INTERNATIONAL
Resurrecting Dostoyevsky’s dictum: Why Russia and Europe need each other
Summer 2007
Russia’s “passive isolationism” is a dangerous part of the country’s social mindset, warn Grigory Yavlinsky (far right), leader of the Yabloko party and its political advisor Victor Kogan-Yasny. It holds serious dangers for Europe too
Nation States are built on ethnic and territorial unity, and in some cases on a history of the monarch’s sovereignty. Their histories and their political development are grounded in a sense of collective identity. Empires, in which one nation dominates others, emerge when a strong and energetic group considers that existence inside its national borders is either risky or is not effective enough, and embarks on a forced expansion that is usually connected with large-scale violence.
Western Europe was only able to find another route for its development by as late as the mid-20th century, when Hitlerism lay in the past but Stalinism posed a very present danger. The western European political intellectuals of that epoch found their own positive answer to a difficult challenge; they realized that both nationalist and imperialist styles of development were totally unacceptable approaches to European long-term state building, and certainly didn’t fit the post-war European mindset. It thus became clear to them that European stability required a union of nations developed in an internally secure way, which both could and should expand, but would never be transformed into an empire. Western Europe’s political elite and its leaders were quick to adopt this position, and America’s “Euro-Atlantic” political thinking of that time, together with the Marshall Plan, contributed to it decisively. The Treaty of Rome, together with the setting-up of the totally separate Council of Europe spanning Eastern Europe too, accomplished a great legal, economic, political, but mostly philosophical breakthrough.
After much effort, and at great risk, a fundamental structural change took place in Europe some 30 to 40 years later. The failure of Soviet communism opened up entirely new opportunities, while at the same time western Europe’s "internal" development reached its full maturity, as exemplified by the Maastricht Treaty, then the Schengen Agreement, the launch of the euro, and, of course, the continued work of pan-European institutions despite the inevitable leadership changes.
The failure of Soviet-led communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union was a crucial turning point in the political reality of Europe. Western European politicians and intellectuals were challenged to devise a solid new paradigm for answering almost unprecedented questions of historical significance in politics and economics. Was this goal achieved? Unfortunately, we can still see even the more adequate answers as no more than part of the more important questions.
The collapse of the Soviet totalitarian system moved the world away from the brink of nuclear annihilation. The “borderline” situation, in existential terms, that had brought the most essential issues to the top of the political agenda, seemed at that time to have been resolved. But this optimistic view turned out to be naïve and short-sighted; following the end of the cold war some new form of pressure was needed to keep political thought and sound policymaking at the sort of level that would ensure these issues stayed at the top of the agenda. Obviously, this did not happen.
It is impossible to escape the feeling that after the great danger of Soviet communism had disappeared, the western Europeans and the Americans were eager to switch their strategic cold war perspective to one more oriented towards trade and commerce.
Those who were ready to seriously consider cooperation with Gorbachev’s Soviet Union in 1990, (and it’s worth noting that this was the same year as the Charter of Paris, the aim of which was the establishment of a pan-European political, legal and social entity, respectful of human rights, a “Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok”), had by 1992 begun to neglect and ignore Russia and all the other former Soviet republics with the exception of the Baltic states. Instead of initiating a partnership relationship with the peoples of the former Soviet Union, the West instead chose to pursue only a tactical relationship with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his post-Soviet bureaucracy.
The western leaders lacked the nerve to do two important things: first, to engage with the Russian people, along with the Ukrainians, in a spirit of full cooperation. Second, to openly condemn the anti-democratic, bureaucratic, and in some cases the imperialist tendencies of the new Russian state. Even mass violence, clear injustices and flagrant fraud in the system were overlooked. Western commentary on the new Russia was cynical and hypocritical, with statements such as "Yeltsin is good for Russia” and later “Putin is good for Russia”. The truth of the matter was that their style of authoritarian leadership was satisfactory in the eyes of the West so long as Russia’s problems were not exported. The war in Chechnya, violations of human rights and freedoms, and the authoritarianism that was justified by the exploitation of ambiguous “multipolar world” ideology − all these things were considered to be Russian problems and Russia’s alone. Even now, most political discussions in Europe focus mainly on the degree of state involvement in the Russian economy and the private sector and on the nationalisation of various industries.
In much the same way that the most primitive version of Marxism was used as a central doctrine, many influential experts after 1992 assume that at some point other political elements of the European system will develop spontaneously in Russia as a result of the implementation of free market ideas. This sort of thinking is based on the one-dimensional, over-simplistic model of the “bad totalitarian USSR” and the “bad, but not so authoritarian modern Russia”, with supposedly a “possibility of civilised democracy and market economy in the future”.
But humanitarian values have been the basis of post-World War II society in Europe. It is inconceivable that the same sort of civilisation will emerge in Russia out of the implementation of a free market system alone.
For the Soviet people, Europe and the West were primarily regarded as regions characterized by their respect for the individual, intellectual freedom and the dignity of human life. Their freedom to conduct business and earn a living was seen as only secondary. The USSR did not collapse for economic reasons; it was instead the slight lifting of the Iron Curtain that had revealed a different reality in which human life was actually valued by the state. This stood in stark contrast to the idea that the people were subordinate to the state, and could justifiably be suppressed if that would benefit it.
Many Russians currently view Europe and the West through the distorting lens of the market (in the most primitive Adam Smith-like interpretation), fierce competition (without regard to moral standards), individualism and pragmatism. Humanitarian values are viewed as a secondary and are often believed to be entirely lacking, existing only as part of western propaganda in praise of its own way of life.
The admission by the EU of 10 new member states in 2004 marked the beginning of a fresh chapter in European history, but did not necessarily illustrate a new pan-European strategy or a “renewed sense” of integration.
For the first time since its foundation in 1957, the EU when preparing for this huge enlargement was forced to face the question: how far in terms of politics, economics and culture do Europe's borders extend? Europe’s national leaders and the political elite could no longer rashly repeat that Europe is everywhere, and that European values like the rule of law, human rights and political transparency are social priorities and models of achievement.
A number of the philosophical critiques one can hear of the European Union, seem perfectly sensible. There are people who are afraid that unlimited enlargement will eventually transform the EU into a sort of empire − not in the model of the violent empires of the past, but an empire nonetheless because although it is free, peaceful and non-violent it nevertheless seeks to extend its own standards to everywhere else. Other political analysts have expressed the seemingly reasonable fear that these standards will be eroded, and that stability will decrease in a Europe that has become unduly large. In our view, however, most of these doubts about the peaceful expansion of western European standards are rooted in the fears of local elites that their own comfort will be threatened.
We believe that sooner or later Europeans should hammer out a consensus vision on the future expansion of the European Union. To do so may well be the only way to build a new kind of empire that is secure. This is, of course, a very different task from re-launching the constitutional treaty, fashioning new legislation and all the other matters that preoccupy the generally competent Brussels bureaucracy.
Does democracy have variable features, depending on different countries or regions? Naturally a state's history and local traditions have an undeniable impact on shaping its political culture, as do factors like the size of its territory and its climate. The infrastructure of civilization has an influence too. But the main aspects of democracy are universal and unvarying: freedom, the rule of law, respect for the dignity of the individual, and a generally humane. In our own country, these ideals were further supplemented by the thinking of Russian Christian liberals. They began their work in Russia's intellectual centres in the early 20th century, and continued in the West, after the forced expulsion by Lenin of many of Russia's non-Bolshevik philosophers, or in the camps of Stalin's Gulag.
Russia has, it is true, always been historically separate from western European tradition and from the “pan-European” style of nation-state civilization that emerged after the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. However, this division was far from absolute, and in the 19th century Western Europe, central Europe and Russia were closely linked as a united cultural and economic space. This space grew and developed in spite of religious diversities and the various political upheavals. Fedor Dostoyevsky noted that Russia needed Europe, and that Europe was the second Russian fatherland. At that time, Russia was also the “second fatherland” for western Europeans and for the western European conscience.
The relationship between the European Union and Russia is today much more "pragmatic", meaning that it is based on realpolitik and trade, which in turn eclipse the strategic perspective.
It addresses the standard of living differences between the two sides. Western and central Europeans no longer feel menaced by Russia, merely inconvenienced. On their side, the Russian people feel ignored by the West, which communicates only with the Kremlin rather than ordinary Russians.
The upshot is that these ordinary Russians are becoming increasingly isolated from the rest of Europe. The European Union’s ordinary EU citizens for their part, exhibit less and less interest in the Russians. Gas, oil and metals trading, is not the best way to build bridges between people. The sort of bridges needed have to be built of very different materials.
Both Russian and western European isolationists favour much the same harmful approach. Accustomed to authoritarianism and burdened by post-totalitarian complexes, the majority of people in Russian society are nonetheless not isolationist, nor anti-western nor anti-European. But passive isolationism, which is characterized by the concept that everything outside Russia seems somehow abstract, is an integral part of the Russian social mindset. This type of impasse thinking creates very great dangers for Russia, and is just as dangerous for its immediate neighbors and for the West
Human rights, democracy, and human values should be shared as a means to achieve a true partnership. In milieu of modern bureaucracies and businesses, it is difficult to speak in these terms. However, strategically, there is no way to avoid or sugarcoat the serious language that must be used in such dialogue.
There is still hope that the political future of Europe will not be one of risky “multipolarity”, but instead will be a wide community of cooperation based on the shared values of freedom and justice.
The Authors are grateful for the assistance of Stefanie Stilies in editing this text