What should we do about NATO? The security needs of its members on both sides of the Atlantic call for an agenda for change. But what might that agenda look like?
First, let’s look at the present state of affairs in NATO. Opinions differ sharply, with some people declaring that NATO is dead and others arguing that it is nowadays more effective than ever. NATO is certainly more active than before; who would have thought 15 years ago that NATO would deploy troops in the Balkans, run a reconstruction operation in Afghanistan, or give airlift support to the Organisation of African States mission in Darfur? Nobody, yet against all odds NATO is doing these things and has begun to leave its Cold War agenda behind it.
But all this doesn’t necessarily mean that NATO is tackling the most important things that need to be done. The alliance is in a very real and deep crisis, despite its hyperactivity. The 1990s were a time of strategic holiday, when we celebrated the demise of the threat that the USSR had represented to all of us. We in NATO became confident that we were powerful enough to intervene and put an end to all civil and ethnic conflicts, if we so decided.
The problem as we now know is that the 1990s were also a time when a new enemy was preparing to strike a fatal blow. The 9/11 attacks were not so much the outbreak of hostilities as a revelation that instead of living in a benign world we are now facing a new existential threat. Not just because terror became mass terror, but because this was a brand of Islamist terror that had a clear strategic vision that is incompatible with our way of life.
September 11, 2001 represented a revolution for NATO. Traditional concepts like containment and deterrence were no longer viable. To rely on the sort of passive defences that had been NATO’s deterrent for four decades or more would put at risk the lives of far too many of our citizens. But going on the offensive and taking preventive measures was something that NATO was not prepared for.
Change takes time and is usually a painful process. So it has been with NATO. For the first time in its history the alliance activated its own Article 5, which says an attack on one of its members is an attack against all, but in practice NATO did little. It was left to its members to cooperate bi-laterally with the US in “Operation Enduring Freedom”.
Some say that it was at that time impossible for NATO to do anything tangible on a major scale, as it had neither the assets nor the means. Others point to America’s own reluctance to replicate the same sort of war by committee that we had seen in Kosovo. It is a debate that is still open. In any case, as we saw throughout the Iraq crisis, NATO’s lack of commitment is not always due to a lack of military capability but to deep political and strategic divergences between NATO members. Of course the European allies should spend more on defence, but bridging the capabilities gap won’t automatically resolve the crisis inside the alliance.
NATO is in crisis because some of its members believe we are at war, and others do not. The former say we are facing an enemy that has declared war on us in a conflict where stalemate is not an option. But the latter think that the Islamist radicals, extremists, jihadists and terrorists do not represent an existential threat to the Western world. They see political Islam as a phenomenon to be dealt with by intelligence services and police forces because they believe its activists should be seen as criminals rather than warriors. I myself believe that we are facing a mortal enemy, and I think it is wrong to see Islamist terrorists as a problem that can be contained.
So here is the NATO paradox: NATO is perceived to be everywhere, because it is almost everywhere, yet the sense of vulnerability and insecurity among its members’ citizens is growing. Put another way, is it acceptable for politicians in Europe to go to the public and argue for the multi-deployment of NATO in far away places, while people are being blown apart in trains and buses on European soil? NATO was created to increase the security of its members and to protect our freedom and prosperity. Then it was somehow re-created and reinvented in the 1990s and its focus was moved beyond European soil to try and keep the peace on our eastern periphery. Now it is time to re-think what NATO is for.
Not everyone agrees. Many still seem quite happy with the NATO we have today. That is because some want it to evolve into an acceptable tool-box for organising coalitions of the willing; others because they hope that NATO’s political relevance will pass into EU hands. Just a few minor adjustments are what is needed, say both groups.
I strongly disagree because what NATO needs is bold transformation; we have to reinvigorate it, revamp it and re-launch it. To start with, NATO must become the venue where its members express clearly that we are liberal democracies committed to collectively defending our freedom and values as well as our own strategic interests. We should all be proud of what we are, and we should not bow to pressure from terrorists or their ideologues to renege on our heritage and principles. NATO cannot be an aseptic and value-free institution.
Second, NATO members must recognise the fact that we need an organisation for our collective defence, because we are under attack outside our borders as well as within them. We have now been attacked several times and the enemy offensive is not going to stop unless we counter-act it accordingly. The happy days are gone when we thought that we were free from external threat, so NATO must do what it has always done, which is to secure our people and our interests. Jihadism has replaced communism, as communism replaced nazism, as an existential threat to the liberal democracies. I believe NATO should recognise this new environment in a new Strategic Concept.
Third, we must accept that it is impossible today to draw a clear line between international security and internal or homeland security. One of the main proposals of the report “NATO: An alliance for freedom” that I and my colleagues at the Partido Popular’s new FAES think tank in Madrid have produced is that NATO should develop a homeland security dimension. I propose that interior and homeland security ministers should in future meet within the framework of the North Atlantic Council, together with their foreign affairs and defence counterparts. It is inconceivable that NATO should not serve as a meeting point for those responsible for homeland security and defence simply because of bureaucratic or corporate vested interest. NATO must become the meeting place for all who are responsible for guaranteeing our security, whatever their ministerial portfolio. The alliance should consider the idea of creating a functional command to deal specifically with counter-terrorism.
Fourth, terrorism is not limited to just a few isolated acts of cruelty and violence. It is much more; it is the tip of the iceberg of a radical and extremist Islam that amounts to global insurgency. It is a global phenomenon that cannot be separated from the problem of nuclear proliferation; we know that some Islamists are willing to kill as many people as they can. That is why an effective counter-terrorism policy must be global and must take into consideration counter-proliferation measures. It is also why any effective counter-terrorist strategy must be collective, because the battlefield has become truly global and multi-dimensional. No nation, not even the US, can prevail on its own in this struggle.
NATO is the best collective organisation available to the western democracies facing this challenge. Not the NATO of today, but a new NATO. The alliance must expand its geographical scope, and that is the second major change proposed in the FAES report. NATO enlargement has so far been focused on central and eastern Europe, but now it is time to change direction. What NATO needs is to expand to better reflect the nations that are willing and able to cooperate in eliminating the threat of Islamist terror. We propose that the next enlargement process would open NATO’s doors to countries like Japan, Australia and Israel, and also to build a strategic partnership with other nations in the forefront of fighting terrorism, such as Colombia.
Other proposals include the idea that NATO should transform its Mediterranean Dialogue into a Partnership for Freedom, where cooperation would be linked to the promotion of political freedom, economic liberalisation and religious tolerance in North Africa and the Middle East.
A number of changes must also take place in the internal functioning of the alliance. For years we have been discussing the difficulty of managing an ever-growing membership. It is time to move beyond unanimity and consensus in the decision-making process. NATO should borrow the EU’s concept of constructive abstention to allow the alliance to move forward when a majority of nations so decides.
I myself very much support the idea of creating a common fund to finance NATO operations. NATO cannot fall into complacency just because it is more active than ever. The essential value of the alliance is to increase the security of its members, and if they cannot count on it for that, NATO will be in deep trouble.