INTERNATIONAL

Spring 2008

by Alexandros Petersen / James Rogers

European countries must genuinely beef-up their defence and security commitments if they are to safeguard their global interests, say James Rogers and Alexandros Petersen. Calling for an EU Security Council that would develop these efforts, they also urge a renewed EU-US alliance

In 1897, Britain’s vast empire celebrated Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee. It marked the apogee of British power and the height of Pax Britannica. The Royal Navy locked the world under an imperial order not seen before or since; British coaling stations, forts and outposts were peppered across the globe. After witnessing one of the great parades in London, a New York Times reporter spoke with pride of the United States being a part of “Greater Britain”.

Many believed Britain’s power to be almost eternal, and that the empire would continue to grow. Yet in hindsight such confidence was clearly mistaken. British power was already fading fast and Germany, Russia and the United States were snapping hard at its heels. By 1900 Britain’s thirst for imperial glory dried up with the horrors of the Boer War, and in the two World Wars, it would be forced to draw on the resources of its former colony, the US.

Last year, we witnessed another great anniversary, the fiftieth birthday of the European Union. There were no celebrations involving military reviews or outpourings of pride. The event was a rather dour affair marked chiefly by the somewhat downbeat Berlin Declaration and a group photograph of the EU’s heads of government. In many ways, this was unfortunate: The Union has helped transform the European continent, bringing order where there was discord, and democracy where there was repression. Warring enemies have become solid friends, providing world leadership in many areas, from human rights and the environment, to technology and finance. It can be argued that Europe has not been so geopolitically integrated since the height of Imperial Rome.

Yet in many respects it might well be 1897 all over again. It has often been said that Britain enforced the United States’ Monroe Doctrine in the Victorian era, keeping the Americas free from European imperialism. Today, the roles have simply been reversed. Since 1945, western Europe’s defence has been upheld by America and NATO, and the current global order − on which Europe depends − rests on the defensive umbrella provided by the United States. Our age is structured under Pax Americana. The fleets of the US navy keep shipping lines open across the globe, and its airpower has replaced Britain’s battleships in keeping hostile enemies at bay and by instilling awe into potential adversaries.

While European “civilian power” has helped to transform a war-torn continent into a haven of peace, the United States has provided the global environment in which this has been able to flourish. But just as in 1897, today’s world order could also be under threat. Given Europeans’ dependency on that order for their prosperity, they must now take a greater responsibility in upholding it. Just as Wilhelminian Germany and Tsarist Russia came to challenge Edwardian Britain, now a myriad of new continental giants are fast emerging. This is not to say that the catastrophes of the past are going to repeat themselves, but rather that China, India and a newly resurgent Russia, perhaps joined by others like Brazil and Indonesia, will become increasingly confident in challenging the status quo. And dangerous autocracies like Iran and North Korea continue to fester, while a number of states are on the brink of failure or combustion.

As these new powers become more assertive, American might will be pulled in many directions. But unlike in the 19th and 20th centuries, the great geopolitical struggles of the future will not be centred in the heart of Europe, but rather in Asia and the broader Middle East. When Pax Britannica began to break down in the early 20th century, it was replaced by multipolarity on the European continent. The coming challenges to American power will point to the emergence of a new multipolarity, this time on a global scale. This new order is likely to be less stable and more dangerous than any before it, particularly when several of these poles may well hold superpower status. A world where Europe, America, China, India − and to a lesser extent, Russia and Brazil − struggle for influence and resources may not be a very orderly one.

What will this all mean? First, in a world dominated by continental giants, no single European country will count for much − this applies as much to Britain and France as to Luxembourg and Denmark. The sheer size and potential of the new giants means that Europeans can achieve much more together than they can alone. As such, the Union’s 50th birthday came at a prescient time. If continental peace was Europe’s mission in the last century, becoming a fully-fledged global power must be its goal now. This means that the importance of the new Treaty of Lisbon cannot be overstated. The Union needs more coordinated, efficient and effective institutions to represent, defend and extend European interests in the wider world. Much has already been achieved − and will be taken further with the Treaty − but future developments rest primarily on Britain and France. They are Europe’s leading military powers; they have the continent’s most advanced strategic thinking; and they have most to lose, along with Germany, should the world system take a turn for the worse. Therefore, following on from the “European Security Strategy” of 2003, it will be Britain and France’s responsibility to project more of their assertive “global power” thinking at the European level. And it will be Germany’s duty to accept a more military-oriented and global approach to an EU foreign and security policy.

Second, Europeans must get real. As Machiavelli warned, it is all very well to be loved, but it is also necessary to be feared. At a time of rising military expenditure in China and Russia − and amongst a plethora of lesser powers − Europeans cannot look the other way. Europe must uphold its capacity to defend its communication routes and protect its partners and allies. What would Europe do if extremists hijacked aeroplanes and flew them into Canary Wharf, La Defense or central Frankfurt? What would Europe do if a foreign government was found to have provided those terrorists with support? In such an uncertain world, the need for higher European defence spending and military integration, and the merging of the European defence-industrial base, has never been greater. Now NATO finds itself operating as a global stabilisation force in places like Afghanistan, Europeans must assist by strengthening their armed forces and beefing up their homeland defences.

The time has therefore come to consider a European Union Security Council. This might seem far-fetched, and may well not emerge for many years, but it is clear that such an institution is needed. For Europe to gain more global influence it will need a central institution that can analyse threats and challenges to its security so that remedial − even preventative − action can be taken. Foreign policy and security analysis is at present undertaken in the Council of the European Union’s General Secretariat and the Office of the High Representative Javier Solana, with other work contributed by the EU’s Institute for Security Studies in Paris and by the comparatively new European Defence Agency. The job of the proposed EU Security Council would be to synthesise all this information and draw-up strategies for Europe’s foreign, security and defence policies.

The Security Council should become home to the brightest strategic minds in Europe, and would be directed by a high-profile figure authorised to confer with EU member states’ intelligence agencies and their foreign and defence ministries. It would produce a more structured and coherent European position on security and defence, as well as liaising with NATO where necessary. The Security Council would give guidance to the European Council and the Council of Ministers where appropriate, therefore developing the concept of “permanent structured cooperation” as outlined in the new Treaty of Lisbon. It could, on the one hand, become an intelligence exchange for EU member states, operating under tight security procedures and, on the other hand, it could help tackle the EU’s “democratic deficit” problems by communicating foreign, security and defence policies to the general public. Far from undermining NATO, the new Security Council would help to foster a stronger strategic culture at the European level, which might in turn create a more robust and military-oriented approach in Europe to external problems.

The third point to be made is that Europeans need to become more assertive, both in their new neighbourhood and further afield. This will demand a far more strategic approach to foreign and defence issues, and a willingness to get tough and “contain” any governments that oppose Europe’s security, energy and economic interests. Europe cannot afford to have unstable countries on its borders. It must therefore make a strong commitment to greater links with, and better governance in, the Black Sea region and Central Asia. A small step in the right direction has been the EU’s Central Asia strategy, which advocates greater European engagement with the former Soviet states.

It is, needless to say, vitally important that Europe not turn its back on the United States. Each remains the most important ally of the other. Recent opinion polls suggest that a high percentage of Europeans now see the US as one of − if not the most − dangerous threat to global security. This view is the product of simple self-indulgence on the part of many Europeans, and jeopardises their own security. To view countries such as Russia and Iran less negatively than the United States is absurd, especially when those countries have directly threatened EU member states in recent years. America, for its part, has shown an unwavering commitment to Europe since 1945, and the bonds built up during those years must not be allowed to wither. This does not mean that Europe should always tow Washington’s line, but rather that there has to be greater realism and understanding on Europe’s part.

Without developing much greater military strength, Europeans will find themselves progressively marginalised. They will discover that the system they depend on for security and commerce will come under mounting pressure if they leave to their American ally the lonely task of upholding world order. A weak Europe and a strained United States serves the interests of neither partner, so Americans should offer their full support and encouragement to a stronger and more integrated Europe. Should both sides fail to do so, Europeans and Americans will not so much drift apart but find themselves aimlessly at sea in the same boat.