POLICY DOSSIER

Summer 2007

by Ludo Block

Ludo Block is a PhD candidate in Public Administration and a former senior Dutch police officer

Europe’s post-9/11 internal security debate has been largely focussed on the prevention of terrorism, and after the Madrid and London attacks in 2004 and 2005 respectively, it became a permanent priority high on the European agenda. Yet there is still little consensus on the effectiveness of current internal security policies.

Police and judicial cooperation are still hampered by sovereignty concerns. The result is that EU policymaking on internal security suffers from a double lock on agreement and implementation. It is anyway increasingly hard to get unanimous decisions from the 27 EU member governments, and the actual implementation of instruments agreed on in Brussels seems an even greater challenge. National parliaments are slow to ratify these instruments, and the additional protocols to the Europol Convention have been an embarrassing example of that. Last but not least implementation of Council instruments in the member states is so often divergent.

Some expert observers question whether Europe’s police forces are willing and able to cooperate, as they seem so reluctant to share intelligence by sending information to Europol. Against this background, EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso has publicly asked Europe’s national leaders: "Shall we have to have another terrorist attack before we take effective common action?"

So what’s to be done? Some now argue that if, after all the warnings, Europe suffers its own 9/11, then ministerial heads must roll. They see the sanction of high-level resignations by political figures as the best way to ensure that preventative action is taken, and taken quickly. But, this view risks presenting a somewhat distorted picture of the internal security situation in the EU. The reality is that much has been achieved in Europe since internal security first appeared on the European political agenda back in the 1970s with the establishment of Trevi that brought together member state diplomats and officials with responsibility for security and justice issues. Although national sovereignty concerns are still present, they have to a large extent become more relaxed as the Schengen agreement on free movement of people, the European Arrest Warrant and the Treaty of Prüm show.

European police cooperation is increasingly coordinated by the Police Chiefs Task Force, and despite its slow start Europol has begun to show some tangible results. An unprecedented degree of multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation between national security services takes place via the Counter Terrorism Group. At national level across the EU, relevant legislation is becoming harmonised and police training is being made more professional and subject to a European norm. Security is becoming a distinct and visible part of Europe’s CFSP foreign policy, and stronger law enforcement links with non-EU countries are being forged. Moreover, one should not forget that these efforts are complementary to non-EU arrangements like Interpol, the Police Working Group on Terrorism and the myriad of bi-lateral contacts through which police forces across Europe effectively co-operate, with their opposite numbers elsewhere.

All efforts must of course be viewed against a background of European sovereign states that themselves took centuries to mature, so integration on such sensitive matters is naturally taking longer than just a few decades. But the most striking feature in the whole debate is that policymaking on internal security is dominated by political and legal rationalities that clearly do not cover all relevant aspects of reality. There is a void where one would expect professional consideration in the debate and decision-making on European internal security Perhaps this is because it is diplomats and ministerial civil servants who predominate in the EU’s Third Pillar working parties rather than security professionals. The result is that well-informed assessments of security risks and of counter-measures in terms of their effectiveness, cost and unintended consequences, are rare.

A number of parliamentarians and civil liberties watchdogs from time to time raise questions about the effects and effectiveness of proposed security measures, but they are all too often branded as being naïve or, as Lene Espersen, the Danish Justice Minister commented in 2005, “not adult enough to take part in the discussion”. Yet there is nothing wrong about reviewing and analysing security measures that could seriously affect the lives of millions of European citizens.

Security is always a difficult issue because it is both a reality and a state of mind. You can feel very secure when in fact you’re not, and you can be relatively secure even though you may not feel very safe. It is important to remember, therefore, that perceptions of risk seldom match reality. Risks of events that are rare, spectacular or beyond our own control − like plane crashes − are generally overestimated, while the risk of common events − like road accidents − is downplayed. A complicating factor in European decision-making on security is the problem of agendas being frequently infiltrated by non-security interests. It’s also true of national security policymaking, needless to say, but it’s a problem compounded by the complexities of EU decision-making.

Terrorist attacks in Europe are rare events. Even during the past three years the risk of becoming a terrorism victim in Europe has been almost negligible. Road traffic accidents, meanwhile, which are hardly perceived as a real threat, claimed on average 90 lives in the EU every day. For all that, the “threat” from terrorism dominates politicians’ speeches, summit agendas and media headlines.

Apparently road safety doesn’t win votes or sell newspapers, but focussing on some mystified threat does. This is not to argue that a terrorist threat doesn’t exist in Europe, or that it should be ignored. But, from a professional security perspective, the terrorism risk as portrayed in European politics is highly exaggerated and leaves one wondering about underlying agendas. Even worse, exaggerating risk usually results in unbalanced security trade-offs and too much so-called “security theatre”, both with possible negative effects on security.

Every security measure entails costs. These can be both financially tangible and intangible in terms of inconvenience, loss of privacy, and so on. Professional security should show a sound balance – or trade-off - between costs and the risks to be mitigated. Unfortunately, many present-day counter-terrorism security measures in Europe and elsewhere are based on flawed assumptions, such as the relationship between identity and intent, while the efficacy of things like data-mining and profiling programmes is grossly overrated, with their costs and unintended consequences underestimated or even ignored. This results in unbalanced security trade-offs involving high tangible and intangible costs for little added security.

An interesting phenomenon is what one renowned security expert has called “security theatre”, meaning measures that at best aim at providing a feeling of security while doing actually little or nothing to improve security. These measures often result from political reasoning that “something must be done” even while doing nothing would be more sensible.

Although security theatre can sometimes reassure the public and keep society working, it should never be confused with real counter-measures that provide genuine security. Examples of security theatre in some member states are the deployment of military personnel at national monuments and other places of interest, or the liquids ban last October under the Commission new rules on airline security. This latter measure could well make air travel less secure because so much attention of security screeners is being forced upon one – unproven − tactic instead of overall passenger assessment.

Terrorism has been a fact of life in Europe since the 19th century, and 100% security against terrorist attacks does not exist. In a defence position by definition the defender is at a disadvantage because the attacker chooses the timing, target and tactics for an attack. Terrorists can strike everywhere and at every moment, so the only sure way to prevent another 9/11 would be to ground all aircraft. But as terrorist attacks are so rare, grounding all aircraft would be in most situations an extremely unreasonable trade-off.

A complicating factor in the debate on ministerial accountability is that not only collective decision-making in the EU but also the effects of globalisation have led to a significant loss of control for individual states. National governments are increasingly bound by international regulations, yet their ability to deliver at local level has decreased. Hence, national governments increasingly share responsibility for many issues with other levels of government and with private organisations.

Security at today’s international airports is a perfect illustration of this, as responsibility for security is often dispersed over many agencies and private contractors. Other institutions at local, national and international level determine the relevant security regulations, so the idea of full governmental control of a modern airport is illusory, and − as the liquids ban has demonstrated − institutions that conveniently bear no responsibility for it can profoundly influence the security situation.

Governments cannot be expected to protect their citizens at all times against the terrorist threat, so to relate ministerial accountability directly to incidents would be unrealistic. Terrorist incidents can, though, be the immediate cause of a policy review, and that’s where ministers have a vital role to play. They must decide whether the security measures taken actually improve real security, and whether the trade-off is balanced. In other words, does decision-making on internal security meet the right mix of political, legal, professional and economic requirements? If not, than ministerial heads should certainly roll.