Never mind the nitty-gritty, it’s time for global “Grand Visions”

Europe’s leaders have a habit of oscillating between the practicalities of getting things done and ‘Grand Visions’ for Europe, with the emphasis on pragmatism. The times for grand visions tend to be when things are not going well, Europe now faces such a time. The financial crisis has been more penetrating than originally expected and European economies are now slipping into recession. Leif Pagrotsky’s call for “unglamorous, gritty, everyday economic work” is therefore contrarian. With hard times upon us, Europe’s leaders would usually think in terms of bold advances.

There are in fact signs that hard times are stimulating Grand Visions. But they are not about Europe’s architecture. They are about global architecture. The institutions set up at the end of the World War ΙΙ are looking extremely dated. We already have a call for a “Bretton Woods ΙΙ” to reform global financial structures, and with other parts of the international system also under stress, such as with the WTO’s Doha round on global trade liberalisation, doubtless the calls will grow louder.

A focus on global architecture is a challenge for Europe. On the one hand, Europe can be a source of ideas for the reforms. On the other, having spent much of the last decade criticising U.S. “unilateralism”, Europe cannot go it alone in promoting its own views. Equally, having extolled the virtues of a multi-polar world, Europe cannot complain if the reform of global structures means that Europe’s weight at the top table will be reduced by the arrival of new powers like China and India.

An emphasis on global institutions and global rule-making will pose a challenge to Europe in another sense. Europe will be seen for what it is – a regional arrangement that is in many fields a second best to global arrangements. It can position itself as the intermediary between the many small European states and the global level, and it can also position itself as the main European vehicle for shaping new global rules. But there is a difference between the rhetoric that goes in this direction and the reality. The reality is that Europe may find itself squeezed between more assertive nation states and more appropriate rule-making venues at higher levels of governance.

There is a further sense in which the discussions on the reform of the architecture and institutions for global rule-making will put Europe on the defensive. Global rule making faces two fundamental difficulties. One is a democratic deficit – people have little idea how global rules are made or where they come from, and cannot influence them even if they want to. Secondly, there is a managerial deficit. The bodies set up at the end of the World War ΙΙ with their universal membership for all countries of the world have become politicised, and include many members who enjoy the perks but do not in any sense contribute to the work. Europe has little to offer in respect of how to solve these problems, but solved they must be. It is all too well known that Europe suffers from its own democratic deficit and its own managerial deficit.

Leif Pagrotsky has written off Grand Visions too quickly. They will soon be on top of us. For a change they will be about a global vision, not about Europe. In the second half of the 20th century the Grand Project of the era was the rebuilding of Europe. The Grand Project for the start of the 21st century is the rebuilding of global structures.