COMMENTARY

Summer 2007

by Christian Wagner

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François Godement is right to stressing that Europe must intensify its relations with Asia. The economic rise of China and India will have far reaching consequences for Europe. Not only will Asia be the economic powerhouse of the 21st century, it will also be the world’s most conflict-prone region, with nuclear powers that haven’t signed the non-proliferation treaty, intense rivalries, lingering territorial disputes and terrorist threats that range from militant religious fundamentalists to left-wing radicals. As Godement points out, these developments will all have a profound impact on Europe’s security.

At first sight, Europe and Asia’s major powers share the same perceptions of most security challenges. The European Security Strategy identifies terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and regional conflicts as the main security threats. These aspects are also regarded as the main security challenges by China, Japan and India. Moreover, most Asian countries prefer multilateral strategies to unilateral actions when trying to deal with international problems. These similarities offer some room for closer cooperation between Europe and Asia, and although the ASEM process may not be a perfect forum, it is a starting point in this kind of interregional dialogue. With the inclusion of India, ASEM is the only institution so far with the long-term aim of representing Asia.

The idea of extending Europe’s foreign and security policy to Asia also presents problems. Given Europe’s limited foreign policy resources, greater concentration would seem to be needed if this is to be successful. Europe’s “expectation credibility gap” is already a problem that needs to be narrowed rather than broadened. Europe is unlikely to provide the hard power capability to cope with Asia’s various regional security challenges, and even a soft power approach requires capabilities that are still seriously undeveloped.

Europe will not be in a position to pursue its interests in Asia on its own but has to look for potential partners. The EU-led Aceh monitoring mission was a positive example, as the deployment of a European force to monitor the implementation of the Aceh peace agreement in cooperation with ASEAN members showed that common crisis management can work well. A much more negative example was the withdrawal of EU observers from the Sri Lanka monitoring mission in 2006 after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was listed as a terrorist group.

The debate about an emergence of a “Beijing consensus” shows the necessity for Europe to develop a more coherent strategy for its official development assistance. Otherwise, Europe runs the risk of being pushed to the sidelines. From that perspective, Europe’s present engagement with China should be complemented by a coherent strategy to develop similar relations with Japan and India. The rise of China and India will also have an impact on global institutions. Europe should therefore develop a strategy to bring both countries closer to existing global governance structures. If China and India intend to become global economic players, then they should recognise that also means being stakeholders in international affairs.

Europe’s soft power rests on its ability to transform economic linkages into peaceful political relationships. Asia’s regional economic organisations should be supported in any efforts to develop similar structures. The EU’s collaboration with ASEAN (Association of Southern Asian Nations) is an important step to strengthen these developments, and Europe’s new observer status in SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), along with China, Japan, and the United States, shows the interest of the international community in promoting regional cooperation in this conflict-prone part of the world. Strengthening regional institutions within Asia and establishing regional and inter-regional governance structures there will also strengthen Asia-Europe relations.