POLICY DOSSIER

Summer 2007

by Klaus Brummer

Far from being able to boost the ESDP, a Franco-German-British “tri-rectoire” could be highly divisive, warns Klaus Brummer

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Europe’s finalité in the realm of defence is to achieve a “common defence” consisting of a fully integrated European command structure in charge of forces that are capable of covering the entire spectrum of conflict. This aim of common defence has become a familiar refrain of many of Europe’s leading politicians, not least of Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Common defence is also, let’s not forget, enshrined in the EU’s constitutional treaty.

There can be little doubt, then, that common defence is a sound objective that would bring with it a number of clear advantages. To begin with, no single European state will on its own be able to cope unilaterally with the security challenges and threats ahead. Nor are the latter confined to single members of the EU. On the contrary, common challenges and threats call for common responses. Besides, effective defence capabilities would also strengthen the continent’s leverage vis-à-vis other international players, not least the United States. Stepping up Europe’s capacities as a defence actor could help reinvigorate the transatlantic security alliance. Last but certainly not least, common European defence that rests on a common European defence market – thereby creating defence economies of scale and reducing inefficiency, waste and duplications – and so offers huge economic benefits.

That’s the theory; the reality is rather different. The road towards common defence is long and winding, and paved with roadblocks that will be hard to bypass. These obstacles include considerable national differences in interests, aspirations, capabilities and threat perceptions, and the desire of many countries to cling to national sovereignty.

The EU’s actual level of ambition is therefore considerably more modest than common defence. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is about crisis-management before, during and after conflicts. The build-up of capabilities along the lines of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 and the Military Headline Goal 2010 aims at enabling the EU to pursue its crisis management objectives. Having said that, issues that reach further to the core of common defence, such as a European army, missile defence or nuclear deterrence, are left untouched at the European level.

Despite member states’ reluctance to tackle the issue, the objective of common defence remains worthwhile. But, taking into account the obstacles, establishing common defence in one major leap seems impossible, so intermediate steps are required. Neither the internal market nor monetary union were built in a day, and common defence will have to follow much the same path.

One positive sign is that the field of crisis management, and hence the centre of EU’s present activities, has already left the national realm. Soldiers of EU member states are almost exclusively deployed in multinational operations, be it under an EU, United Nations or NATO flag. With the EU battlegroups (each 1,500+ strong) – as well as NATO’s Response Force (up to 25,000) – having reached full operational capability, this trend will continue. On paper at least, the EU also disposes of a 60,000 strong European Rapid Reaction Force.

Widening and deepening the “Europeanisation” of defence in crisis management as well as in other areas is pivotal for reaching common European defence. Additional as well as larger multinational European units that are led by further multinationalised command and control structures and equipped with jointly developed and procured capabilities would serve as first steps in that direction. The latter’s socializing effect on national defence cultures and decision-makers cannot be overstated. If positive as well as cost-effective results are accomplished through the combination and pooling of national resources, multinationalism creates trust and paves the way for allegiances and defence identities that transcend national boundaries.

To accomplish further Europeanisation, leadership will be crucial. Given the scope of the challenge a single nation would be overburdened by assuming the lead so a leadership group is needed. As the willingness to move forward must be matched with political clout and defence capabilities the major EU states move into focus. At first glance, the so-called “Big Three” – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – appear to be the “natural choice”. Among the EU-27, these three countries have the largest populations and the biggest economies. They are also the largest defence spenders in absolute terms. However, two major problems unfold with Big Three leadership. One is getting the three countries to agree in the first place. The other is the potential divisiveness of such a “tri-rectoire” for the EU.

For starters, how to get France and the UK to agree? The impetus the St Malo summit of 1998 gave to the creation of ESDP demonstrates the potential of Franco-British “entente”, but it did not last very long. This is deplorable as France and the UK are probably the two countries among the EU-27 that are most willing to act in security and defence. This will to action is underpinned by capabilities and a strategic vision that extends well beyond Europe. However, the respective strategic visions seem to point in opposite directions. While the UK strives primarily for maintaining the special relationship with the United States, France advocates multipolarity and a Europe puissance, not least to curb US influence in global affairs.

As irreconcilable as they might appear, there is no alternative but to bridge those opposing views. The insight stated above – no European country can cope on its own with the future security and defence challenges – also holds true for France and the UK. The changes in leadership in both countries might be the opportunity for reinvigorating the Franco-British relationship. With the two countries appearing to grow increasingly impatient with the defence endeavours of their European peers, they should neither complain nor turn away. Instead, they should take the lead.

A Franco-British rapprochement would be highly attractive for Germany, which is still constrained by its past. But also because of Germany’s preference for incrementalism, and its underdeveloped strategic vision of security and defence. Germany has shown little inclination to become a driver for ESDP, and its narrow ESDP agenda during its EU presidency focused primarily on the implementation of what was already on the table. Germany is nevertheless much in favour of further developing ESDP, so if countries like France and the UK were to trigger an initiative for enhancing European defence cooperation, Germany would most probably join the process.

This leads to the other problem with Big Three leadership: legitimacy, or rather the perceived lack of it. Even though an agreement among France, the UK and Germany on a common defence project would be attractive to many EU members, that’s not true of them all. Italian criticism on the Big Three’s handling of the Iranian nuclear row was a small example of Italy’s displeasure at being left out. Big Three leadership clearly has the potential to seed division inside the Union.

In short, the Big Three are not enough. To sidestep looming division and increase legitimacy, France, the UK and Germany must win over other countries from the outset. Getting more than three countries to agree will prove all the more intricate as their differences multiply, but at the same time, if leadership rests both on numbers and greater legitimacy, its foundation must be expanded.

“ESDP6” might turn out to be the most promising formula for the Europeanisation of defence. As “G6”, France, Germany and the UK along with Italy, Poland and Spain are already pushing European cooperation in internal security affairs. Provided there is political will, they could do the same for defence. Of course, building common defence needs more than informal and non-binding discussions that characterise the exchanges of the G6. Another question is how to pursue leadership when the Nice Treaty, for lack of the constitutional treaty, prevents differentiated integration in ESDP and thus the formation of a “defence core” within the legal framework of the EU.

Here, another lesson can be learnt from the field of internal security. The envisioned incorporation of the Treaty of Prüm into the EU framework, which aims at stepping-up cross-border cooperation to combat terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, presents one of the major strides in recent years. In 2005, the seven signatories of the treaty agreed on ambitious objectives particularly concerning the exchange of information that would not have been acceptable among all EU members at that time. Like Schengen, the Prüm process started outside the EU framework, yet it contains two “openings”; one for the accession of other EU countries, the other for the incorporation of its provisions into the legal framework of the Union. Both openings pave the way for legitimacy that the process might have lacked when it was initiated.

Two conclusions for common defence can be drawn from this. First, if a lack of unanimous support and options for forming a core inside the EU mean that the leadership group’s ambitions cannot be pursued within the EU framework, the process should be started outside it. Second, those countries that are not included from the outset should not oppose the process as long as it remains open to new members and explicitly aims at becoming integrated into the EU.