LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Spring 2007

by Stephanie Babst

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Sir,

Julian Lindley-French is a renowned Atlanticist and his article argued convincingly that Europeans and Americans need − and will continue to need − each other. But it is also no secret that Washington is sometimes unhappy with NATO’s consensus machinery. The US would like to see Europe becoming more ambitious in reaching out to global partners and, perhaps more importantly, providing a greater share of military forces and capabilities in Afghanistan. On balance, though, the transatlantic relationship is in good shape. So while Julian argues that Americans are “stuck” with NATO out of weakness, it is equally possible to argue that the US sticks with NATO to maximise its strength.

Second, Julian speaks of the need for a “new Franco-US strategic consensus”. But the transatlantic consensus on security reaches far beyond French and American viewpoints. Allies old and new often hold different opinions across the whole gamut of alliance-related issues. So it is all the more remarkable that in practice NATO continues to produce consensus on a challenging transformation agenda and has become a multi-faceted security provider in recent years.

Third, the recent NATO Summit in Riga demonstrated that many European leaders will continue to insist upon a UN mandate for alliance operations. It is a domestic political imperative in Europe, regardless of any alleged US desire to by-pass an uncooperative Security Council.

Fourth, many – perhaps most – American commentators have long regarded a strong NATO as a manifestation of US strength rather than weakness. Indeed, the fleeting and now discredited idea that US strength could be maximised when exercised alone reflected a mistaken understanding of the nature of power in a globalised world. Following President George W. Bush’s visit to NATO headquarters in early 2004, the US has re-emerged as a full and active player within the alliance.

But there is a deeper issue here. Some argue that the transatlantic alliance continues to be relevant only because it represents the most efficient way for Europeans and Americans to pursue mutual self-interests. If NATO interfered with either party’s interests, then it would become irrelevant. However, this argument overlooks one key factor. A healthy transatlantic alliance is in itself a vital interest for the West. NATO is the embodiment of that shared interest and therefore cannot merely be a conduit for national or regional security policies.

What the so-called doctrine of “structural interventionism” lacks is a meaningful discussion of the two key things that hold the alliance together: common values and shared threats. It would be mistaken to view concerted NATO action as a means to maximise the allies’ power. Rather, NATO allies choose to act in concert because they recognise that only a strong transatlantic partnership can effectively confront today’s trans-national challenges of terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and instability exported by failed states.

I am not saying that NATO is beyond the influence of power-relationships. But NATO operations in Afghanistan, Darfur, Kosovo and elsewhere are most certainly designed to engender geopolitical stability rather than geopolitical advantage. Claiming that NATO’s operations in, say, Afghanistan constitute an exercise in self-interested power projection is a bit like saying that putting up stop signs at a crossroads is a form of imperialism. It may well be. Although doing so serves not only western interests, but everyone else's interests too.