The main lesson that the European Union should learn from its internal division during the Iraq war is that when it is divided it lacks the capacity to influence the United States. Neither Tony Blair’s policy of automatic alignment, which was supported by a group of EU states, nor the policy of opposition of France and Germany, which closely reflected European public sentiment, had any influence on decisions taken in Washington. What remains to be tested is the influence on US decisions that a united Europe might have, one that speaks with one voice and preserves its autonomy. For many throughout Europe, European unity would have forced the US to seek a solution to the Iraqi question within the framework of the UN. The war in the Lebanon and Gaza shows that even when it comes to questions affecting its neighbourhood about which there is great consensus in Europe, the Union has yet to realize that division is its main weakness.

 

The kind of international system that reflects Union values is one based not on unilateralism or a multi-polar balance of power, but rather on an efficient multilateralism of the kind that can resolve the big international questions and, as in Dayton, that can impose peace and protect the fundamental rights of civilians. This is what it should be doing in the Middle East and in Darfur.

 

The reform of the UN is fundamental in this regard, not just of the Security Council (UNSC) but also in terms of consecrating of the principle of UN humanitarian intervention. Without this kind of change, there will be circumstances in which the EU will have to intervene without a clear mandate from the UN to prevent crimes against humanity (as it should have done in Bosnia and Rwanda). But such interventions require that certain conditions be fulfilled, including legitimisation by a regional organisation, the exhaustion of all diplomatic efforts, and the urgency of the need for intervention, which should be led by the UN as soon as possible, as it was in Kosovo. It was under such conditions that Portugal supported the intervention in Kosovo.

 

Seen from Lisbon, the reform of the UN should mean giving Brazil and other regional powers a role in the UNSC. Some have also called for German membership of the UNSC, but this is not the same as asking for Brazilian membership. The issue is one of representation and will not be solved by bringing in another European state. German membership could actually dilute the drive to affirm the Union as a multilateral actor. Germany is the most multilateral of the state of the EU, and it can only benefit from supporting EU action in the UN and EU membership of the Security Council, particularly as the presence of the Union in the UNSC would constitute a major reinforcement of EU foreign policy, its capacity to speak in one voice, and of multilateralism. But for the EU to take on such a role, it would first be necessary to ratify parts I and II of the European Constitution, the parts that give the EU a real juridical identity and establish an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs.

 

In conclusion, either EU foreign policy will be multilateral or it will not even fully exist. European integration was promoted precisely to quash power politics. And the multilateral order depends heavily on the ability of the Union to take a fully active rule in a global reorganisation and in the multilateralisation of US policy.