The failed referendums on the constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands, along with the low levels of support for enlargement amongst EU citizens, are clear evidence of the crisis which the European Union is in. In Germany there are a number of different reasons for today’s mood of criticism and mistrust – some of them the result of political miscalculations and others the result of mounting worries over globalisation.

 

One of the reasons for German scepticism is the fact that many people believe that some of the 10 new member states joined the EU prematurely, on purely political grounds. Now the danger is that this mistrust of enlargement will be aggravated by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, since grave deficiencies still exist in both countries, in internal security in Bulgaria and with reforms that are not anchored firmly enough in Romania. People are concerned that the precautionary measures laid down in the constitutional treaty, together with stricter monitoring – which are preconditions for the German Bundestag's support for this round of enlargement – are inadequate to deal with such problems as the rule of law and the fight against organised crime and corruption. They are concerned that internal security challenges will be created that could have been avoided if both countries joined the EU only after having fully complied with the accession criteria. The EU’s decision to begin accession negotiations with Turkey has also significantly boosted German concerns about the Union’s lack of transparency and about its final geographical limits. When I point out to voters in my constituency that Turkish accession would mean the EU becoming a neighbour of Iran, Syria, Georgia and Armenia, their message is loud and clear: "That would no longer be our EU".

 

Concerns about competition from cheap labour in the new accession countries and frequently expressed annoyance over Germany's role as the EU's largest net contributor are also reinforcing German doubts about enlargement. These are concerns that must be taken very seriously, and we politicians need to be much more successful in explaining to people that of all the “old” EU states Germany has the most to gain economically from enlargement; that the number of immigrant workers is limited and that in this new era of globalisation, an annual German net contribution to the EU budget of €87 per head of population brings benefits in terms of economic, political and security policies.

 

Attempts to water down the stability pacts’s criteria for economic and monetary union have also aggravated German euroscepticism. The Germans were really only persuaded to give up the deutschmark because the Kohl government more or less dictated to its EU partners that they would have to accept Germany’s stability criteria, and Germany saw itself as the guardian of these criteria. Yet, when threatened with censure from Brussels, the Schroeder government did everything possible to increase the room for manoeuvre allowed by the criteria. This has led to difficult questions being asked once more about the single currency, so the clear commitment made by the Merkel government that it intends to stick to the stability criteria from 2007 onwards is important.

 

The present mood in Germany owes much, of course, to persistent doubts about the EU's ability to solve problems that are crucial the future – unemployment, slow economic growth, terrorism and protecting the environment. The same is true of doubts about whether we Europeans will be able to maintain our model of the social market economy and our beliefs regarding human dignity in the face of globalisation.

 

The prevailing mood is so sour that it will take much more than Europe-wide PR campaigns to enhance acceptance of the EU. And although explaining more effectively to people the advantages of the European integration process is clearly vital, it can only have a limited positive effect. Three things are therefore going to be decisive.

 

First people must be encouraged to see for themselves that much more than in the past the EU as a whole is better equipped than individual member states to tackle cross-border and even global challenges. This means that the EU, and especially its member states, must develop significantly more economic strength and modernity so as to deal with globalisation. That means flexible labour markets, a further opening-up of the internal market, more emphasis on R&D and steady improvements in levels of professional qualifications. The EU must also be more successful in tackling terrorism, international criminality and both environmental and energy problems. Measures that EU citizens can grasp at a personal level are needed, too, and some people are talking of a "Europe of projects" made up of such initiatives as:

 

Second, EU governments must stick much more consistently to the key decisions they have already taken and which form the basis for successful EU action in today’s increasingly difficult environment. This means, for instance, strict adherence to the EMU’s Stability Pact, and also would involve the EU fulfilling its own commitment that it will insist that all accession candidates comply strictly with all chapters of the acquis communautaire. No political discounts must be allowed.

 

Third, a genuine discussion is needed about the EU's absorption capacity. It would be wrong to see the answer to this question simply in terms of the fourth of the Copenhagen criteria. Instead, discussion of absorption capacity must involve a comprehensive examination of how the EU should develop further, and what direction this development should take. The EU's image of itself and the limits of the EU should help provide answers to these questions.

 

Last October, when they decided to launch accession negotiations with Turkey, EU foreign ministers formulated three sentences on absorption capacity. They stressed that the EU needed to be able to take in new members while "maintaining the momentum of European integration". They said that enlargement should "strengthen the process of continuous integration". And they stated that "every effort should be made to protect the cohesion and effectiveness of the Union".

 

This means that the EU must not be allowed to slip into reverse gear – moving backward in the direction of a union that is little more than a free trade zone, for instance. Not only must the current degree of integration be maintained, but Europe’s cohesion, effectiveness and ability to act must be enhanced so that the integration process is actually deepened. Great care will be needed to ensure that these far-reaching criteria are not watered down once again.

 

In December this year, the European Council is to examine the issue of absorption capacity on the basis of a Commission report. There are six criteria which I see as potentially useful to define more precisely the concept of absorption capacity in line with the criteria set out last October by Foreign Ministers.

 

Europe’s ability to act: The goal must be for the community, even after further enlargement, to retain its ability to take necessary decisions effectively and speedily. The provisions in the Nice Treaty are neither sufficient for effective and speedy decisions in a Europe of 27, nor for new members like Croatia to be absorbed. This means that if the EU is to continue functioning as an institution, it will not be able to absorb any new members after Bulgaria and Romania until the entry into force of the constitutional treaty. And in the light of experience so far on the constitutional treaty, we will have to examine whether an EU which has provided the states of the western Balkans with the lure of accession needs such further institutional reforms as extension of majority voting, revision of voting quorums, and acceleration of the work of Council working groups. This would also mean that the EU needs to allow different levels of integration; led by a group serving as the motor of European policy which would nevertheless remain open to other member states.

 

A clear division of competences: The goal must be to set priorities. The larger the EU becomes, the more it will need to focus on its core competences. People need to understand who is responsible for what, which tasks the EU should carry out and which it should not because they are better dealt with at national or regional level. An important step in this direction was contained in the constitutional treaty. In line with the principle that "less Europe is more Europe" we therefore need to examine more carefully which aspects of national sovereignty we wish to surrender, which we want to retain and which policy aspects we want to see returned to national level. We also need to ask ourselves whether European powers really do create added value for individual citizens and enhance their social security as well as the EU's internal and external security.

 

 

The capacity to finance itself: The goal must be for the EU budget to become more tightly geared to tackling the growing challenges of globalisation, whilst ensuring solidarity with the weaker member states. To this end, the planned 2008/2009 review of the EU budget should also help to advance a comprehensive and lasting reform of the structures of the EU financing system (through co-financing of agricultural spending, for example, and an end to the British rebate), thus enhancing the EU's absorption capacity.

 

The limits of the EU: The goal must be to create greater clarity regarding the limits of the EU. The perspective laid down in the constitutional treaty, which stresses that "the Union shall be open to all European states which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together" should apply in principle to all European countries including Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Yet the EU will need to decide each case individually, examining whether candidates have fully complied with the accession criteria, what the EU's current situation is and whether it can cope with taking in further members.

 

Foreign policy stability: The goal in future rounds of enlargement must be to ensure that the EU remains an "anchor of stability". Providing the prospect of EU membership for the western Balkan states is in the EU's security interests, providing these states are able to overcome their domestic and cross-national conflicts, so that NATO and the EU can fully withdraw their troops. If they meet all the accession criteria, especially those that concern the fight against organised crime, this will considerably enhance the security of the EU’s current members. But the prospect of the EU becoming a direct neighbour of Iran, Syria and Iraq as a result of Turkish accession raises serious questions for the EU's internal and external security, and these must be answered clearly, and on the basis of consensus, in advance of Turkey’s membership.

 

A common European identity: The goal in an ever-larger EU must be to reinforce the feeling of a common European identity, a feeling that it is "our" Europe. We must once again focus more clearly on the values the EU was founded on, and we must make it clear that our actions inside and outside the EU are based on these values. For example, our financial assistance for the Palestinians, EU development assistance, EU troop deployment in the Congo and our commitment to the Kyoto provisions are all based on these values. We can be grateful to Chancellor Angela Merkel for the clarity in her government policy declaration last May that "in our interaction with other religions and cultures it will be important for us Europeans to be able to clearly define our cultural identity. This is what others expect from us. How can we defend our values if we cannot define them first?" In this context, we need to look very carefully at the degree of diversity and social and cultural differences the EU can cope with if it is to comply with the principle that every round of enlargement should protect the EU's cohesion. It is an issue that must not be allowed to remain taboo.

 

Should the European Union decide due to conditions within the EU itself, that it is unable to accept an application for full membership by any particular state, this must not be a question of "all or nothing". Interim solutions and alternatives for closer ties, such as partial membership, privileged partnership or the concept of the European economic area, are also options which should be used.

 

Tackling the issue of the EU's capacity for enlargement is not about preventing new members from joining. It is a strategy aimed at greater acceptance of the European Union amongst its citizens, enhancing its capacity for action, improving its global competitiveness and thus enlarging the Union’s own capacity to accept more members.