EUROPE
Let’s build on neighbourhood policy with an EU-backed "Commenwealth"
Summer 2006
How should the EU approach the increasingly vexed question of its future enlargements? Former Greek Defence Minister Ioannis Varvitsiotis MEP argues that a loose structure based on Britain’s post-imperial Commonwealth offers a no-cost, no-risk solution
When the EU launched its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), it was with the aim of associating itself more closely with the countries that surround it, both to the east and to the south. The idea was for the Union to define its borders rather than to exclude its closest neighbours from politico-economic development and co-operation.
But although we are still at the very beginning of the ENP, we must remember that it is a policy with institutional foundations; if it were limited to co-operation and aid for these neighbours, that would never be enough to meet their aspirations. We need to create an institutional framework to make our neighbourhood policy instruments more attractive and useful for our new partners. In years to come, any candidate facing insuperable difficulties in its bid to join the EU could instead envisage participation in the ENP because that would be both politically and economically worthwhile.
My suggestion, then, is that as an extension of the ENP we in the EU should constitute a European Commonwealth for Freedom and Prosperity; It would be an improved and more elaborate version of the "British" Commonwealth, and it would place the EU in pole position for bringing peace, freedom and prosperity to the region.
This European Commonwealth would be composed of countries neighbouring the EU that are already part of the ENP, but they would have a "special relationship" of reinforced co-operation among themselves and with the Union. There would be a customs union with the EU in addition to the provisions of the ENP, and there would be a new financial instrument integrating the TACIS and MEDA programmes. The free movement of these neighbours’ citizens in EU countries and participation in EU decision-making bodies and the single currency would not be on offer. But they would nevertheless benefit from important financing in such fields as infrastructure, energy, transport and the environment. There would, for example, be no need for visas for their citizens to travel in the EU, which is a new element in relation to the ENP.
The economic and other advantages of this "special relationship" with members of the Commonwealth will be particularly important in terms of their "third country" status, adding up to a substantial motivation for participation without being comparable to the advantages of full EU membership.
The Commonwealth would have a parliamentary body composed of representatives of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliament for the Mediterranean countries, the national parliaments of the other countries and the European Parliament. It would meet twice yearly to deal with issues of economic development, social convergence, security and defence and common values within the Commonwealth and elsewhere in the world.
The Commonwealth Parliament's decisions would be of an advisory nature, but they could constitute the basis of decision-making at the level of the national parliaments of Commonwealth members, and also of the European Council and the European Parliament, in accordance with the various constitutions of both these states and the EU itself. Commonwealth countries would, needless to say, be obliged to maintain peaceful relationships among themselves and with EU members. To be in confrontation with either a Commonwealth or EU member would naturally spell rejection from the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth could be up and running quickly, once the institutional framework is established. Within a decade it could integrate the countries of the Mediterranean – Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Syria, the Palestinian Authority and Israel – if they wished to join. The pre-requisites for participation would be much the same as those requested by the European Union under a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or under Euro-Mediterranean co-operation.
The strategic advantages of this European Commonwealth include the fact that it would provide a valuable alternative if the full integration of an applicant country into the EU encountered serious problems. If an applicant country does not manage to integrate, or if some member states were to reject its membership following a referendum, it would still be able to join the Commonwealth. The alternative of Commonwealth, instead of Union membership would help defuse political pressures inside an applicant country and in the EU, too.
The Commonwealth would have further strategic value by providing an open door for the countries on the European periphery to come together quickly and safely with the Union itself. This would lead to the creation of an ensemble of EU neighbouring countries with a European orientation that would enlarge the EU’s economic area, strengthen its security and increase its international prestige and influence. And it would do so without additional economic costs and without harming existing internal equilibriums. The Commonwealth would, furthermore, help to definitively regulate EU’s ongoing dilemma between continuous enlargement and its need for closer integration. It would allow consolidation of the Union with its 25+2 members without obstructing future enlargement because newcomers would be incorporated into the Commonwealth. In my view, it offers a solution to a number of familiar problems, and at the same time would reunify us and strengthen us without cost or risk.