If the typical Swedish election process is a calm event, the one of September 2006 was even more than typically Swedish. Still, and to the surprise of many foreign observers, who saw the figures of solid economic performance, it led to a government change. The explanation to this might lie in some fairly simple factors. One of them is that the opposition parties were for once united. The Moderates, the Liberals, the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party, presenting themselves under the name of Alliance for Sweden, published documents outlining their common policy on the essential issues. Furthermore, Fredrik Reinfeldt, new leader of the Moderate party and also of the opposition, had skilfully moved to the middle and found new voters. In all the energetic opposition leader compared favourably against the slightly tired Prime Minister, Göran Persson, having held his position for 11 years. An after-election comment also among some social-democratic voters was that change was healthy for democracy.
Issues centred on welfare, school issues and unemployment, the latter being high for Swedish standards, considering the economic boom. Security and defence issues were conspicuously absent, which was deplored by some but not surprising. First, many of the issues were generally endorsed, and, second, to the extent that this was not the case, this division was not according to party lines and therefore not very suitable for election debates.
The four parties do not share views on all issues – the Liberals and the Moderates are for example more positive to NATO membership than the other two. Since public opinion is strongly for continued non-alignment there is at the moment no possibility for a change and the problem may therefore rest. Consequently the government declaration presents Sweden as a non-aligned country without mentioning any future possible change. However, like the previous government the alliance has stated that they see it as more or less self-evident that Sweden helps an EU country or a Nordic country in need.
The static view on non-alignment is, however, not representative for the new government’s European policy as a whole. The outspoken wish is to be part of the core of security and defence policy in Europe. The ambitions of the former government in participating in ESDP operations (Sweden having participated in all of them this far) are endorsed by the new one. Still the number has fallen to 800 men and women in international operations, far below from the early nineties and the new government in its first Government Bill, has added to the budget in order to allow for 2000 persons being simultaneously on duty in international missions.
The ambitions are underlined also by the appointment of ministers with strong views on an active Swedish participation – former Prime Minister Carl Bildt as Foreign Minister and former EU Parliamentarian Cecilia Malmström as Minister for Europe. Both ministers have spoken up for strong efforts that should be done by Sweden. Foreign Minister Bildt in a radio interview speaking about the relations to NATO has, however, seen the greatest difference in the way these issues are discussed – whereas the former government worked closely together with NATO, it had what he called a Berührungsangst in speaking about this cooperation. His own recent proposal is that Sweden, rather than buying expensive aircraft for transportation tasks, should join the NATO pool.
One area where Sweden is likely to meet opposite views within the EU is in the strong endorsement of continued enlargement of the European Union. Not only should the western Balkans and Turkey be included. In due course Ukraine, Moldova and a democratic Belarus should also be given the possibility to become EU members.
So what does this make of Sweden? Much of the same perhaps – a strongly endorsed and at the same time largely irrelevant non-alignment combines for the government with the feeling that Sweden should be where the action is, whether it is peace enforcement with EU in Africa, ISAF with NATO in Afghanistan or arguing for the general ideas of civilian crisis management and the continued soft security of enlargement.