COMMENTARY

Spring 2007

by Marcin Zaborowski

RELATED ARTICLES:

---

The central thesis of Werner Weidenfeld’s argument is that the rise of India and China will lead to the recasting of transatlantic relations and it is not only absolutely correct but is also already happening. There can be no doubt that for Washington the relative importance of transatlantic relations has declined; Europeans visiting Washington are quickly made aware that the EU no longer attracts much attention there. European officials find it increasingly hard to meet their American counterparts, seminars on transatlantic relations in the US attract a dwindling number of (mostly Democrat) pro-European diehards, while a meeting with, say, a Chinese Minister is guaranteed to attract a (mostly young and diverse) crowd. In the eyes of the Washington establishment, it is not Europe but India, China and the developing world that are worth getting excited about.

I agree with Weidenfeld’s thesis that Europe needs to unite if it is to count on the global stage. To achieve this, the EU must first concentrate on its internal reform, and so move forward on the stalled constitutional treaty, and it must do so first and foremost on the provisions that relate directly to EU foreign policy. After all, these were not among the reasons the treaty was rejected in the Dutch and French referenda.

As the EU matures into a global player, its views on international issues, including the rise of China and India, will inevitably differ at times from those of the US. The debate about the EU embargo on arms sales to China shows that this has already begun to happen. The EU’s decision on whether to lift the embargo has been delayed for the time being, and the US remains staunchly opposed to any European policy change on this, while the EU is concerned that if it does so it might seriously undermine any chances of a post-Iraq transatlantic rapprochement.

It has been argued that the EU’s decision on this issue will be of more symbolic than practical significance. The issue is of course highly symbolic for EU-China relations, but it is also important for the EU itself and its emerging role as a foreign policy actor. The EU’s suspension of its arms embargo decision is widely interpreted by both the Chinese and the Americans as evidence that the Union lacks both a strategic perspective and the ability to act independently vis-à-vis China. But transatlantic considerations in this decision seem exaggerated, if not misjudged. America’s equally close allies Israel and Australia are selling arms to China, and so far that has not led to significant friction with Washington.

The arms embargo has been a major focus of the transatlantic debate on China, but there seems little doubt that the issue’s importance has been blown up out of all proportion. On the majority of East Asia issues, the positions of the EU and the US are very close. Like the US, the EU is interested in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwanese issue and in preventing any risk of instability in East Asia. The EU is also as concerned as the US about the link between China’s energy investment and its leniency towards Iran and Sudan. And like the US, the EU considers some of China’s economic practices to be protectionist and it takes a similar position on the Chinese currency, demanding that it be allowed to appreciate in value. Finally, the EU shares and fully supports the US’s demand that Beijing should crack down on intellectual property piracy.

Although similar, the interests of the EU and the US regarding China are not identical. Unlike the US, the EU is not militarily present in East Asia and does not represent an important element of the balance of power in the region. China’s military modernisation clearly bothers the US, but that is not true of the EU, which tends to see it as a natural consequence of China’s growing international status. The US debate focuses on the rapid growth in China’s defence spending, while Europeans point out that even if China spends twice as much every year as the $35bn it declares, this is still a small fraction of the Pentagon’s annual budget of over $500bn.

Nor do Europeans always share America’s security assessment in the region; they are unwilling to participate in the “China-hedging” strategy. As the EU further develops its foreign policy role, and as its political presence in East Asia grows it seems inevitable that currently minor transatlantic differences over East Asia will become more apparent and perhaps more consequential. But it is far more important that Europe and the US should continue to share the view that a stable, prosperous and internationally responsible China is in their common interest.