar could not perform the most demanding tasks, even inside Europe, in the absence of “guaranteed” access to certain vital US assets – so even within Europe, NATO operations would be subject to approval by the US President. Concerns over antagonising or marginalising the United States are in any case unjustified, because Washington would not be bound by any EU decision, but would simply have to respect a general rule on the activation of NATO. Also because if a sufficient number of European countries thought it necessary to resort to NATO instead of the EU, they could always say so within the EU, thus automatically removing any obstacle to a more prominent role for the alliance – which in turn facilitates a leading US role.
If this shift in NATO’s decision-making appears revolutionary, it’s worth remembering that the very first step in the development of a limited European defence capability linked to the EU was the Franco-British St. Malo declaration of December 1998 that was born out of frustration over Europe’s weak performance in the Balkans.
As was the case then with Kosovo, there will be important grey areas bordering the EU where America still intends to be a crucial player. But there is space for high profile European engagements, as was dramatically confirmed by the Lebanon conundrum last summer and by the ongoing problem of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Balkans may be more “European” than a decade ago, but the situation is much less clear in the Caucasus, Ukraine, Belarus and parts of Africa. Flexibility and pragmatic adjustments are the only answer to this host of issues, but it is worth noting that current arrangements between NATO and the EU are already based on “constructive ambiguity”. We are not envisaging a quantum leap, therefore, but an evolutionary step designed or at least to partly clarify mutual expectations in the Euro-American arrangement.
To reinvigorate the alliance, the US connection and the EU track must remain complementary. If the key EU members are serious about their commitments to the Battlegroups, the CivMil Cell, and a fully functioning European Defence Agency, there will be an EU component alongside NATO’s structures which will require special coordination mechanisms but will remain closely tied to the alliance, actually serving some of the alliance’s interests. Changing the decision-making system as we’ve proposed would make coordination even more vital, but also more orderly.
Should the major EU countries fail to meet their stated goals, NATO will not be magically healed: on the contrary, it will be weakened. The alliance is not challenged by the potential success of the European Union as an effective international actor, but by its possible impotence and paralysis. It is time for the European members of NATO to be daring, since only their strategic impulse can inject new energy into the old Atlantic pact.