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MATTERS OF OPINION |
Germany is top of the pops
Germany is widely thought to be better led than other western countries, according to the results of a Gallup survey. Half (51%) of the EU citizens judged its leadership to be superior to that of France (41%), the UK (39%) and of the George W. Bush administration (a lowly 20%). In the Commonwealth of Independent States, composed of Russia and a number of former Soviet republics, there was 47% support for Germany – although Russia came out top with 62%.
The poll (2Q-3Q, 2008) was conducted against a background of deteriorating relations between Germany and the West: the crisis over Georgia, Russia’s worries over Ukraine’s bid to join NATO and its protests over American plans to site anti-missile installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. During this period, Chancellor Merkel did much to shape the EU’s policy towards Russia.
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Russia's actions over Georgia have of course affected EU-Russia relations, ensuring that they are now under closer scrutiny than ever. The in-depth examination of EU-Russia relations published on 5 November last year included a substantial contribution from the Commission. It highlighted the interdependence of Europe and Russia, with Russia now the EU's third largest trading partner after the United States and China, and the EU by far Russia's number one trading partner. The investment figures are also impressive: EU member states account for 80% of foreign investment in Russia, and 80% of Russia's own investments abroad are in EU countries. To put these figures in context, though, it’s worth pointing out that EU investments in Russia are a mere 15% of what Europeans invest in the United States.
Energy interdependence will continue to be pivotal to economic relations between the EU and Russia, with the stakes high for both parties. More than 60% of Russia's total oil and gas exports are earmarked for the EU, and, from our standpoint a quarter of all our oil imports and 40% of our gas imports come from Russia.
We in Europe will continue to share common interests with Russia in the face of international security challenges that range from peace in the Middle East to relations with Iran, cooperation at the United Nations and global climate change, not to mention such challenges as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the propagation of contagious diseases.
The EU, needless to say, is prepared to pursue constructive dialogue with Russia on all these topics. But in the light of this brief synopsis of the importance of good relations between the EU and Russia, we now need to identify those areas that demand more attention.
The EU should work with Russia on a pragmatic and sober basis, taking the country as it is rather than wishing to see it transformed. At the same time, we must be clearer on the commitments we expect Russia to make.
It is important that the negotiations that resumed last November on a new version of the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia should significantly change the relationship. Strong and effective institutional arrangements that will ensure good governance are fundamental to the new agreement as EU-Russian relations are too often clouded by emotions stemming from a common history that is both rich and painful. This could yet jeopardise our future strategic partnership by preventing us from resolving problems on a day-to-day basis. A distinction should therefore be made between the historical debate that needs to be conducted at an academic level, and the pursuit of our mutual political interests. As Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev said in Berlin last June, "an honest academic debate" is needed on the events of the 20th century, even though it must be said that the openness of this debate was somewhat compromised last December when the authorities in St Petersburg seizing the archives of Memorial, the human rights organisation holding details of the victims of the Gulag.
Which brings me to the question that is so often raised of whether we have "shared values". We certainly share commitments in the areas of human rights and democracy; Russia is a member of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and of the Council of Europe, and is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights and by the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Which means that we in the EU see no room for compromise on Russia’s adherence to the rule of law or its respect for the principle of territorial integrity.
Two things are key to cooperation in the EU’s common neighbourhood with Russia: bi-lateral relations of both with the countries of Eastern Europe, the Black Sea region and central Asia should be furthered, and any new initiatives should be in the context of the "Eastern Partnership". These must offer real advantages such as those envisaged in the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy. The Georgia crisis sent shockwaves through the EU, prompting it to step up its efforts to find long-term solutions to the frozen conflicts that are acting as a brake on political, economic and social progress.
The Eastern Partnership is intended to signal the EU’s commitment to working with all its neighbours. But that in no way means it should therefore be interpreted as a sign of hostility towards Russia. However, Russia's new foreign policy recommends a return to the concept of spheres of influence – something that is unacceptable to the EU. We need to be clear on the principles that maintain peace and stability on our continent, such as respect for independence, the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. Theories of zones of influence or zero-sum games are derived from the outdated diplomatic approach that underpinned so many of the conflicts that wracked Europe in the past. President Medvedev's proposal on a new security architecture in Europe highlights the need for a debate on this subject, although first there needs to be agreement over how this debate would be set up.
In the area of economics, the EU and its partners must continue to work together to integrate Russia into the global economy, and into organisations of multilateral economic cooperation like the WTO and the OECD. The obstacles to Russia’s WTO membership are no longer technical but political. Russia must make up its mind on whether it wants to join the WTO, because that holds the key to its future economic diversification and to creating a more welcoming environment for foreign investors in Russia.
On energy, we need to monitor energy security conditions in Eastern Partnership countries. Last August’s events in Georgia heightened awareness of the EU’s need to revise its energy policies; although security of supply was not affected, we have seen how vital it is to secure energy transit through the Caucasus and the trans-Caspian corridor, and to seek new suppliers in Central Asia and the Middle East. The EU Strategic Energy Review presented last November, and the Commission’s communication in December on developing an eastern European partnership, contained a number of proposals on these issues.
Fundamentally, Europe and Russia must tackle these issues together. In the long term, the EU hopes to establish a strategic partnership whereby it will work with Russia to diversify and modernise its economy and increase its energy efficiency and innovation. The EU will remain Russia's natural partner in these areas.
For Russia to continue with the process of international engagement the only way is to address its deeply-rooted structural problems, which include the need to create a genuinely independent judiciary. Russia will therefore have to define itself politically with greater clarity, coherence and above all credibility. The financial and economic crisis now engulfing us brings this need right to the fore.
But Russia cannot aspire to a greater role on the international scene while failing to ratify the conventions or protocols of the major multilateral institutions to which it is a party. Various conventions of the Council of Europe and UNESCO as well as the European Energy Charter offer examples of this state of affairs. By the same token, Russia's accession to the WTO will be critical to showing its commitment to international compliance, including its bi-lateral relations with the EU.
In sum, it would be futile to think that Russia can aspire to being a strategic partner of the EU, while continuing with policies that maintain the status quo. Both sides want a strategic partnership, but for the EU this implies that technical and trade matters must be settled without becoming political issues, so that attention can be paid to the bigger picture. It would be desirable for the EU and Russia to implement this shared vision in their new partnership agreement, so the time for making choices about the future direction of EU-Russia relations appears to have arrived. |