If the EU were to act with unaccustomed boldness, it could bring the United States and Iran together to strike a “grand bargain”, says Bernd Kaussler, who ponts out that Europe’s Economic muscle gives it considerable leverage with the leadership in Tehran.
Only European diplomacy can alter the collision course on which Iran and the United States are heading, because only the EU can find a sustainable solution to the nuclear issue.
The impasse over Iran’s nuclear programme has entered a volatile new phase. Iran’s defiance of UN Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747, demanding the immediate cessation of enrichment activities, has in turn triggered a more aggressive stance on Iran by the Bush administration. There is now a real possibility that by designating the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a “foreign terrorist organisation” and accusing Tehran of killing Americans in Iraq by supplying weapons to insurgents, and with the increase of the US naval presence in the Persian Gulf, Washington may already be exploring a military option. But trying to resolve the issue by force would have a devastating impact on regional as well as international security.
Europe’s policy of constructive engagement with Iran started well. In the 1990s it resisted Washington’s pleas to support sanctions, and the election in 1997 of Mohammad Khatami as president raised hopes of reform. From 2000 Europe’s dialogue with Tehran on human rights was followed by tangible results: human rights bills were passed by the Iranian parliament and Khatami’s government established institutions and committees aimed at protecting these rights and fostering the rule of law.
The EU, under its soft-power strategy, offered Iran a lucrative trade and cooperation agreement conditional on political and judicial changes. It encouraged Iranian reformists to investigate human rights violations and sought to expose the motives of those who resisted moves towards more democracy.
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MATTERS OF OPINION |
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Now the Middle East looks to Asian leadership
The war in Iraq has taken its toll on the public image of the US and UK in countries of the Middle East and North Africa. People in the region now view the governments of China, Japan and Russia in a more favourable light than those of the UK or US, according to Gallup surveys conducted in 12 countries in the areas under review (between 2005 and 2007).
Asked whether they approved or disapproved of the leadership in a selection of the world’s economic powers, Japan got the highest (median) approval rating, 45%, China 41% and Russia 27%; the US and UK languished with 17% and 15% respectively (see chart).
Israeli and Lebanese respondents gave the highest approval ratings to UK and US leadership, while support for Japanese, Chinese and Russian leadership was higher in Iran than in other countries. After Iran, people in Egypt and Yemen were the most likely to approve of Chinese leadership, and Saudi Arabians of Japan. Most disapproval for the US came from the United Arab Emirates; Russia was the least favoured in Israel, Jordan and Turkey; China in Israel; and Japan in Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories.
When asked if the US and British-led invasion of Iraq and the ousting of Saddam Hussein had been morally justifiable, just 8% said it could be completely justified, while 50% said it could not be justified at all (the 10 countries mentioned in the text, plus Algeria and Kuwait).
http://www.gallupworldpoll.com/
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Since February 2004, when conservatives won a majority in the Iranian parliament - because most reformists were barred from standing - the EU’s engagement with Iran has lost its momentum. Sadly, Europe turned a blind eye to the manipulation of the election because by then its priority was Iran’s nuclear programme. In an effort to keep the Iranian nuclear envoys at the negotiation table, the EU simply acquiesced to the fix. The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in 2005 ended any discussion about human rights
However, Europe can still achieve legitimate political change within Iran as well as finding a solution to the nuclear issue acceptable to both sides. What is needed, though, is boldness – a quality often lacking in EU enterprises.
So far, Ahmadinejad has managed to burn most diplomatic bridges with the West and his erratic rhetoric and policies seem to leave little hope for immediate political reform. But his economic record may offer the EU a chance for more daring European diplomatic initiatives.
Ahmadinejad’s promise in his presidential campaign to reduce the income gap between rich and poor and to fight corruption among the ruling elite resonated with the poorest sections of the population. Rather, he has been busy increasing the political and economic weight of radical vigilante groups as well as of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. Foreign policy disasters, such as the government’s decision to question the historical validity of the Holocaust, coupled with almost complete disregard of economic and political realities at home, have contributed to the president’s present unpopularity. A regime whose survival relies heavily on popular acquiescence is being undermined by policies aimed at restricting political freedom and a reluctance to share the profits of oil sales with the people. Riots in Tehran in June 2007 followed the decision to stop subsidies for fuel, and were backed by protests at university campuses.
Much of the government’s budget has been allocated for imports, “crony projects” and military goods. Since this came at a time of price increases of consumer goods, Ahmadinejad’s spending spree and militant diplomacy have resulted in an Iran without foreign investment, plus high inflation (currently 20%-30%). Even everyday goods have become unaffordable for poor Iranians. Rationing petrol is a desperate measure by the government to tackle the budget deficit.
Europe is dealing with an Iranian president who is alienated at home and abroad, giving him less and less room to manoeuvre diplomatically.
UN sanctions in place can be an effective diplomatic tool in dealing with a country in an economic mess. UN resolutions 1737 and 1747 are targeting members of the country’s top brass and through them the nuclear programme. Powerful pragmatists, such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, defeated by Ahmadinejad for the presidency, are in fact more concerned about foreign investments and business ventures abroad than the nuclear programme. Essentially, Iran’s clerics are businessmen. It is this constituency as well as circles close to the Office of the Supreme Leader, Savvid Ali Khamenei, who have an active stake in Iran’s economy.
The EU is able to restrict the country’s access to international capital markets and investments. As long as sanctions are specifically targeted against these elements in Iran, avoiding any humanitarian side effects on society, they could increase the country’s factional divisions, putting pressure on the government to negotiate. The country needs EU trade, investment and transfer of technology more than Europe needs Iranian oil. It is vital for the EU to push for more targeted sanctions through the UN Security Council.
In 2003 Khatami, then president, put a grand bargain on the table, proposing concessions to the US government. Iran would stop supporting terrorist groups, give unconditional support for a two-state solution for Israel/Palestine and provide full transparency for Iran’s nuclear programme, in return for the US to accept a “dialogue based on mutual respect.” The Americans declined to give the proposal much credence. Under President Bush, the US government has ostracized Iran and condemned all of its policies. But the deal proposed by Khatami is an indication of Iran’s foreign policy thinking in its quest for security.
Only the EU has both the credibility and political muscle to mediate between the US and Iran and propose an arrangement in which Tehran would give a transparent and verifiable undertaking to bar weapons-grade uranium enrichment in return for US security concessions. Using its good offices the EU could in addition propose a new “roadmap for rapprochement”, comprising a non-aggression pact between the two countries with an option eventually to re-establish full relations. In the 2003 memorandum that accompanied Khatami’s “grand bargain” the Iranians proposed gradual rapprochement, creating US/Iranian working groups on disarmament, terrorism and regional security along with economic cooperation. The current Iranian parliament indicated that it would ratify a bill foreseeing an intrusive inspections regime of nuclear sites in the country. Building on a Russian proposal, Iran also seems likely to accept the establishment of an international consortium on fuel-cycle development that would be jointly owned and operated by countries possessing the necessary technology and be placed under IAEA safeguards. It is evident, that what needs to be brokered by the EU is a major deal, which not only allows the Iranians to save face, but one which would genuinely address mutual security concerns.
While negotiations with Iran may at present be a “non-issue” for the US, the deteriorating situation in Iraq, where Iran has considerable influence, may well provide the Americans with an incentive to seek direct negotiations with Tehran. A Democratic president in the US in 2008 and an Iranian reformist successful in 2009 (Khatami has said that he will run) are likely to be keener on good relations than the current administrations. Whether or not another “grand bargain” will be on the table depends on the EU taking the initiative.
For almost two decades Iran has been hosting Iraqi groups opposed firstly to the Sunni government of Saddam Hussein and more recently to the American-led occupation forces. As the first Shia Arab government in history Iran’s can claim close ties to Iraq’s Shias, a majority of the population. Whether the Americans can win militarily in Iraq remains debatable; they certainly cannot win without giving Iran an active and constructive role in its political and economic reconstruction.
Since the invasion, Iran has been supporting the Shia political establishment, most notably the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, as well as the militant opposition under Muqtada al Sadr. This seemingly contradictory policy reflects Iran’s competing power centres. The Iranian officials helping the militant opposition are hardliners who are likely to enjoy the tacit approval of Khamenei, the Supreme Leader. But the Iranian government is also eager to maintain good relations with the Iraqi government and mainstream parties in order to have a foothold if the country’s transition to democracy is secured. Iran is one of Iraq’s biggest trading partners. Over the past two years, the two governments have concluded numerous energy ventures, increased economic cooperation and started talks about a Gulf free trade zone.
Building on existing, yet fruitless, US-Iranian official exchanges in Baghdad, the EU has to find ways to make the exchanges fruitful. Neither country wants Iraq to be a failed state. Maybe a level-headed bureaucrat from Brussels is needed to explain that the Iranians have been strong supporters of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a Shia who also happens to be the Bush administration’s biggest hope for stabilising the country. A US-Iranian declaration on Iraq could set out realistic aims by the two countries for achieving security and stability. The more diplomatic and economic capital the Iranian government is allowed to invest in Iraq, the less likely Iranian hardliners will be able to wreck Iraq’s political integrity.
Under Ahmadinejad, human rights have deteriorated, allowing paramilitary groups and the Iranian Hezbollah to increase persecution against followers of the Baha’i faith (Iran’s largest religious minority), intimidate journalists and the judiciary, and to detain dissidents and academics without trial. It is also evident that the reformists are striking back. In December 2006, reformist candidates took 80 % of all municipality councils in the country, giving Ahmadinejad a bloody nose. A grand coalition of reformists is being formed, including Khatami.
International law would permit local councils in EU states to invite Iran’s reformist councillors and guide them on the rule of law and human rights legislation. Would this be a move too audacious for the EU? Iranian human rights activists and like-minded politicians need support on this scale. UN resolutions are helpful but cannot substitute for genuine empowerment and human rights training. The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights could provide an online platform allowing Iranians to exchange political views without fear of reprisal. There is nothing revolutionary about such an online platform; rather it would truly represent Europe’s commitment to the right of freedom of expression.
But, I repeat, is it a move too bold for the EU? Iran is politically the most mature state and society in the Middle East. While its quest for democracy has been troubled by unelected and authoritarian elements, there is a desire for the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. It is vital for the EU to convince the US of the merits of engagement concerning democratisation from within rather than seeking forceful regime change from without. When Baztab, an Iranian news website, recently ran a poll on Ahmadeinjad’s performance as president, the result must have astounded him. Of the respondents to the poll, nearly 63% of those who voted for him in 2005 said they would not vote for him again, and 95% of those who did not vote for the president last time said they still do not support him.
Conclusion The EU’s relations with Iran have come a long way since it adopted a policy of constructive engagement. For all its setbacks, the EU’s objectives continue to be supported by all member states. For the sake of regional and international security, the EU must put all its efforts into assertively engaging with Iran while distancing itself from the possible use of force. Military action against Iran – no matter how surgically air strikes would target only military and nuclear installations – would rally Iranians in defence of their country, whatever their view of Ahmandinejad. EU statecraft can have an impact on Iranian behaviour that, if employed effectively, could possibly save the day in the Middle East – as long as it dares.